Britain’s Future in Europe: The known Plan A to remain or the unknown Plan B to leave.  CEPS Paperback 2nd Ed., March 2016 by Graham Avery, Graham Avery et al.

Britain’s Future in Europe 
 
“Emerson and his fellow authors deserve congratulations for 
producing a book that uses hard evidence to set out the arguments 
with clarity and common sense”.  
Tony Barber 
Financial Times 
“An absolutely invaluable resource for anyone concerned with 
Britain’s evolving relationship with the European Union.”  
Anthony Giddens 
former Director of the London School of Economics 
and member of the House of Lords 
“In the finest tradition of British pragmatism: a much needed 
injection of common sense and seriousness into the British debate 
on Europe.”  
François Heisbourg 
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris 
“This is a comprehensive and cogent analysis of the British 
government’s review of EU competences. While the government 
was reluctant to draw conclusions from its own review, the CEPS 
researchers are bolder.” 
 Charles Grant 
Director of the Centre for European Reform, London  
“This extraordinarily fair-minded and balanced book is a myth-
busting exercise of the best kind. Meticulously boiling down every 
single European policy field to its very essence, the authors (one of 
Europe's leading think tank teams) are replacing misperception and 
misrepresentation with sober facts and sound assessments. What 
they offer is a non-romantic, no-spin, jargon-free, no-hyperbole 
guidebook to the Brexit debate, highly useful for everyone who 
wants to navigate this fateful question with a cool head and clear 
vision.” 
 Jan Techau 
Director of Carnegie Europe 
  
 
The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) is an independent 
policy research institute in Brussels. Its mission is to produce sound 
policy research leading to constructive solutions to the challenges 
facing Europe. 
The views expressed in this book are entirely those of the 
authors and should not be attributed to CEPS or to any other 
institution with which the authors are associated, or to the European 
Union, or the government of the United Kingdom. 
The first edition of this book was published in March 2015 
before Prime Minister Cameron had set out his precise requests for 
negotiation with the European Union. It was however after 
publication of the British government’s ‘Balance of Competences 
Review’, which was a major source for the first edition. 
This second edition is published following Cameron’s 
negotiations that were concluded on 18-19 February 2016, and after 
the announcement of the 23 June 2016 date for the referendum to 
remain in or leave the European Union. It contains an analysis of the 
results of these negotiations and of possible scenarios for secession 
should the referendum result in a majority vote to leave. The 
original text of the first edition is reproduced here unchanged.  
The authors are most grateful to the Open Society 
Foundations for their kind support for this project. 
  
 
 
 
Britain’s Future in Europe 
  
 
  
Britain’s Future in Europe  
 
The known Plan A to remain 
or the unknown Plan B to leave  
 
 
Edited by  
Michael Emerson 
Contributors 
Graham Avery 
Miroslav Beblavý 
Arno Behrens 
Steven Blockmans 
Hugo Brady 
Michael Emerson 
Daniel Gros 
Alzbeta Hájková 
Karel Lannoo 
Adam Łazowski  
Jorge Núñez Ferrer 
Steve Peers 
Michael Wriglesworth 
 
 
 
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels 
Rowman and Littlefield International, London 
  
 
Published by Rowman & Littlefield International, Ltd.  
Unit A, Whitacre Mews, 26-34 Stannary Street, London SE11 4AB 
www.rowmaninternational.com  
 
Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd. is an affiliate of Rowman & 
Littlefield 
4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706, USA 
With additional offices in Boulder, New York, Toronto (Canada), and 
Plymouth (UK) 
www.rowman.com 
 
Copyright © 2016 Centre for European Policy Studies 
 
Centre for European Policy Studies 
Place du Congrès 1, B-1000 Brussels 
Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11  
E-mail: info@ceps.eu 
Website: http://www.ceps.eu 
 
The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of 
this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 
1988.  
 
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form 
or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information 
storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the 
publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. 
 
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data 
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library 
 
ISBN:  978-1-78660-070-7 Paperback 
 978-1-78660-071-4 Ebook 
 The paper used in this publication meets the minimum 
requirements of American National Standard for Information 
Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, 
ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992. 
 
Printed in the United States of America 
 
 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
About the Contributors x 
Glossary xi 
Preface xiii 
Executive Summary 1 
Part I. The known Plan A to remain or the unknown Plan B 
to leave 7 
1. The known Plan A to remain 7 
2. The unknown Plan B to leave 11 
Plan B.1 – A clean break, ‘big bang’ Brexit 13 
Plan B.2 – Remaining in the EU’s single market and 
customs union 15 
Plan B.3 – Negotiating with the EU and the world at 
large 17 
The UK’s status in world affairs 36 
A final point - short but grave 38 
Part II. Questions 39 
3. What is the Balance of Competences Review? 39 
4. What are the EU’s competences? 41 
5. What are the underlying issues? 43 
Part III.  Evidence 45 
6. Core single market policies 45 
6.1 Single market overview 45 
6.2 Free movement of goods 48 
6.3 Free movement of services 52 
6.4 Free movement of capital and financial services 56 
6.5 Free movement of people 60 
6.6 Competition and consumer policies 65 
6.7 Foreign trade and investment 69 
7. Sectoral policies 72 
7.1 Transport 72 
7.2 Energy 76 
  
viii  
7.3 Environment and climate change 81 
7.4 Agriculture 87 
7.5 Fisheries 91 
7.6 Food safety and animal welfare 95 
7.7 Public health 98 
7.8 Digital information rights 100 
8. Economic, monetary and social policies 104 
8.1 Economic and monetary union 104 
8.2 Social and employment policy 111 
8.3 Cohesion policy 114 
8.4 EU budget 118 
8.5 Taxation 122 
9. Justice and home affairs 125 
9.1 Fundamental rights 125 
9.2 Civil judicial cooperation 130 
9.3 Police and criminal law cooperation 135 
9.4 Asylum and non-EU immigration 138 
10. Education, research and culture 142 
10.1 Education, vocational training and youth 142 
10.2 Research and space 145 
10.3 Culture, tourism and sport 148 
11. External relations 150 
11.1 Foreign and security policy 150 
11.2 Development cooperation and humanitarian aid 155 
11.3 Enlargement 158 
12. General issues 162 
12.1 Voting, consular services and statistics 162 
12.2 Subsidiarity and proportionality (S&P) 166 
Part IV. Conclusions 171 
13. By groups of policies 171 
14. By reform, renegotiation, or repatriation 178 
15. Contemplating secession 187 
Appendix  Balance of Competences Review - Schedule of 
the British government’s work 201 
Index 205 
 ix 
List of Tables, Figures and Boxes 
 
Table 1. Summary of Balance of Competence findings 172 
 
Figure 1. UK economic performance relative to the eurozone, 
1993-2016 110 
 
Box 1. Measures decided by the European Council on 
Cameron’s four points 8 
Box 2. A warning on the Swiss model 20 
Box 3. Main chapters in the EU’s typical trade and cooperation 
agreements 24 
Box 4. EU preferential or free trade agreements 30 
Box 5. The competences of the European Union as defined 
in the Lisbon Treaty 42 
Box 6. Administrative Burden Reduction Plus Programme 
(ABR+): priority simplifications 181 
Box 7. A cosmopolitan London narrative 183 
Box 8. Secession procedure in Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty 187 
Box 9. Statements by business leaders on the prospect of Brexit 196 
 
 
 
x  
ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS 
Michael Emerson, Associate Senior Research Fellow, Centre for 
European Policy Studies (CEPS) 
Graham Avery, Senior Member of St. Antony’s College, Oxford 
University 
Arno Behrens, Research Fellow, Centre for European Policy Studies 
(CEPS) 
Miroslav Beblavý, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for European 
Policy Studies (CEPS) and Member of Parliament in Slovakia 
Steven Blockmans, Senior Research Fellow, Head of EU Foreign 
Policy, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), and 
Professor of EU External Relations Law and Governance, 
University of Amsterdam  
Hugo Brady, Visiting Fellow, London School of Economics 
Daniel Gros, Director, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) 
Alzbeta Hájková, Assistant to Miroslav Beblavý at the Slovakian 
parliament 
Karel Lannoo, Chief Executive Officer, Centre for European Policy 
Studies (CEPS) 
Adam Łazowski, Professor of EU Law, University of Westminster 
Jorge Núñez Ferrer, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for European 
Policy Studies (CEPS) 
Steven Peers, Professor of Law, Essex University 
Michael Wriglesworth, Associate Senior Research Fellow, Centre 
for European Policy Studies (CEPS) 
 xi 
GLOSSARY 
BIT Bilateral Investment Treaty 
BSE Mad cow disease 
CAP Common Agricultural Policy 
CBI Confederation of British Industries 
CCCTB Common Consolidated Corporation Tax Base 
CEPS Centre for European Policy Studies 
CfD Contracts for Difference 
CFP Common Fisheries Policy 
CSDP  Common Security and Defence Policy 
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy 
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union 
CODEC Coalition for a Digital Economy 
CRD Capital Requirements Directive 
DCFTA Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement 
DEVCO Development Cooperation (Directorate General of the 
European Commission) 
EBA European Banking Authority 
ECB European Central Bank 
ECHO European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil 
Protection department  
ECTS European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System 
EEA European Economic Area 
EEAS  European External Action Service 
EFTA  European Free Trade Association 
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment 
EQF European Qualifications Framework 
ERA European Research Area 
ERDF European Regional Development Fund 
ESA  European Space Agency 
ESF European Social Fund 
ESFS European System of Financial Supervision 
ESMA European Securities Markets Authority 
ETS Emissions Trading System 
xii  GLOSSARY 
 
EURODAC European Dactyloscopy (fingerprint data base) 
EUROSUR European Border Surveillance System 
FDI Foreign direct investment 
FIFA Federation Internationale Football Association 
FP7 7th Framework Programme (of the EU for research) 
FTA Free Trade Agreement 
FTT Financial Transaction Tax 
GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
IPCC International Panel on Climate Change 
IoT Internet of Things 
MERCOSUR South American Common Market 
MRPQ Mutual Recognition of Professional Qualifications 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
OMC Open Method of Coordination 
QMV Qualified Majority Voting 
REACH Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction 
of Chemicals 
REFIT Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme 
SIS Schengen Information System 
SME Small and medium-sized enterprise 
SRM Single Resolution Mechanism 
SSM Single Supervisory Mechanism 
S & P Subsidiarity and Proportionality  
TEU Treaty of European Union (Lisbon Treaty) 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(Lisbon Treaty) 
TRIPS  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights 
TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
UEFA Union of European Football Associations 
UKIP United Kingdom Independence Party 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change 
VAT Value Added Tax 
VIS  Visa Information System 
WTO World Trade Organisation
 xiii 
 
 
PREFACE 
t is one year since the first edition of this book was published. At 
that time, Prime Minister David Cameron’s precise requests for 
negotiation with his EU partners were still unknown. Nor was 
the date of the pledged referendum known, except that it had to be 
before the end of 2017.  
A year ago, however, the government had concluded the 
preliminaries, with publication of the results of its exhaustive (30-
volume) enquiry into the workings of the European Union. This 
“Balance of Competences Review” was a unique and admirable 
piece of professional work, spoiled only by the government’s refusal 
to summarise it in a document that the public could be expected to 
read, or even to draw the political conclusions that the evidence 
warranted. On the other hand, their failings left the door open for 
others to do precisely this, which was the purpose of our first 
edition. 
This second edition retains the content of the first edition, but 
adds new chapters to bring the story up-to-date. Cameron duly 
submitted his requests for renegotiation to his European partners in 
November 2015, and by February 2016 an agreement was reached 
at the European Council under the four headings of Cameron’s 
requests. The referendum date was then set for 23 June 2016.  
The terms of the February agreement, adding to the status 
quo of opt-outs and other special deals, have become the Plan A to 
be accepted or rejected. The government has insisted that there is no 
Plan B to handle the case where the referendum might produce a 
majority vote to ‘leave’. Nor have the advocates of secession 
published any operationally defined Plan B. This leads into the most 
important and hazardous democratic deliberation the British people 
have had to confront in many decades, namely to choose between a 
I
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‘known something’ and an ‘unknown something else’. The gravity 
of this predicament is why this second edition devotes the larger 
part of the new chapters to trying to fill out the choice.  
Our thank are due to Roderick Abbott, Steven Blockmans, 
Jacques Pelkmans, Jean-Claude Piris, Marius Vahl, Guillaume Van Der 
Loo and Steven Woolcock for their helpful comments on this second 
edition. 
We also thank Anne Harrington, Els Van den Broeck and 
Jackie West at CEPS, and Sarah Campbell and Alison Howson at 
Rowman & Littlefield International, for their valuable editorial 
assistance. 
Finally, we are greatly indebted to the Open Society 
Foundations for supporting the project. 
 
Michael Emerson 
Brussels, March 2016 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
Stage 1. Evidence on the Workings of the EU 
The British government began its approach to settling its ‘European 
question’ by launching in 2012 the most comprehensive-ever 
assessment of the workings of the European Union, called the 
Balance of Competences Review. This initiative took two years to 
complete. By July 2014, some 32 volumes (3,000 pages) of analyses 
were published, distilling the evidence submitted by over 1,500 
independent sources. 
The central question posed in the Review was whether or not 
the competences (i.e. legal powers and responsibilities) of the 
European Union are excessive. The evidence submitted identified 
no instance where there was a case for repatriation of a competence 
at the level at which they are defined in the Lisbon Treaty (leaving 
aside questions about the euro and the Schengen area, which do not 
apply to the UK).  
Most of these competences are shared with member states, 
which means that the detailed balances are open to adjustment over 
time and in the light of experience in either centralising or 
decentralising directions.  
The evidence produced by the Balance of Competences 
Review showed in fact that the sharing of competences between the 
EU and the member states has mostly been refined through years of 
negotiation and experience to the point of reaching plausible 
balances.  
The argument that the European Union is ‘unreformable’ was 
shown to be simplistic and untrue. 
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On the contrary, the reform and policy improvement agenda 
– past, present and future – is evident in almost every policy 
domain.  
The EU now gives increasing priority to weeding out 
unnecessary ‘red tape’, with a new top-level appointment at the 
European Commission to oversee this effort, which corresponds to 
a key British demand.  
The amount of EU-based legislation adopted by national 
parliaments needs an objective perspective. A thorough study 
conducted by the House of Common showed that 6.8% of UK 
primary legislation and 14.1% of UK secondary legislation had a 
role in implementing EU law, in marked contrast to allegations 
made in various political speeches citing figures as high as 75% – 
without referencing any serious source.  
The UK attaches the highest priority to the single market, and 
has since the 1980s played, and continues to play, a major role in 
shaping its reform. As a result, the number of EU laws passed each 
year saw a high peak in the 1980s and early 1990s when the single 
market was being completed with strong British support. However, 
these numbers have declined by two-thirds since then. 
The UK works as a promoter of more effective and enhanced 
(not diluted) EU policies in key single market sectors where there is 
important work in progress. These include, notably: 
- the single market for services, across the board, 
- financial markets,  
- energy and climate change and 
- the digital sector. 
Two much criticised sectors have undergone major reform: 
- fisheries, with key reforms in 2013 and 
- agriculture, 
In the case of agriculture, reforms in the 1990s saw a radical 
shift from production support to decoupled income support 
(ending ‘butter mountains’, etc.), and leading on to a continuing 
decline in its share of the EU  budget. 
There are two other areas where the UK has been successful 
in advancing key interests, namely: 
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- higher education with the Erasmus+ programme and 
- winning a large share of EU research grants. 
The UK has already negotiated or re-negotiated huge opt-outs 
or special arrangements for those EU policies that it does not want 
for itself. These include, notably: 
- Opt-out of the eurozone, not only of the euro currency, but 
also from coercive elements in broader macroeconomic and 
fiscal policy coordination procedures. The UK thus stands 
aside from the hugely important ongoing issues of systemic 
reform and macroeconomic regulation of the eurozone. 
- Opt-out of the Schengen area, thus retaining control of its own 
borders, and now protecting itself from an influx of refugees 
from the Middle East on the crisis scale observed in the rest of 
the EU. 
- Opt-out of the domain of justice and home affairs, except for 
the possibility to pick and choose what elements it wants to 
opt back into. 
- In the past it has opted out and then back into various social 
policies. 
- A special rebate on budgetary contributions, compensating 
for low farm-subsidy receipts. 
In specific policy areas where the UK is concerned not to see 
erosion of its sovereign national powers, there are unanimity 
safeguards to prevent this. These include, notably: 
- foreign and security policy and 
- taxation. 
Stage 2. Negotiations and the Referendum 
The findings of the Balance of Competence Review, while given 
little publicity by the government, seem to have influenced strongly 
what Prime Minster Cameron finally requested of his European 
partners for renegotiation. Repatriation of competences did not 
appear. Reform became the keynote. In November 2015, after 
months of informal consultations with his European partners, a set 
of moderate requests were presented under four headings: 
Economic Governance, Competitiveness, Sovereignty and 
Immigration. After intense negotiations an agreement was reached 
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on all four points at the European Council on 18-19 February 2016. 
Immediately afterwards the date for the referendum to ‘remain’ or 
‘leave’ was set for 23 June 2016.  
The scene is thus set to clarify the consequences of this 
seemingly simple choice: in or out.  
The ‘remain’ choice (Plan A) is fully known, consisting of the 
status quo, as marginally improved under Cameron’s four points. 
These improvements could only be marginal because basically the 
UK is already ‘in’ what it likes (the single market and a full role in 
foreign policy and political affairs), and ‘out’ of what it does not like 
(the euro and Schengen), and has special deals on other important 
matters (the budget and justice and police cooperation).  
Plan B, or the terms of secession, in the immortal words of 
Sherlock Holmes, is “the dog that did not bark”. The ‘leave’ choice 
is unknown territory, since it has not been specified by the 
secessionists beyond vague statements like regaining freedom from 
Brussels and being able to engage in freer trade with the world at 
large. Since the posing of a choice between a ‘known’ and an 
‘unknown’ is a big hazard in democratic deliberations, this study 
does some homework that the secessionists have been unable or not 
wanted to do. Three Plan Bs are defined, which span a range of 
views.  
Plan B.1 corresponds to one popular sentiment to get out 
simply and fast, with a clean break on Day 1. This would mean 
scrapping all EU law, including all its international agreements, and 
thus create initially a huge legal void that would be unthinkably 
catastrophic for the economy. No British government would 
conceivably do this. Consequently, there can be no quick clean 
break.  
Plan B.2 consists of quitting politically while staying within 
the single market and/or the customs union, and thus minimising 
economic disruption. This could be workable, since the mechanisms 
already exist and have been tested with some other non-EU 
countries. The problem here, however, is that it would mean still 
taking on a lot of EU policy without having a say in its making, i.e. 
a loss of sovereignty compared to Plan A (‘no say, still pay’, as some 
have dubbed it). 
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Plan B.3 therefore sees the UK trying to negotiate the best 
possible deals with the EU and its international trading partners. 
This however becomes a very messy prospect, with years and years 
of negotiation lying ahead in a climate of uncertainty over the 
outcome. The UK’s preferred deal with the EU would aim at 
maximum freedom of action including an end to the free movement 
of people, but at the same time retaining maximum continued 
access to the EU market for goods and services. Negotiations with 
the EU towards this end, however, would be very problematic, 
encountering predictable objections to this ‘cherry-picking’ 
approach. As a result, the UK economy would risk losing both its 
two ‘crown jewels’ – namely the preeminent position of the City in 
financial markets and the UK’s rank as the preferred location for 
foreign investment aimed at the EU market. Moreover, the idea of 
the UK replacing the EU’s international free trade deals with 
something better and faster is an illusion, since major trading 
powers will continue to view the EU as their priority, as our analysis 
shows in some detail.  
The overall conclusion is that all three Plan Bs fail to come up 
with something preferable to Plan A, as a matter of cold calculation 
of concrete costs and benefits.  
To this should be added the certainty that under all the Plan 
Bs the UK would lose status in international affairs in the eyes of the 
rest of the world. It would also inflict huge damage on the entire 
European project that has for half a century delivered peace and 
prosperity to the continent, a seemingly miraculous achievement 
after the preceding half-century of the worst hell that the modern 
‘civilised’ world ever witnessed.  
Last but certainly not least, Brexit could also destroy the UK 
itself, leading quite possibly to Scottish secession, alongside the 
risks also of unsettling the peaceful status quo of Northern Ireland 
in relation to the Republic. 
 
 
  
 7  
 
PART I. 
THE KNOWN PLAN A TO REMAIN OR 
THE UNKNOWN PLAN B TO LEAVE 
1. The known Plan A to remain 
The status quo for the UK in the EU has been described in detail in 
the first edition of this book (and reproduced elsewhere in this 
second edition). The comprehensive survey of the workings of the 
EU’s present competences that are relevant to the UK (i.e. mainly 
the single market, while excluding the euro and Schengen policies), 
produced abundant evidence from independent sources showing 
that  the sharing of powers between the EU and its member states 
was mostly ‘about right’.  
Cameron’s negotiations for a better deal with the EU 
crystallised around his requests under four headings. This resulted 
in a unanimously agreed Decision made at the European Council on 
18-19 February 2016 covering all points, as summarised in Box 1.1  
The Decision first recalls the existing set of special 
arrangements from which the UK benefits: - opt-out from the euro - opt-out from the Schengen area - opt-out from most provisions in the field of police 
cooperation and judicial cooperation over criminal matters, 
with the possibility to opt-in selectively at any time - exemption from the Court of Justice ruling on the application 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
It might have added the special budget rebate from which the 
UK and some other member states benefit.  
                                                        
1 For the complete text of the Decision, see www.consilium.europa.eu/en/ 
meetings/european-council/2016/02/18-19/ 
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As a result of these special arrangements, the UK is already 
out of those EU activities that it does not like, while remaining in 
those that it does like, namely the single market and general political 
deliberations. This amounts at the strategic level to what has been 
called ‘having the best of both worlds’, in and out at the same time.  
 
Box 1. Measures decided by the European Council on Cameron’s four 
points 
1. Position of non-eurozone member states  
 Discrimination between euro and non-euro economic actors 
prohibited 
 Eurozone measures to respect the internal market of EU as a 
whole 
 Banking union open to non-euro member states as an option 
2. Competitiveness 
 Better regulation, lowering of administrative burdens 
 Repeal of unnecessary legislation, with an annual review 
mechanism 
 Ambitious trade policy towards the US, Japan, Latin America 
and Asia-Pacific 
3. Sovereignty 
 Ever-closer union of peoples not a legal basis for extending 
EU competences 
 All member states do not have to aim at a common 
destination, with recognition that the UK does not want 
further political integration 
 Role of national parliaments enhanced with a new ‘red card’ 
mechanism (55% of vote trigger)  
4. Social benefits and free movement of workers 
 Safeguard mechanism, restricting non-contributory in-work 
benefits for four years 
 Member states control over benefits for non-active EU 
migrants 
 Indexation of exported child benefits 
 Measures against abuses, such as marriages of convenience 
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Against this background, the agenda for plausible 
renegotiation was extremely limited. Various Eurosceptics have 
argued for a repatriation of various EU competences, but as just 
remarked the UK government’s own review showed no objective 
justification for this. Others would like to opt out of the free 
movement of people, but this is clearly a red line that the rest of the 
EU would not accept, with insistence that the four freedoms for 
goods, services, capital and people are a whole, and cannot be 
subject to picking and choosing.   
Cameron’s four sets of requests were thus seeking, and in the 
end largely secured, a set of additional assurances (outlined in the 
box below): i) the City would not be subject to discrimination by the 
eurozone; ii) the agenda of internal and external economic 
competitiveness would be boosted; iii) the UK would not risk being 
dragged into some future European federal super-state and iv) the 
UK could take steps to deter perceived ‘benefit tourism’ by EU 
migrants. 2 
The Decision detailing these measures is legally binding 
under international law and will be backed up by a combination of 
legislation that the Commission undertakes to submit, and Treaty 
amendments that are pledged to be introduced on the next occasion 
when treaty revisions are made. These provisions will only be 
initiated after the UK has notified the EU that it remains a member 
state.  
A broader interpretation of the decisions may be as follows. 
On the position of non-eurozone member states, the UK’s 
concern has been to protect the City against financial market 
legislation that could be decided by the eurozone majority in the 
Council, and which might have a discriminatory bias against the 
City. Assurances on this point are detailed, and will be reflected in 
future treaty amendments. Negotiations on the detail were difficult 
because of the legitimate concern of the eurozone to avoid installing 
procedures that would restrict the capacity of the eurozone to 
respond rapidly to crisis situations.  
                                                        
2 For a detailed legal analysis, see, see Stefani Weiss and Steven Blockmans, 
“The EU deal to avoid Brexit: Take it or leave”, CEPS Special Report No. 
131, CEPS, Brussels, February 2016. 
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On competitiveness, the UK’s objectives are of fundamental 
importance and are shared by the EU institutions and other member 
states. The Commission is already at work trying to cut regulatory 
‘red tape’, and this British crisis here serves the useful purpose of 
enhancing the priority attached to the painstaking and detailed 
work in pursuit of ‘better regulation’.  Similarly the British interest 
in extending the EU’s set of liberalising trade agreements with 
major third countries, including the US and Japan, is given a boost.  
As regards the ‘ever-closer union’ phrase in the preamble to 
the treaties, the Decision is a reassurance to those in the UK who 
have feared that this is a mechanism for moving continuously 
towards some kind of federal destination for the EU. The Decision 
confirms what is the considered view of most Europeans in any 
case, namely that this wording is no legal basis for constitutional 
change. As an act of reassurance to certain segments of political 
opinion in the UK, it has its importance. However for the rest of the 
EU these provisions have the far more worrying prospect of 
opening up a Pandora’s Box of claims for special arrangements by 
any other member state.  
As regards the role of national parliaments, the debate has 
centred on what is informally called a ‘red card’, namely procedures 
for a sufficient majority of national parliaments to block legislation 
that they consider unjustified on grounds of the subsidiarity 
principle. The key issue here was to find a solution that might 
indeed enhance the role of national parliaments, without on the 
other hand making the legislative process even more complicated 
and potentially unworkable. The result is that 55% of national 
parliaments, weighted by their votes for this purpose, will be able 
to get a contested draft law tabled afresh at the Council, which will 
then discontinue the legislative process unless adequate 
amendments to the draft are introduced. It remains to be seen 
whether national parliaments will use this provision more actively 
than the existing ‘yellow’ and ‘orange’ card mechanisms on which 
it builds.  
Finally, on the most difficult issue of social benefits for intra-
EU migrants, agreement was reached on a complex set of safeguard 
measures. The challenge was to find measures that would provide 
reassurances against so-called ‘benefit tourism’ without calling into 
question the principle of free movement of people and non-
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discrimination by nationality. The core measure decided upon is a 
new “alert and safeguard mechanism” that can be triggered when 
there is an inflow of workers for other member states “of an 
exceptional magnitude over an extended period of time”, and which 
put “excessive pressure on the proper functioning of public 
services”. A member state that considers that it has such a problem 
can notify the EU institutions accordingly, and the Council may on 
proposal of the Commission authorise restrictions on non-
contributory benefits for newly arriving EU workers. These 
restrictions may last up to four years for individuals, while the 
authorisation for the regime itself can last for seven years.  In 
addition the level of exported child benefits (i.e. where the child 
resides in the home country of the migrant worker) may be indexed 
on ‘conditions’ (e.g. cost of living) in the home country. Further 
legislation will be proposed by the Commission to crack down on 
marriages of convenience and other forms of abuse of social benefit 
systems. Finally, as regards EU migrants not seeking work, the 
Decision confirms the possibility for member states to control the 
right to residence as a function of sufficiency of the financial 
resources of the immigrant, and thereby their access to social 
benefits.   
Conclusion. Overall, the February 18-19 Decision of the 
European Council makes only a marginal change to the UK’s 
relationship with the EU, which could only be the case since the UK 
has so many important special arrangements already. It also serves 
to some degree to boost various economic reform efforts of the EU. 
It provides political reassurances to various segments of British 
political and public opinion who have unwarranted fears that the 
‘ever-closer union’ means that the EU is on automatic pilot towards 
becoming a federal super-state. However re-assuring for the UK, it 
is by the same token worrying for the rest of the EU as setting a 
precedent for any other member state to claim its own special 
arrangements. 
2. The unknown Plan B to leave 
All that is known is the procedure to be followed. Article 50 of the 
Lisbon Treaty (TEU)  reads: 
1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union 
with its own constitutional requirements.  
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2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the 
European Council of its intention. In the light of guidelines 
provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate 
and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the 
arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the 
framework for its future relationship with the Union. … 
3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the state in question from 
the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, 
failing that, two years after the notification referred to in 
paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with 
the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to the 
contrary. 
The Plan B for secession would have to specify operationally 
and realistically what the UK government would try to do, starting 
immediately after a referendum vote to leave. The secessionists 
have not wanted or been able to do this. They have not done their 
homework or ‘due diligence’ over their own proposal. Here we do 
it for them.  
In the first edition of this book, six options were already 
identified on the economic side: i) a simplistic big-bang exit, ii) the 
Norwegian model to remain in the single market, iii) the Turkish 
model to remain in the customs union, iv) the Swiss model, which 
is a messier version of Norway, v) a simple WTO trade model, and 
vi) a global free trade model. Other authors see a similar landscape.3 
The conclusion from this large variety of economic options 
might be that ‘anything could happen’, which is theoretically true 
but unhelpful. Nevertheless, the options can be narrowed down by 
focusing on three main alternatives, with a view to assessing 
whether any of them are superior to Plan A.  
The big uncertainties are all on the economic side. Politically, 
institutionally and legally, the prospect is clear. The UK leaves all 
the institutions of the EU, and all EU laws, regulations and policy 
positions cease to apply, unless there would be explicit steps to 
                                                        
3 See, for example, Jean-Claude Piris, “If the UK votes to leave: The seven 
alternatives to EU membership”, CER Policy Brief, Centre for European 
Reform, London, 12 January 2016 (www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/ 
policy-brief/2016/if-uk-votes-leave-seven-alternatives-eu-membership). 
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retain elements of EU law, which returns us then to the major 
economic options.  
Among the objections raised to remaining in the EU, we note 
the argument of Chris Grayling MP, since he was the first cabinet 
minister to have spoken out in favour of secession. The crux of his 
argument goes as follows:  
And so we have reached what I believe is a crucial 
crossroads for the United Kingdom. The crisis in the 
Eurozone and the migration challenge have led to calls for 
still more integration and a move towards much greater 
political union. It is a path that the UK will not and should 
not follow. 4 
It is true that the eurozone needs further measures to make it 
more robust, and that there is a call for strengthening the external 
borders of the Schengen area to cope with the combination of 
refugees and economic migrants flooding into Europe. However, 
since the UK is in neither the eurozone nor the Schengen area, it is a 
non sequitur to say that this means political union for the whole of 
the EU. On the contrary, any measures in the direction of political 
union for the whole of the EU would have to be agreed by 
unanimity, i.e. with British assent.  
Plan B.1 – A clean break, ‘big bang’ Brexit 
On Day 1 of withdrawal, the UK is freed of all EU laws and 
regulations, or in the language of the Treaty of Lisbon (TEU, Article 
50), “[T]he Treaties shall cease to apply”. This would mean deleting 
from the UK statute book around 5,000 regulations, directives and 
decisions relating to the internal market for goods, services, capital 
and people and around 1,100 international treaties between the EU 
and third countries, including all the EU’s preferential trade 
agreements. (The EU’s extensive legislation in the realm of justice 
and home affairs, the Schengen area and the eurozone would not be 
affected, since they already do not apply to the UK).  
However, the practical realities would be even more 
complicated with respect to around 1,400 internal market directives, 
which are implemented by national legislation, and therefore would 
                                                        
4 “Chris Grayling calls EU ‘disastrous’ for Britain in clearest signal yet he 
plans to back Leave campaign”, Daily Telegraph, 16 January 2016.  
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not be automatically repealed since they are of British jurisdiction. 
The radical ‘clean break’ would then in theory require an omnibus 
UK law repealing all domestic legislation that has been adopted in 
order to implement EU directives.  
In the external trade domain, all the EU’s current preferential 
and free trade agreements would cease to apply to the UK. The 
default solution would be that the UK would move to WTO-based 
trade relations with all such third countries. The UK might continue 
with the EU’s external trade tariff regime bound in the WTO as its 
MFN (most-favoured nation) rates for the time being without the 
EU’s existing free trade agreements, but this would be a big 
backward step for the economy compared to the status quo. 
Alternatively, to be more radically liberal, there is the simple 
scheme recently proposed to the House of Commons Select 
Committee on 3 November 2015 by Professor Patrick Minford that 
the UK should simply scrap all tariff protection unilaterally for the 
whole of the world without seeking any quid pro quo, and thus do 
it very fast. Various secessionists speak vaguely of the ‘Singapore 
model’, but none are saying clearly that the UK should completely 
open its goods and services markets without negotiating reciprocal 
advantages. If they did, the idea would be crushed in public debate.  
Overall, this Plan B.1 would result in a colossal legal void that 
would be an unthinkable disaster for the modern economy, creating 
an anarchic emptying of the rule of law and huge legal uncertainty 
for business internally and externally. The seceding British 
government would have to move on to consider other options, as 
under Plans B.2 or B.3 set out below.   
Conclusion: The point of setting out this scenario is to show 
that a simple clean break on Day 1 is inconceivable. It is still relevant 
to go through this, however, because so much public debate is 
conducted in simple emotional terms such as “Let’s just quit the EU 
and regain our freedom once and for all”, without any thought to 
how this might work in practice. But the idea of a clean break, or a 
‘big bang’ Brexit, is a total illusion.  
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Plan B.2 – Remaining in the EU’s single market and 
customs union 
The idea here is that the UK would seek to retain what it most values 
from its EU membership, namely its single internal market and 
customs union, and so also minimise uncertainty and disruption for 
the economy. The formula for doing so exists. It can be otherwise 
defined as joining Norway in the European Economic Area (EEA), 
while also remaining in the EU’s customs union as is the case with 
Turkey. The EEA involves all the four freedoms – goods, services, 
capital and people. 
This regime would minimise the unknown, and have the 
important qualities of legal clarity, certainty and continuity for 
business. The technical and legal mechanisms are well established, 
and they work. They are enforced where necessary by the courts. 
They are also subject to continuing processes of amendment and 
updating, and these changes are automatically taken on board 
today by Norway5 and Turkey. The system is thus also dynamic, 
avoiding obsolescence. 
The advantages of remaining fully and credibly in the single 
market are well known. Of course it means retaining a huge amount 
of EU legislation, both technical standards for goods, and regulatory 
norms for many service sectors and economic networks (for 
transport, energy, etc.). This avoids the extra costs of entering 
European markets if the UK developed different national standards 
and regulations for its home market. Divergent technical standards 
have very substantial costs, the size of which are often found (when 
translated into tariff-equivalents) to be much greater than the tariffs 
themselves, for example on the order of 20%. There are occasional 
references to the ‘Norway model’ in some speeches or documents 
of secessionists. Some of these references, however, also make the 
                                                        
5 More precisely, the EEA partner states such as Norway have the general 
obligation to keep up with changes to EU legislation, but where the partner 
state does not want to do so there is the possibility under Art. 102.5, which 
allows for the suspension of the ‘affected’ part of the EEA Agreement. But 
this clause has never been activated, since even when there are tensions 
over taking on new EU legislation, the choice has always been made to be 
compliant. 
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wholly mistaken assumption that this could mean remaining in the 
internal market without having to follow EU rules. 
One can discuss alternative sub-strategies, such as whether 
the UK might opt for either the EEA or the customs union. To join 
both is actually not possible, since to join the EEA the acceding 
country has also to join EFTA and all of its 25 free trade agreements 
with third countries, which would be inconsistent with the EU’s 
customs union.  These are very thin free trade agreements, cutting 
tariffs but doing little else beyond recalling WTO rules for non-tariff 
barriers, government procurement, etc.   
The advantage of the customs union is that there are no 
customs controls and no need to prove that the ‘origin’ of the 
products exported within the customs union. This seeming 
technicality is of major importance for the products of 
manufacturing industry with complex supply chains, where the 
value added may accumulate across several countries. The ‘rules of 
origin’ are complicated matters, but roughly speaking there has to 
be around 40% value added in the exporting country for it to profit 
from preferential free trade arrangements. The corporate and 
governmental bureaucracy of proving ‘origin’ is costly, however, 
and is estimated to amount to the equivalent of a 5% tariff, to which 
should be added another 3-4% for border control costs. Quitting the 
customs union would mean the opposite of what advocates of 
secession want, by increasing the regulatory bureaucracy, not 
lessening it. For this reason, the scenario of combining both the 
single market and customs union has a serious economic logic, but 
this can only be done with full EU membership.   
But there is a major disadvantage of being in the EU’s customs 
union without full membership. The UK would have to apply the 
EU’s preferential tariffs, but third countries have no obligation to 
reciprocate, as Turkey has learned to its discomfort. In its new trade 
agreements the EU requests its partners to include a ‘Turkey clause’, 
requesting them to negotiate a consistent free trade agreement with 
Turkey. The UK would thus in any case have to negotiate its free 
trade deals with these countries, which would take years, with no 
certainty over the results. The customs union option in the 
hypothesis of secession can therefore be discarded, although it is an 
important part of the advantages of full EU membership. 
BRITAIN’S FUTURE IN EUROPE  17 
 
Conclusion.  There could be a clearly defined Plan B.2 to stay 
in the single market as a member of the EEA, which would largely 
avoid the risks of uncertainty and could rely on legal and economic 
policy mechanisms that are tested and work. However, it would 
leave the UK having still to implement a huge amount of EU policy 
and law without a say in its making, while also having to make a 
significant contribution to the EU budget (hence the ‘no say, still 
pay’ dictum). It would also mean continued free movement of 
people. Overall this would defeat the presumed political purpose of 
secession, and for this reason it is not clearly advocated by the 
‘leave’ camp. However, when the UK government would come to 
reflect on its options in the event of a referendum decision to leave, 
and in particular after examining the complicated problems with 
Plan B.3, it might conclude that Plan B.2 was the better of the Plan B 
options after all.  
Plan B.3 – Negotiating with the EU and the world at 
large  
Plans B.1 and B.2 are clear and simple propositions. But since they 
are either illusory (B.1) or unattractive politically for the 
secessionists (B.2), the spotlight has to be turned onto more complex 
scenarios, in which the UK would seek to get the best possible free 
trade deal with the EU outside the internal market and customs 
union, and also the best possible set of free trade deals with third 
countries.   
Indeed the texts of the secessionist organisations point in this 
direction: 
- “We negotiate a new UK-EU deal based on free trade and 
friendly cooperation” (www.vote.leave). 
- “Leaving the EU would give the UK the freedom to make its 
own global trade deals” (www.leave.eu). 
These two propositions have to be examined in some detail, 
since they turn out to be anything but simple. It should be explored 
in two parts, first negotiating with the EU, and then with the rest of 
the world.  
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Plan B.3.1 Negotiating with the EU 
Secessionists tend to argue that since the EU has a trade surplus 
with the UK, it would be keen to conclude a friendly free-trade deal. 
This is an illusory and misleading simplification, which grossly fails 
to understand the likely EU response.  
First, the UK would have inflicted serious institutional and 
reputational damage on the EU, and the atmosphere surrounding 
negotiations would be cold, with little desire to help solve the UK’s 
problems quickly.  
Secondly, the EU would be anxious not to give the impression 
that secession from the EU would be an easy and costless 
proposition for any other member state that might be tempted to 
follow suit.  
Third, the EU would certainly first respond to a request by the 
UK to negotiate the terms of secession by asking that the UK sets 
out its intentions and requests in full, notably with regard to all 
existing EU internal market legislation. It would not agree to 
embark on a re-run of the ‘old’ so-called Swiss model, i.e. to open a 
sequence of negotiations of sector-specific packages of deals, taking 
the easiest ones first (on which more below).  
Fourth, and most concretely, the EU would see an 
opportunity to gain advantage in commercial competition over the 
two ‘crown jewels’ of the UK economy, namely the preeminent role 
of the City of London in financial markets and the UK’s success so 
far in attracting more foreign direct investment (FDI) from the 
world at large than any other EU member state. Both of these two 
UK ‘crown jewels’ would be at risk. The UK could no longer have 
any say in EU financial market regulation, unlike under Plan A. And 
if the UK’s place in relation to the single market were uncertain or 
less than under the EEA, the competition over FDI would be tilted 
in favour of the EU against the UK. Since the UK economy is only 
15% of the EU total, foot-loose international investors aiming at the 
major EU market would progressively switch away from the UK. 
The EU could be expected to play a tough game in negotiations with 
the EU over a possible free trade agreement, in which a long period 
of uncertainty over the outcome would help the rest of the EU gain 
market share from the UK over both its two ‘crown jewels’.  
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What more precisely would the UK actually want to try and 
get for its new deal with the EU? At the level of strategic choices, it 
could be expected to want to remain largely in the free movement 
of goods, services and capital, but to scrap the free movement of 
people. At a further level of detail, it would want to scrap individual 
pieces of EU internal market legislation that it found irritating, 
while otherwise remain in compliance with EU market rules. The 
method of selecting what irritants to be repealed could be called a 
‘subtraction’ method, i.e. to touch as little as possible in order to 
minimise disruption and uncertainty for business.  
What would be the EU’s likely response? First it would say 
that the four freedoms – for goods, services, capital and the 
movement of people – come together as a holistic package in the 
single internal market. If one of the four, notably the free movement 
of people, were withdrawn, there would be consequences for goods 
and services. If the UK engaged in a ‘subtraction’ approach, the EU 
would reciprocate with its own ‘subtractions’ from the initial 
condition of full internal market access.  
Can this hypothetical deal for tariff-free trade without full 
access to the internal market and mutual ‘subtractions’ be described 
more concretely? Of course the precise negotiated outcome cannot 
be anticipated, but from observing the workings of the EU and its 
external relations there is still much plausible guidance available. 
This means going into some detail. Fundamentally, however, the 
EU has shown a strong disinclination in its dealings with 
Switzerland to negotiate any selective inclusion in the single market 
(see further below). 
A general point is that the UK, in declining to join the EEA, 
would presumably refuse to follow automatically new EU market 
legislation. If in various sectors the UK’s regime would increasingly 
fall out of compliance with EU law, what then would the general 
response of the EU be? It might well request the insertion into a UK-
EU agreement of an important phrase found in the EEA Agreement 
in Article 102.5, which stipulates how disputes over non-compliance 
should be met. The key language here is that after all attempts to 
find solutions have failed the “affected part” of the agreement may 
be “provisionally suspended”. To take a hypothetical concrete 
example, if the UK failed to keep up with changes to EU public 
procurement law, the EU could suspend market access in this sector. 
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And if the UK fell behind new regulations in more and more sectors, 
its market access would be progressively restricted. 
At this point it may be useful to dispose of the so-called Swiss 
model, which some secessionists say they like. The Swiss have since 
1992 negotiated progressively a series of sector-specific agreements 
with the EU in a seemingly more flexible and selective approach. 
However as explained in Box 2, the Swiss model has actually broken 
down since the country voted in a referendum to abandon the free 
movement of people, with various other linked agreements now 
suspended.  
 
Box 2. A warning on the Swiss model 
After Switzerland voted in a referendum against joining the EEA in 
1992, it proceeded to negotiate a long list of sector-specific 
agreements, assembling as much as possible of the EEA package. 
This became known in EU circles as ‘cherry-picking’, i.e. choosing 
what it liked and avoiding what it did not like.  The EU has since 
adopted a hard line in favour of a holistic approach, i.e. balancing 
advantages and disadvantages, and explicitly opposing ‘cherry-
picking’. Then in 2014 Switzerland voted again in a referendum to 
abandon the free movement of labour.  
Since the EU had insisted on legal linkages between various 
sector-specific agreements, the referendum result, if implemented, 
will trigger the suspension of other agreements of value to 
Switzerland, including the Erasmus programme for education and 
the Horizon 2020 programme for scientific research (both of which 
happen to be of the greatest interest for the UK). The story is not yet 
complete, with Switzerland trying to find damage-limitation 
solutions. In the meantime, however, the EU has drawn the 
conclusion that the Swiss model was systemically defective, has 
broken down and will not be repeated. The EU’s formal position is 
that “an ambitious and comprehensive restructuring of the existing 
system of sectoral agreements would be beneficial to both the EU and 
Switzerland”.6  
                                                        
6 Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on a homogeneous 
extended single market and EU relations with Non-EU Western European 
Countries, Press Release, 16 December 2014.  
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Switzerland now wishes to negotiate some solution from this 
unsatisfactory state of affairs, but the EU has put this on hold 
precisely because of parallels with the British problem. So now the 
Swiss are having to wait for the British model to emerge, without 
knowing what it will turn out to be. 
Already, however, an EU Council Decision on the negotiating 
mandate for a new agreement with Switzerland gives an advance 
warning of what the UK might well face. This mandate clearly aims 
at something with comprehensive content for all four freedoms and 
much internal market law, close to the EEA model but with fuller 
reliance on the European Court of Justice for enforcement (i.e. with 
less sovereign powers than the EEA countries that have their own 
court).7 If Switzerland persists in wanting to exclude the free 
movement of people it seems quite likely that either a new 
agreement will simply not be forthcoming, or its market access will 
be limited to a simple and thin free trade agreement, with limited 
commitments notably for services where Switzerland (like the UK), 
had comparative advantages and strong economic interests (on 
which see further below in more detail).  
Scrapping the free movement of people. This restriction is high 
on the agenda of the secessionists and would presumably entail 
quantitative limits on immigration from the EU. At a minimum, EU 
citizens wishing to take up employment in the UK would be 
required to obtain work permits (like the UK currently applies to 
US, Japanese and Australian citizens). These involve long, uncertain 
and bureaucratic procedures, which would render the UK labour 
market less flexible and poorer in skills. The EU would surely 
reciprocate, requiring work permits for UK citizens. The total 
number of intra-EU migrants affected is believed to be around 2 
million UK citizens on the continent for both labour market 
participants and the non-active, with as many ‘other’ EU citizens in 
the UK, thus rough parity. 
As a result the UK economy would no longer be able to freely 
hire people from the EU. These constraints are of importance across 
a wide range of professional skills, from building workers and farm 
                                                        
7 See ”Council Decision authorizing the opening of negotiations on an 
agreement between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation on 
an institutional framework governing bilateral relations”, 6 May 2014. 
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labourers who are in short supply, through to high tech and creative 
skills. Cosmopolitan London thrives on access to the talents of the 
European labour market, and would see its dynamism dampened 
by a work permit system. 
Secession would also mean that the EU’s current social 
security arrangements for non-active migrants would cease for UK 
citizens on the continent. This would place UK retirees and students 
living on the continent at a serious disadvantage. As regards the 
older generation, there is now a substantial number of retired 
British people who have opted to live in the sunny Mediterranean. 
Retirees are of course highly dependent on health care services, and 
within the EU there are legally secure mechanisms for cooperation 
between national health services, which eliminate risks of non-
coverage, or discriminatory lack of access to free health care.  These 
provisions would cease to apply in the event of secession. The UK 
could seek to negotiate re-installation of these arrangements, but the 
outcome cannot be anticipated, depending on how restrictive the 
UK’s immigration policies towards the EU would become.  
A further theoretical policy move to put a brake on 
immigration would be for the UK to require visas for EU citizens, as 
the UK and the EU currently require for Turks or Russians, and 
which, if activated, would surely be reciprocated by the EU. This 
would be so unpopular with UK citizens accustomed to holidays on 
the continent that it can presumably be disregarded. 
However a much more likely possible collateral impact could 
be an end to the 2003 Le Touquet bilateral treaty between the UK 
and France, which has provided for UK border controls to be 
implemented on French soil at Calais and Dunkirk, and has 
prevented the migrants in the ‘jungle’ of Calais from crossing the 
Channel. This treaty has manifestly benefitted the UK more than 
France. Various politicians in France advocate that it be scrapped, 
which either the UK or France can do at any time (with an 
implementation delay). As the Prime Minister himself has noted, 
this could result in the emergence of migrant ‘jungles’ in Kent. There 
would be no automaticity to suspension of this agreement, but 
secession will gravely damage the climate of political goodwill on 
which it was founded, and the existing political pressures within 
France to scrap Le Touquet would surely further build up. If this 
happened, the result would be that the UK’s attempt to curb 
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immigration from the continent would in this respect turn out to be 
counter-productive. 
How far would the EU go in response to the UK’s withdrawal 
from the free movement of labour? That would depend on what 
other steps the UK might choose to take to withdraw from other 
parts of EU internal market law. This question is considered in the 
next section on goods and services. For the moment, let us consider 
just the possible impact on other people-related programmes of the 
EU, notably educational and scientific research networks.  
For university students and teachers, a huge exchange and 
mobility system (Erasmus) has been built up over recent decades, 
under which it has become the norm for many students to take at 
least a year away from home to study in a university of another 
European country. The Erasmus programme is also open to third 
countries, but on a far more-restricted scale. The university sector in 
the UK deplores the prospect of secession, as also does the related 
scientific research community, which would have less access to EU 
funding. Under the EU’s major Horizon 2020 research programme, 
the UK wins more grants than any other member state except 
Germany. Non-EU member states are able to associate with Horizon 
2020, but Switzerland now finds its access to both Erasmus and 
Horizon 2020 under the prospect of suspension as a result of its 
referendum to quit the free movement of people. Overall therefore, 
the UK’s leading role in European higher education and scientific 
research would risk being significantly damaged.  
Free movement of goods and services. The EU has a standard 
list of chapters that applies both to its internal market legislation 
and to trade agreements with third countries, as listed in Box 3. This 
provides a check list for the seceding UK government to consider 
where it wanted to be in relation to existing EU legislation.  
The seceding UK would be in the special situation of being 
initially wholly compliant with EU rules, except to the extent that 
the UK government wanted to repeal them by ‘subtraction’. It could 
leave in place UK laws that are implementing EU directives, and it 
could copy and paste the substance of EU regulations such as food 
safety rules into new UK laws to the extent it wanted to do so. The 
UK government would therefore have to comb through the entire 
mass of EU market legislation to make up its mind on what to keep 
and what to reject.  
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Box 3. Main chapters in the EU’s typical trade and cooperation 
agreements 
Tariffs 
Customs procedures 
Rules of origin  
Trade remedies (anti-dumping, etc.) 
Food and plant regulations 
Technical standards for industrial products 
Services, general rules of establishment 
Financial services 
Transport services (road, rail, air and maritime) 
Telecommunications and digital services 
Energy supplies and networks 
Competition policy 
Public procurement 
Intellectual property rights 
Environment 
Climate change 
Health and safety for consumers and workers 
Labour market regulations  
Education 
Scientific research 
 
What can be said of the UK’s likely preferences? At a general 
level it would want to retain as far as possible a seamless access to 
EU’s internal market, while still jettisoning elements of EU law that 
it considered excessively burdensome. At a more technical level, it 
could be informed by the exhaustive findings set out in its own 
Balance of Competence Review exercise.8 The broad evidence 
obtained from independent sources was that most EU regulations 
and standards were fit for purpose, and that it would not make 
sense for the UK to devise its own set of technical regulations and 
policies. There was a scattering of individual regulations that were 
considered cumbersome. But it is also to be noted that the current 
European Commission has from its start in 2014 upgraded the task 
of weeding out such cases, or reforming them. Concretely the 
                                                        
8 As examined in detail in the 1st edition of Britain’s Future in Europe: Reform, 
renegotiation, repatriation or secession?, reproduced later in this same volume. 
BRITAIN’S FUTURE IN EUROPE  25 
 
Commission now has its First Vice-President explicitly charged 
with this duty and the UK has been quite successful in building up 
the case for reforms along these lines.  
The UK would certainly want to keep to zero tariffs. The EU 
would probably agree in due course, but not fast and only after the 
whole set of trade-related issues listed above in Box 3 was 
negotiated. The EU would insist on tough rules of origin and trade 
remedies, notably anti-dumping rules, neither of which apply within 
the EU. The rules of origin are, as already noted, bureaucratically 
burdensome and costly to implement, and the EU would insist on 
the UK accepting the same rules as for other neighbouring countries 
under the System of Pan Euro-Mediterranean Cumulation,9 to avoid 
it becoming an ‘off-shore aircraft carrier’ for foreign investors to 
access the EU market. In addition anti-dumping rules have a large 
degree of discretion in determining ‘damage’, and the EU would be 
keen to show that it was going to be tough in this respect, in order 
to pull more of the market for footloose direct investment away 
from the UK to itself.  
The UK would largely stick to the plethora of technical 
standards and regulations for foods and industrial products. To retain the 
whole body of European standards has the great advantage that no 
questions or complicated checks and procedures are necessary for 
exports to the EU. The UK might want to opt out of this or that 
regulation for food products, but it would have to take great care 
not to ruin its overall market access for products in which there are 
complex food chain linkages and traceability requirements. Chris 
Grayling MP, as noted earlier, the first cabinet minister to advocate 
secession, welcomes the UK’s inclusion in the ‘Common Market’, in 
order “to avoid umpteen different varieties of lawnmowers …”10. 
The lawnmower may be taken as a metaphor for the thousands of 
technical safety and health standards for products and regulatory 
standards for services. Wherever the UK chose to install its own 
different technical regulations there would be consequential loss of 
                                                        
9 For explanation of this complex system involving no less than 42 
countries, see http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/common/archive/ 
news/2006/article_783_en.htm 
10 “Chris Grayling calls EU ‘disastrous’ for Britain in clearest signal yet he 
plans to back Leave campaign”, Daily Telegraph, 16 January 2016.  
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automatic market acceptance in the EU market certainly for the 
products in question. But the damage could be far wider, since the 
UK would have departed from the simple state of affairs in which 
everything the UK produces is automatically accepted in the EU 
market. In the new situation in which the UK had subtracted from 
even a minority of EU technical standards, there would be 
confusing questions for business of what was now out or still in. The 
clarity of full internal market access would have been broken. 
Next on the UK’s wish list would be continued access to a 
huge set of service sectors and network industries: services in general, 
financial services, transport services (road, rail, air, maritime), 
telecommunications and digital services, energy supplies and networks. 
These are understood by the British government to be a set of 
economic interests of the highest importance, where seamless 
connections with the EU market would be the objective. So here the 
UK would want to get as close as possible back to the EEA 
conditions of complete market access, with a consequential need to 
follow existing and all new EU legislation. However, partial 
attempts at selective clawing back into the EEA would probably not 
be viewed favourably by the EU. On the contrary, the EU would 
point out that in the service sector in particular, in its agreements 
with third countries, the member states maintain a hugely long list 
of reservations restricting market access. These same reservations 
would be tabled at the UK-EU negotiations, with the remark “either 
you want to be entirely in the EEA or not; if not here is the third 
country regime”. One concrete illustration is in the road haulage 
market, where EU member states operate quota systems for the 
number of foreign trucks that can operate in the EU.  
The case of financial markets calls for special attention, given 
the importance Cameron gave under his four points to try and 
guarantee that the City’s interests would not be hit by 
discriminatory legislation by the eurozone member states. Some 
commentators from the ‘leave’ camp are dismissive of the 
importance of these agreements made for Plan A. However the 
dangers for the City would be crystal clear. The eurozone member 
states and European Central Bank would say with increasing force 
that the financial centre for the euro had to be physically in the 
eurozone itself. Frankfurt, Paris, Dublin, Amsterdam and other 
financial markets would be very keen to exploit all opportunities to 
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gain market share at the expense of London. The agreement made 
by Cameron under Plan A would be void, and the UK would have 
no protection against legislation favouring the EU’s financial 
markets at the expense of the City. 
Also of strategic importance are the telecommunications, 
digital and energy sectors, where the EU has ambitious plans under 
the headings of ‘digital union’ and ‘energy union’. The UK has been 
a leading advocate of both, but without EU membership it would be 
marginalised in these processes.  
The digital sector is currently at the centre of hugely important 
technological and market developments, with many open questions 
as to how the overarching European regulatory environment is to 
be defined, what conditions are established for e-commerce and 
how business taxes are reformed to tackle the issues posed by the 
global digital giants (e.g. Google, Amazon), etc.  The EU is a key 
player in these matters. Would the UK wish to be on the side lines 
outside the EU, versus being an influential policy shaper on the 
inside? In February 2016, a survey of 175 digital start-up companies 
in the UK11 revealed the top reasons why 81% of them wanted the 
UK to remain in the EU: 
 Access to the large single market, with harmonised 
regulations 
 Free movement of labour, giving access to a talented 
workforce 
 Having a ‘set at the table’ 
 Stability and security 
As regards energy, the UK is now becoming increasingly 
dependent on gas and electricity imports. The EU is itself hard at 
work to improve the integration of energy networks through 
infrastructural investments and regulatory mechanisms. It is 
currently working on proposals for security and solidarity 
mechanisms in the event of major energy supply disruptions, 
ranging from geo-political supply cuts by Russia through to 
electricity black-outs due to capacity shortage. Outside the EU, the 
                                                        
11 Conducted by the Coalition for a Digital Economy (CODEC), an NGO 
that campaigns for policies in support of digital start-ups in the UK (see 
www.coadec.com/startups-want-us-to-stay-in-the-eu/). 
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UK would be opting out of the development of such mechanisms, 
possibly exposing itself to more risks.  
For a further set of key market regulatory policies, namely 
competition policy, intellectual property rights, and public procurement, 
the UK would want to stay as close as possible to EU practice, with 
which it has no real problems. On the contrary, its main concern has 
been for other EU member states to take these rules as seriously as 
it does. The UK’s continued access to the EU’s public procurement, 
however, is likely to be reduced to WTO levels, which are much 
weaker than in the EU. This would be an example where the EU 
would say to the UK: “You want to quit the EEA, the free movement 
of labour and various specific market rules, but you cannot expect 
the EU to agree to your wish to have full access to public 
procurement market.”  
Finally there are some chapters where the UK would want to 
repeal individual laws without contesting the main objectives. This 
could be the case for aspects of labour market regulations and 
environmental policy.  As for the labour market the UK could easily 
repeal EU laws, but it should be noted that most of the substance is 
virtually the same as the many conventions of the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO), so little would be changed. There are 
two well-known EU directives concerning working time and agency 
workers that would be the main targets for repeal. The main point 
here, however, is that EU law has not prevented the UK from having 
one of the most flexible labour markets of all advanced economies. 
As for environmental policy, there are various detailed EU laws that 
are contested on grounds of not adequately respecting the 
subsidiarity principle, but this is precisely one of the main targets of 
the current Commission initiative to cut ‘red tape’.  
Conclusion. The UK’s likely preference in the case of 
secession would be to depart from the EU’s internal market law only 
to a limited extent by ‘subtraction’ or exception, rather than 
wholesale. It would want to quit the free movement of people, and 
various details of labour market and environmental policies, and 
other individual regulations deemed to be unnecessary irritants. 
However, the UK would want to retain consistency with core trade 
and market policies. On the other hand, the likely response from the 
EU side could be very costly for the UK compared to the status quo 
in the EU. The eurozone would be expected take steps to shift the 
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euro’s financial centre away for London. Trading rules and practices 
such as anti-dumping rules could be managed by the EU with a 
view to gaining market share of foreign direct investment targeting 
the EU market at the expense of the UK.  
For the UK’s vital economic interests in broad service sectors, 
including the digital sector, there would also be bad news. The 
introduction of work permits for EU immigrants would surely be 
reciprocated for British citizens wishing to work and live on the 
continent. Collateral damage could come through France 
withdrawing from the Le Touquet treaty, leaving the UK border 
defenceless against the Calais ‘jungle’ refugees. And after long 
negotiations, the UK might get a tariff-free deal with the EU, but it 
would be a large step backwards compared to the status quo in the 
EU under Plan A, or hypothetically in the EEA as under Plan B.2, 
and in the meantime much damage could have been inflicted on UK 
interests. 
Plan B.3.2 Negotiating with the rest of the world 
The secessionists say that the UK should regain its freedom to make 
its own free trade agreements with the rest of the world. These 
speeches are ill-informed to the point of being disinformation, since 
they fail to recognise that the EU already has, or is negotiating, 
preferential trade agreements with virtually the whole of the world, 
with few important exceptions that the UK would be unlikely to 
pursue alone (see Box 4). 
Since all the EU’s existing preferential and free trade 
agreements would cease for the UK on Day 1 of secession, the 
seceding government would have to decide what to do. The UK is 
a member of the WTO alongside the EU, and would remain a 
member of the WTO after secession. The default position would be 
that the UK’s trading relationships with WTO member states of the 
rest of the world would keep to its present WTO levels of bound 
MFN tariffs (i.e. the EU common external tariff). The UK would be 
free to renegotiate its WTO bound MFN tariffs to different levels if 
it wanted to do so, but this is unlikely. If it chose to lower these rates, 
it would get nothing in exchange. The rest of the world would be 
under no obligation to reduce their WTO-MFN tariff schedules just 
because the UK had done so. If it wanted to raise its tariff levels 
other WTO member states would be able to demand compensation.  
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Box 4. EU preferential or free trade agreements 
Europe 
EFTA/EEA/Switzerland – in force 
Turkey – in force 
Balkans – SAAs in force 
Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia DCFTAs – concluded, provisionally in force 
i.e. all except Russia and Eurasian Union 
North Africa, Middle East 
Euro-Med FTAs - in force; Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Egypt – being 
upgraded  
Gulf Cooperation Council - suspended 
Africa 
African, Caribbean and Pacific 79 countries – in force 
Southern Africa – EPA concluded 
Central Africa – EPA ongoing 
East and Southern Africa – EPA ongoing 
West Africa – EPA concluded 
East African Community – EPA concluded 
Americas 
Canada - concluded 
US - ongoing 
Mexico, Chile – in force  
Central America – in force 
Caribbean – EPA in force 
Andean – Colombia, Peru, Ecuador in force/concluded 
Mercosur (Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Paraguay, Uruguay) – 
ongoing 
Asia, Pacific 
Korea – in force; Japan – ongoing; India - ongoing 
China – investment agreement ongoing 
Vietnam – concluded; Singapore - concluded 
Thailand – preliminaries; Malaysia – possible resumption 
Australia – beginning; New Zealand – beginning 
Pacific – Papua New Guinea, Fiji - EPA ongoing 
_______ 
Notes: DCFTA = Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, EPA = 
Economic Partnership Agreement and SAA = Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement. 
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This default position would be contrary to the wishes of the 
UK to be an open trading nation with free trade agreements with as 
much of the world as possible. However to negotiate a new set of 
deals with most of the rest of the world would be a highly complex 
affair taking years and years to complete. Three categories of cases 
would need to be carefully addressed: 
- What to do following the cancellation for the UK of all the 
EU’s existing preferential or free trade agreements? 
- How to proceed with those countries where the EU is 
currently negotiating free trade deals? 
- Whether to make agreements where the EU is not currently 
negotiating free trade deals, namely Russia and China? 
The UK alongside the EU’s existing agreements. The first 
impact of secession would be that all the EU’s 1,100 international 
treaties and agreements would cease to apply to the UK, thus 
creating initially a huge legal void for the UK’s international 
relations. These would include all the EU’s existing trade and 
economic cooperation agreements. How would the UK try to fill this 
void as best and fast as possible? 
A first category consists of the EU’s agreements with its 
closest neighbours: the countries of the EEA (Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein) and EFTA, which includes the three EEA states and 
Switzerland. The UK could make a free trade agreement with EFTA 
without joining the EEA. It could alternatively seek to accede to 
EFTA, but this would entail acceding also to EFTA’s existing stock 
of 25 free trade agreements with 35 countries. These latter, however, 
are mostly very thin in content beyond scrapping tariffs, and would 
prevent the UK from making its own trade agreements.  
A second category are the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreements (SAAs) made with the non-EU member states of the 
Balkans, and the new Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas 
(DCFTAs) with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, all of which see a 
large number of commitments by these countries to adopt EU 
market laws progressively, approaching in due course what the 
EEA countries do. These agreements would therefore not be a 
sound model for the seceding UK’s relations with these countries. 
Something much more limited would be needed. 
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A third category of agreements is with developing countries, 
including simple free trade agreements (FTAs) with several 
Mediterranean countries, and Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. These 
agreements typically involve faster tariff liberalisation on the EU 
side than for the partners, together with development aid packages. 
Some of the existing Mediterranean FTAs are currently under 
renegotiation for an upgrade into the DCFTA category, such as for 
Morocco and Tunisia. The ACP group consists of 79 developing 
countries that are signatories of the Cotonou Agreement, of which 
48 countries are from sub-Saharan Africa, 16 from the Caribbean 
and 15 from the Pacific. The Cotonou Agreement is now being 
complemented by separate regional Economic Partnership 
Agreements, which allow for greater differentiation between 
regional groups of states from Central, Western, Eastern and 
Southern Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific. The UK would 
presumably want to engage also in free trade and development 
relations with these countries. But it would need first to see how the 
EU’s DCFTA negotiations worked out with the Mediterranean 
countries in question, and also how the several regional EPAs were 
concluded. 
A fourth category consists of the EU’s trade and cooperation 
agreements with more advanced countries outside Europe, 
including long-standing agreements with Mexico, and various 
Central American and Andean countries, and newer and deeper 
agreements with South Korea and Canada. The latter two go way 
deeper than just physical borders into matters of non-tariff barriers 
and compatibility or mutual recognition of regulatory standards for 
service sectors and economic networks. The common feature of 
these cases is their long and comprehensive list of market rules that 
they cover, which on the EU side is of course based on EU external 
and internal market law. As to what the seceding UK might do, it 
would first have to decide what part of EU market law it wanted to 
retain, and what it would repeal. As the previous section has noted, 
this will not be a simple or easy process. At a minimum, the UK 
would want to secure comparable market access for goods and 
services in these cases as the EU has already established for itself. 
The idea of the UK, with so much less leverage, getting better deals 
would be an illusion. On the contrary, the issue would be over the 
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length of the delay in making new bilateral agreements with these 
countries and the extent to which it was possible to secure 
comparable results, piggy-backing on what the EU has achieved.  
Conclusion. These existing agreements are rich and complex 
in content. The seceding UK would want to fill the huge resulting 
void for its international relations. To make fast progress it would 
be necessary either to clone as far as possible the EU’s agreements, 
or go for something much thinner in substance, which would hardly 
be an improvement in relation to the status quo.  
The EU’s ongoing negotiations. This involves many cases of 
the highest interest, including negotiation of comprehensive trade 
and economic agreements with the US, Japan, India, Australia and 
New Zealand. The practical question is whether these countries 
would be interested to make quicker and more favourable deals 
with the UK than with the EU? Would they put the UK on a faster 
track?  
The secessionists argue that the EU is a slow negotiator and 
that the UK could go faster. This argument is implausible for several 
reasons. 
The US has already given its official answer. The ongoing 
TTIP negotiations with the EU have priority, and the US would not 
want to open negotiations bilaterally with the UK. The US Special 
Trade Representative, Michael Froman, has stated this in public. He 
has enough problems with getting any trade deal through Congress, 
and the TTIP involves complex regulatory questions in relation to 
the EU’s single market law alongside those of the US. A seceding 
UK would, for reasons already detailed above, be in an uncertain 
position in relation to EU single market law for some time.    
On Japan, it is again most unlikely that this country would 
want to reveal its bottom line bargaining position, for example over 
services and technical barriers to trade, in bilateral negotiations with 
the UK that might undercut its negotiating position with the much 
bigger EU.  
As regards India, these negotiations have stalled because 
India has for years been notoriously protectionist over services. The 
UK is highly interested in services, but again India would not want 
to make concessions first to the UK that would prejudice its 
negotiations with the EU.  
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The UK has always wanted to have free trade with its 
Commonwealth partners. Beyond the cases of Canada, India and 
African and Caribbean developing countries already discussed, 
Australia and New Zealand are the interesting instances that 
remain. For both of these two countries, the political decisions were 
taken in 2015 by the EU to start negotiations for ‘comprehensive and 
high-quality’ agreements. The UK might offer more liberal 
arrangements for agriculture, but as in other cases reviewed above, 
Australia and New Zealand would be eying agreements with the 
EU as their first priority.  
The EU has ongoing negotiations with Brazil through the 
Mercosur customs union group, important therefore for including 
one of the supposedly dynamic BRICSs. These negotiations have not 
progressed, partly because the group contains countries with wildly 
anti-liberal policies such as Argentina and Venezuela, and partly 
because Brazil itself is in deep economic trouble. The UK alone 
would be even more powerless than the EU to turn this situation 
around in favour of an enlightened free trade deal.  
Conclusion. The overall message from this very important set 
of ongoing negotiations between the EU and key foreign trade 
partners is that the seceding UK would on the whole not be in a 
position to get faster and better results, and would rank lower in 
these countries’ priorities.  
Where the EU is not negotiating (Russia and China). There is 
an idea in circulation for a free trade area between the EU and 
Putin’s pet project, the Eurasian Union (Russia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan). This idea might progress 
under certain conditions. First, under WTO law, participants in such 
free trade agreements have to be WTO member states, which is not 
yet the case for Belarus, and without which it would be illegal. 
Secondly, Russia would have to be seriously interested in free trade, 
for which there is no evidence. On the contrary, Russia is 
increasingly protectionist, constantly reneging on various WTO 
commitments. Third, the political context would have to become 
more favourable over Ukraine, resulting in an end to the Western 
sanctions (EU, US, all G7). For the UK to go ahead before the EU or 
the US would mean breaking ranks with the Western alliance, 
whereas its position up until now has been solidly taking a tough 
line with Russia. Putin might like the idea of a quick agreement with 
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just the UK, but that would just be to gain geo-political advantage 
through dividing and weakening the Europe. The UK would then 
become his de facto collaborator. Would the seceding British 
government want to do this? Probably not.  
The idea of free trade with China would of course be of huge 
importance. But would the UK want to go ahead alone, without 
cover from the EU? The present priority on the EU side is to make a 
limited investment agreement with China. This could become a 
forerunner to a free trade agreement, but so far the EU has not 
agreed any mandate for the Commission to begin free trade 
negotiations. The UK currently seeks to be China’s best partner in 
Europe. However the current crisis in the steel industry offers a 
reality check here. In early February 2016, the UK Business Secretary 
Sajid Javid sent a letter, co-signed with his French, German, Polish 
and Belgian counterparts, to the European Commission calling for 
the EU "to use every means available and take strong action" in 
response to alleged steel dumping by China and Russia, which have 
been accused of exporting steel at below-market prices. The UK 
would not want to be alone in the room with China on such matters. 
Moreover, if the seceding UK sought to make an early free 
trade agreement with China, there would be some predictable 
reactions from the EU, fearing that UK would become China’s ‘off-
shore aircraft carrier’ to attack the EU market (the metaphor already 
circulates).  The EU would at least redouble its preparedness to use 
rules of origin, anti-dumping and other standard safeguard 
measures to limit the Chinese market penetration. Quite likely, the 
EU might choose to go slow over a free trade agreement with the 
UK, if the UK initiated negotiations with China, to see first what the 
outcome would be.  
It is not likely, therefore, that the UK would move ahead of 
the EU in making free trade deals with either (for different reasons) 
Russia or China.  
Conclusion. The overall conclusion for Plan B.3 is that it 
would involve a huge exercise in multiple parallel negotiations for 
which the UK government has at present no adequate team of 
experienced trade negotiators. There would be long delays in 
getting results in many cases, and the idea that the UK could overall 
get better deals faster than the EU is a fantasy. If the UK did secede, 
Plan B.2 would be greatly preferable to either Plans B.1 or B.2. 
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However, all three look very unfavourable compared to Plan A on 
economic grounds, to which may be added the political and foreign 
policy considerations, discussed in the following section. 
The UK’s status in world affairs 
Common to all the Plan Bs for secession would be an impact on the 
UK’s status as foreign policy actor in international relations. Would 
the UK gain or lose from being outside the EU? This question is 
often debated but mostly in rather fuzzy terms, but it can be 
discussed more concretely.  
The UK is currently free to pursue whatever foreign policy it 
wants, either contributing to EU actions, or acting on its own. Since 
it can veto any EU policy move that it does not like, in general terms 
the UK has nothing to gain by secession.  Where the EU takes an 
initiative by common agreement, it serves as a ‘multiplier’ for UK 
interests.  
Development aid policy is important to the UK, and here the 
rules of the EU are clear. While the EU has its own aid mechanisms 
and policies, these in no way constrain what the UK’s development 
policies or actions should be.  
More concretely one can consider a few of the most important 
foreign policy issues of the present time, and how the UK’s interests 
would be affected in or out.  
Case 1. Russia and East Europe. As noted above, the UK is a 
clear supporter of the mainstream EU policy of sanctioning Russia 
and helping a Europe-oriented Ukraine. The UK is one of the most 
robust supporters of this policy. In the event of secession, the EU’s 
position would tend to weaken, contrary to the UK’s perceived 
interests. 
Case 2. Migration and refugee crisis. Thanks to its geography 
and related opt-out from Schengen, the UK escapes the current 
refugee tsunami and any mandatory relocation by the EU. This 
situation would in no way be improved by secession, but it could 
worsen in the event that France opted to end the Le Touquet 
agreement (as explained above).  
Case 3. Jihadist terrorism. The UK is with other core EU member 
states in the frontline fight against ISIS. Here the sharing of 
intelligence over our ‘foreign fighters’ and terrorist threats is helped 
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by the UK’s selective opt-in rights under EU justice and home 
affairs. Secession would meaning losing these rights. There might 
be ad hoc cooperation, but secession would certainly not help. The 
EU has not interfered with the UK’s independent decisions on 
military actions in Iraq and Syria.  
Case 4. UK in the UN Security Council. The UK’s role in the UN 
Security Council is not constrained by the EU, although its influence 
there is enhanced as one of the two European permanent members 
with veto rights. In the event of secession, the UK’s standing in this 
regard would be diminished relative to that of France, which alone 
would be speaking for Europe. 
Case 5. The US and other traditional friends of the UK. All of the 
UK’s traditional friends and allies, including the US and the 
Commonwealth, have already spoken out against the UK’s 
secession. As for the US, President Obama has argued against 
secession explicitly, because the UK is valued as an influential 
member state of the EU. By contrast, the only significant politician 
who has not joined in this large consensus view is Vladimir Putin, 
for the obvious reason that he would welcome a weakened EU as an 
opportunity for enhancing Russia’s own geo-political objectives in 
Europe.  
Case 6. China policy. The UK seeks currently to have a 
prominent role in cooperating with China, but this is not impeded 
by the EU. However in the event of secession, China would 
probably view the UK as a less interesting cooperation partner, 
since it would no longer have leverage on EU policy towards China. 
In fact on 22 February 2016 the Chinese foreign ministry issued a 
statement virtually identical to that of President Obama in 
preferring the UK’s continued membership of a strong EU.   
Conclusion. Overall UK foreign policy has nothing to gain but 
a lot to lose by secession. The US regards UK secession as an act that 
would undermine the strength of the Atlantic alliance, and the rest 
of the EU would regard it as damaging their collective interests.  The 
advocates of secession deny how far this would translate into a loss 
of friends and influence in Europe and the world, and even invent 
illusions of enhanced status.  
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A final point - short but grave 
A final point of the utmost gravity can be made quite simply. If 
England voted in the referendum to leave the EU, while Scotland 
voted to remain, the stage would be set for an end to the United 
Kingdom. Opinion polls and political statements by the Scottish 
first minister suggest this scenario is quite possible. In this 
hypothesis the independent Scotland could be expected to seek to 
open accession negotiations with the EU while negotiating 
secession from the UK, and while at the same time as the UK was 
negotiating its own secession from the EU, which is an amazingly 
chaotic prospect. The EU, however, might well not agree to open 
negotiations with Scotland, inter alia, because Spain would fear 
contagion in relation to Catalonia. In addition there are serious 
worries in Ireland that the peaceful status quo there could be 
destabilised, with the re-introduction of border controls between 
north and south.  
For many British citizens, these alarming prospects may 
outweigh the more complicated technical considerations of 
economic policy set out above, but they still reinforce the overall 
conclusion that there is no Plan B that would be superior to Plan A.  
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PART II. QUESTIONS 
3. What is the Balance of Competences Review? 
The ultimate question is whether Britain should stay in the EU or 
secede, which Prime Minister Cameron has committed to put to a 
binding referendum on 23 June 2016.  
The referendum is intended to resolve this question once and 
for all, while setting a target date sufficiently far ahead to allow for 
negotiations with the EU and other member states to solve as many 
of the perceived problems as possible in the meantime, and for 
public debate to mature in parallel.  
To prepare the ground for defining its policy on Europe, in 
July 2012 the government launched a “Review of the Balance of 
Competences” of the EU, namely the balance between the EU and 
the member states in the distribution of powers. This is described in 
official documents as “an audit of what the EU does and how it 
affects the UK.”12  
The core question that the Balance of Competence Review 
addresses is whether the distribution of competences between the 
EU and national levels is about right or is in need of change, which 
could mean changes in either direction, with repatriation of 
competences from the EU back to the national level, or the 
strengthening of competences at the EU level, or both at the same 
time. These changes might represent mere adjustments or be more 
radical in amplitude.  
From the outset the Review was intended to collect objective 
evidence, with open invitations to any interested organisations, 
companies or persons to make submissions that would be analysed 
by the civil servants of the relevant government departments and 
published with transparent attribution of sources. In all, 32 sectoral 
                                                        
12 See Appendix A for website links to the individual Reviews, and the page 
numbers in the text refer to these sources.   
40  PART II.  QUESTIONS 
 
reviews were commissioned, covering the entire landscape of EU 
policies, and the results have now been published, totalling around 
3,000 pages of evidence submitted by some 1,500 independent 
individuals or organisations (see Annex A for links to the published 
materials).  
As to the rules of the game, the terms of reference for these 
reviews were not to reach explicit conclusions and 
recommendations, but rather to provide objective materials for 
others to do so. In fact, the many volumes of evidence provide a 
unique resource for anyone seriously interested in this question. 
Nothing like this has been done before – and there are many 
textbooks on European affairs. For this reason the present authors 
wished to distil conclusions from this substantial basis, reducing the 
mass of evidence to a short book while subjecting the findings to our 
own independent assessments. 
Regarding the political context, the Prime Minister set out his 
terms of engagement in the European question in his ‘Bloomberg’ 
speech in January 2013.13 While important as a political statement, 
the speech gave little indication of what he wanted, beyond such 
expressions as “the EU must change”, “power must be able to flow 
back to member states, not just away from them”, and the need “to 
negotiate a new settlement with our European partners” and for the 
EU to be “more flexible, more adaptable and more open”. A year 
later, in March 2014, the Prime Minister reiterated his position, 
using much the same language of negotiating a “new settlement”, 
with emphasis on “no to ever-closer union”; “no to unnecessary 
interference and red tape”; and more specific reference to 
immigration and “the free movement to take up work, not free 
benefits”.14 Many Conservative MPs talk of the need to “repatriate” 
competences of the EU, but mostly without stating which 
competences they have in mind, beyond the frequent references to 
immigration and certain labour market rules.  
                                                        
13 David Cameron, speech at Bloomberg on the Future of Europe, 23 
January 2013 (https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-speech-at-
bloomberg).  
14 David Cameron, “The EU is not working and we will change it”, Daily 
Telegraph, 17 March 2014. 
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Overall, there is a huge contrast between the comprehensive 
and concrete survey approach of the Balance of Competence Review 
on the one hand, and political speeches that are generally thin in 
terms of operational content on the other. It is the task of the former 
to inform the latter. 
4. What are the EU’s competences? 
The EU has accumulated many competences in recent decades. 
These are codified in several categories in the Lisbon Treaty, signed 
in December 2007.15  
The EU has a few ‘exclusive’ competences, where only the EU 
has the power to legislate in these areas. These are mainly in the 
field of international trade, and monetary policy in the eurozone. In 
these cases, the exclusivity is driven by practical realities, since 
customs union or monetary union could not function alongside 
multiple national policies.  
The EU has a greater number of ‘shared’ competences, as listed 
in Box 5, where both the EU and member states can legislate, with 
rules to prevent conflicting laws. The respective shares of the EU 
and member states can change over time, in either direction, 
depending on the extent of new legislation at either level, or the 
repeal of existing laws. Many of these competences are in the broad 
area of the single market, which requires many technical regulations 
to govern the supply of goods and services. 
The EU has several ‘supporting’ competences, where it may 
carry out certain actions to support, coordinate or supplement the 
actions of member states, but where the main responsibility lies 
with the member states, such as for public health and education.  
Two of the most important fields are the subject of more 
specific description under the Lisbon Treaty. For economic policy, for 
example, the treaty states that “member states shall coordinate their 
economic and employment policies within arrangements provided 
by the Treaty, which the Union shall have competence to provide” 
(Article 2.3, TFEU). These ‘arrangements’ include a considerable 
amount of legislation, most importantly for the eurozone. 
                                                        
15 More precisely, in Title I of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union – TFEU.  
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Box 5. The competences of the European Union as defined in the 
Lisbon Treaty 
Exclusive competences 
 Customs union competition policy 
 International trade policy 
 Monetary policy for members of the eurozone 
 Some aspects of fisheries policy 
Shared competences 
 Internal market  
 Social policy 
 Cohesion (regional) policy 
 Agriculture and fisheries 
 Environment 
 Consumer protection 
 Transport 
 Energy 
 Freedom, security and justice 
 Aspects of public health 
 Research and technological development16 
 Development cooperation and humanitarian assistance17 
Supporting competences 
 Protection of human health 
 Industry 
 Culture 
 Tourism 
 Education, training, youth and sport 
 Civil protection 
 
For foreign policy the treaty says that “The Union shall have 
competence, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty on 
European Union, to define and implement a common foreign and 
security policy), including the framing of a common defence policy” 
(Article 2.2, TFEU). The method remains largely inter-governmental 
                                                        
16 This sector has a modified form of shared competence, with the member 
states free to implement their own policies in these areas.  
17 This sector has a similar modified form of shared competence.  
BRITAIN’S FUTURE IN EUROPE  43 
 
here, however, with unanimity among member states forming the 
basic decision-making rule.  
The core method of the official Balance of Competence 
Review has been to work systematically through all of these 
competences, obtaining independent evidence on how each has 
been functioning. This has been a huge undertaking, never before 
conducted on this scale. For each of these Reviews the bottom-line 
question is whether the competence of the EU in this area, relative 
to the powers of the member states, is about right. Or are the EU’s 
competences excessive, or insufficient, for effective policy-making? 
The main part of the present study consists of summary 
assessments by expert authors in each area of the findings and 
judgments made in the 32 Reviews.  
The Reviews go deeper than the core question of whether the 
EU’s competences are ‘about right’ or not, and consider where there 
is scope for improving efficiency and effectiveness in the 
functioning of present competences, without necessarily calling into 
question their attribution to the EU. This is material for the ‘reform’ 
agenda.  
5. What are the underlying issues? 
While the question of whether or not to secede from the EU is, in 
principle, clear, the answers should be based on the clarification of 
a second tier of questions that go into the underlying issues at stake. 
These concern both the conditions for continued membership and 
the conditions for secession.  
On the conditions for continued membership, the political 
debate in the UK is using three keywords: reform, renegotiation and 
repatriation. There are crucial differences between these 
eventualities. 
Reform is a loose and maybe over-used term. It can embrace 
any steps that improve the status quo, either at the level of 
individual policies and laws, or on a grander scale. In the context of 
the EU, reform means measures taken by the EU as a whole, without 
special provision for a single member state, such as the UK. The 
political speeches of the British government mostly refer to 
achieving a “reformed EU”, which would be the basis for the 
government to recommend a Yes vote at the proposed referendum. 
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UK opinion polls are clear on this point: there is a large majority in 
favour of staying in a “reformed EU”, whereas the majority in 
favour of remaining in the EU without any such qualification is 
slender, or questionable. Reform is also part of the vocabulary of 
other EU leaders, and so in principle points to a positive way ahead. 
But then comes the question: What reforms? Here the Balance of 
Competence Review helps identify at the operational level where 
EU policies could be made more efficient, where so-called ‘red tape’ 
could be cut, etc.  
Renegotiation is about the UK receiving special treatment or 
‘opt-outs’ in relation to EU laws and policies. This has been done in 
the past, notably for contributions to the EU budget. As regards opt-
outs, the major cases of the euro and Schengen area were negotiated 
at a time when these policies were being shaped. The practical 
question is whether further opt-outs might be sought by the UK and 
successfully negotiated with other member states. 
Repatriation is about returning competences to the member 
states. This leads to the question of which competences might be 
targets for repatriation, and at what level. The first level consists of 
competences as defined in the Lisbon Treaty (as listed above). 
Repatriation would require unanimous agreement on treaty 
changes, followed by repeal of the numerous operational laws of the 
EU that have been passed on the basis of the treaty provisions. The 
second level consists of the individual legal regulations and 
directives, which can be repealed on an individual basis without 
withdrawing the EU competence at the treaty level. This enters into 
the detail of EU policies, and especially the many ‘shared’ 
competences of the EU, where the relative proportions of the 
sharing can be adjusted.  
On the conditions for secession, the British government would 
first need to work out what it would seek. The idea of a simple, big-
bang, unilateral repeal of all EU law on the British statute book is 
not plausible, since it would create a huge legal void and economic 
uncertainty. There would have to be a negotiated settlement. A 
number of scenarios are discussed in Part III, and each of these leads 
to the question of what the political and economic consequences for 
the UK would be.  
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PART III.  EVIDENCE 
6. Core single market policies 
6.1 Single market overview 
The Review of the single market surveys a vast field, with many of 
the subsequent Reviews going into more detail sector by sector. 
Overall, this Review observes a broad consensus that the single 
market is the EU’s core mechanism for advancing and sustaining its 
high level of economic development.  
It highlights the strong influence of the UK on the 
development of the single market. The big move towards 
completing the single market began in 1985, when the objective was 
set to achieve this goal by 1992 with the aid of 279 legislative 
measures, masterminded by Commissioner Lord Cockfield. There 
were two general keys to this achievement: first the move to 
qualified majority voting in the Council, and second the increased 
emphasis on the method of mutual recognition as opposed to 
harmonisation.  
Business interests note that the single market regime brings 
legal certainty and market openness, but also regulatory burdens. 
But these burdens are not necessarily greater than national 
regulations, and of course enterprises engaged in cross-border 
business are saved from having to master 28 different regulatory 
regimes.  
In seeking to summarise what powers remain in the hands of 
member states the Review rightly comments that there is no clear 
boundary between EU and national competences, but rather a 
continuous process of interactions. Member states remain free to act 
as long as they do not infringe upon EU law, and in particular any 
restrictions on the free movement of goods, services, people and 
capital are subject to legal challenge.  
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The Review analyses effects on the economy, on economic 
actors, and on policy-making. 
In goods markets integration in the single market has meant 
the development of complex cross-border supply chains for both 
material and service inputs. Integration has lagged behind in some 
important network industries, however, including energy, 
telecoms, transport and the digital IT sector. Whereas the early 
single market agenda has now reached a stage of maturity, for the 
network industries much remains to be done, and many popular 
comments that the EU is ‘over-regulated’ miss this point.  
As regards foreign direct investment (FDI), there is a 
particular British interest in the single market, since the UK has been 
winning a disproportionate share of the EU total, notably from 
Japan. It is generally thought that international investors would 
downgrade the ranking of the UK as an investment location in the 
event of secession from the EU and its loss of completely secure 
access to the single market.  
Regarding the regulatory burden on businesses, there is a 
broad distinction in the Review between large internationally 
oriented businesses that place a high value on legal certainty for 
their operations, and small- and medium-sized businesses that do 
not export and would prefer less regulation. UK respondents have 
two particular concerns; that the UK itself may be ‘gold-plating’ its 
implementation of EU regulations with unnecessarily costly 
provisions (but the evidence for this is not clear-cut); and that other 
member states may be less diligent than the UK in implementing 
such measures.  
As regards the policy-making process, the Review notes the 
significant influence of the UK in pushing single market policy in a 
liberalising direction, and indeed other liberally oriented member 
states are concerned that secession by the UK would weaken this 
strategic orientation. For UK interests contemplating the prospect of 
secession there would be a double risk; both that access to the EU 
market would become uncertain, and that the single market regime 
itself could become less liberal.  
Looking to the future, the Review considers that a new long-
term strategy for the single market will anyway be called for after 
the renewal of the Commission and Parliament in 2014. On the one 
hand this will need to fit in with the growing globalisation of the 
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world economy, and on the other hand to be reconciled with the 
widening scope of eurozone economic governance, notably in 
financial markets. On the question of specific priorities the Review 
highlights the case for the ‘digital single market’.  
Finally, the Review asks where the UK might gain from the 
EU doing less in the single market area. If this were to mean 
weakening the depth of integration, “it is hard to see that could be 
in the UK’s interest” (p.57 of the Review). Although it is easy to say 
that the EU should regulate less, justifying this in operational terms 
and deciding on what and how to regulate less is more of a 
challenge. The Review acknowledges the continuous pressure from 
markets and technological change to develop new or to revise 
existing regulations.  
“The EU could help itself in this area by, for example, 
ensuring it has a properly functioning mechanism that screened 
legislative proposals more systematically and objectively, for 
example that a proposal would only proceed if it clearly had a 
positive impact on growth” (p.57).  
The Commission’s REFIT programme aims to achieve this, 
which the Review does not mention.18  
Assessment 
At the strategic level the Review shows the UK to have been a driver 
in support of a liberal regulatory order in the single market. The 
appreciable economic benefits of the single market to the EU as a 
whole including the UK are considered matters of broad consensus. 
The UK’s interest in the single market is highlighted by its success 
in attracting a disproportionate share of foreign direct investment 
from third countries, which would be undermined by secession. 
The Review does not explicitly discuss the consequences of 
hypothetical secession for the UK’s access to the single market A 
seceding UK would surely wish to retain secure access to the EU 
single market, but the only evident model for doing this is the EEA 
regime enjoyed by Norway, which the British Prime Minister has 
ruled out on the grounds that it would mean an unacceptable loss 
                                                        
18 European Commission, “Regulatory Fitness and Performance (REFIT): 
Results and Next Steps”, COM(2013)685, final, 2 October 2013. 
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of sovereignty. Yet anything less than this opens up a huge 
unknown as to what the post-secession regime would consist of. 
One hypothesis is that existing EU market legislation would remain 
in force unless and until it were repealed or replaced. If the UK were 
to adopt a selective approach its present guarantee of full access to 
the single market would be undermined. What is certain is that a 
seceding UK would have no say in new EU regulations or the 
revision of old ones, and no assurance at all that the direction of EU 
single market policies would be in the UK’s interests. As the Review 
clearly shows, the EU’s single market regulatory processes are in 
continuous interaction with the dynamics of globalisation and 
technological change, so merely keeping existing EU regulation on 
the books would soon become an obsolete option. 
Postscript. Regarding the ‘red tape’ issue, and subsequent to 
publication of the Review, the Juncker Commission taking office in 
October 2014 appointed Frans Timmermans to the new position of 
First Vice-President, charged with the task of screening legislative 
proposals for subsidiarity and proportionality (discussed in more 
detail in section 12.2 below). 
 
The evidence at a glance – single market overview 
Strategic priority for the UK, with leadership role since the ‘1992’ 
programme reform 
Large majority support for EU competence 
Advantages of legal certainty, openness, and avoidance of 28 different 
regulatory regimes 
National regulations would not necessarily be lighter, some ‘gold-plating’ 
by UK  
6.2 Free movement of goods 
This Review covers much the same ground as the preceding one at 
the level of general strategic arguments, confirming the priority 
given to the single market by successive British governments. It 
does go into more detail on Lord Cockfield’s programme to 
eliminate cross-border restrictions by 1992, however. The plan had 
two key innovations that overcame previous obstacles that slowed 
progress towards the single market objective to a snail’s pace. The 
first was to switch the decision-making rule for single market 
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legislation to qualified majority rather than unanimity, which 
enabled the Cockfield plan to be implemented. The second was to 
reduce the burden of harmonisation of product standards by a ‘new 
approach’ extending the use of the mutual recognition principle. 
From 1979 onwards there had been a number of rulings by the 
European Court of Justice that established the mutual recognition 
principle, for example in a number of landmark cases for liqueurs 
and beer.19  
The Review explains in some detail how the new approach of 
the ‘1992 programme’ overhauled the previous system more 
generally and radically. Legislation would be restricted to 
identifying the essential health or safety requirements, and technical 
specifications were now to be entrusted to European 
standardisation bodies. If products were made to conform to these 
standards they would gain the ‘presumption of conformity’. 
Manufacturers could still produce goods according to other 
technical standards, but in this case they could be required to justify 
them to the mutual recognition authorities of member states. The 
new approach is now taken for granted, such that reversal to the 
situation that prevailed some 30 years ago would be unthinkable. 
Still, it may be noted that Prime Minister Cameron’s flagship speech 
on Europe on 23 January 2013 barely recognised this, with wording 
such as “the EU cannot harmonise everything”.  
However, the conclusions of the review on the EU’s 
competences for the free movement of goods may be considered to 
reflect the broad European consensus on the question, not just a 
British view. “The majority of respondents to this review, including 
most respondent from business organisations and individual firms, 
                                                        
19 The landmark Cassis de Dijon ruling of 1979 where Germany blocked the 
import of this French liqueur on the grounds that its alcohol content was 
below the minimum set by German law, even though the product was in 
conformity with French law. The Court of Justice ruled that an importing 
member state could not forbid the sale of a product that was in conformity 
with the exporting member state. It took time for this principle to gain 
general acceptance, however, as was seen in the 1988 case around the 
German beer ‘purity’ law (Reinheitsgebot) dating back to 1487, which was 
being used to prevent the import of Dutch Heineken beer, for example, on 
the grounds that it endangered the health of German consumers. The Court 
of Justice again supported the case that these imports could not be blocked.  
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supported the current balance of competence on the free movement 
of goods…. They felt that the advantages of EU action – for example 
a level playing field for UK businesses and a single transparent set 
of rules with scope for legal redress – outweighed the costs arising 
from administrative burdens, regulatory costs or policy trade-offs” 
(p.6). 
Beyond this general assessment, the Review goes in some 
detail into a number of key issues. 
Supply chain economics are seen to have become an 
increasingly important factor in the structure and functioning of 
European industry. The UK’s automotive sector sources 90% of 
motor vehicle components from the EU, for example. For this and 
other sectors the need for fast, reliable and low-cost shipment of 
goods across borders for ‘just-in-time’ delivery is a competitivity 
factor of paramount importance. The removal of the need to make 
customs declarations has represented a major administrative 
simplification and cost-reducing factor. This is taken for granted 
now, but would re-emerge as an issue if the UK left the customs 
union.  
The EU’s competence in the field of intellectual property 
rights is a complex matter, which the Review examines. The 
findings from stakeholder representations were that the EU’s 
responsibilities for the ‘Trade Mark’ and ‘Design Right’ received 
strong support. The European Patents Convention and Patent Office 
have simplified the process of obtaining patent protection across 
Europe, while the forthcoming Unitary Patent and Unified Patent 
Court are seen as strengthening enforcement.  
There remain some exceptional categories where member 
states can restrict imports of goods from elsewhere in the EU. UK 
legislation, in particular, can require import or export licenses for 
antiquities of cultural value, drugs, firearms, animals and military 
goods. Customs controls are governed by EU law but execution 
remains in the hands of national customs services, and criminal 
offences are dealt with under national legislation. 
The Review reports findings on the costs of EU regulations as 
well as the benefits of open markets. Small businesses, especially 
those that do not export or import, complain most about the burden 
of EU regulations. However, the counterfactual case of not being 
subject to EU regulations would not mean freedom from regulation. 
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UK manufacturers would need to comply with EU standards in any 
case if they wished to export to the EU, and the UK would itself 
probably adopt laws and procedures similar to those set by the EU. 
At the same time it is considered desirable to devise regulatory 
regimes that where possible mitigate burdens on small enterprises, 
and this is an issue that the Commission seeks to address in a 
number of areas. 
The Review reports concern by representative business 
organisations over unequal performance of member states in 
implementing and enforcing EU rules. In the British case, while 
there is widespread demand for a light regulatory touch, there is 
also a legal culture that favours strict enforcement. 
Assessment 
The majority of evidence presented suggests that the balance of 
competence for the free movement of goods and intellectual 
property rights was in the UK’s interest. While some respondents 
advocated withdrawing competence from the EU, most 
respondents felt it better to work with and through the EU 
institutions. While there is concern for the EU’s competences to be 
executed more efficiently and effectively, the case for drastic 
deregulation found little support. Outside the EU, the UK would 
find itself adopting much the same regulatory standards, but with 
the disadvantage that divergences in product standards would 
reduce economies of scale on production lines, and lead to increased 
costs and prices. However, even inside the EU, product standards 
are voluntary rather than mandatory, such that if enterprises 
wished to aim predominantly at external markets there is nothing 
in the regulatory regime preventing them from producing goods 
according to the client country’s standards. 
 
The evidence at a glance – free movement of goods 
Key ‘1992’ reform: mutual recognition for goods standards 
Less reliance on harmonisation 
Trans-European supply-chain economics needs EU competence 
Useful complementary competences for Trade Marks and Patents 
Little support for return to national regulations that would re-open the field 
for unfair practices between member states 
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6.3 Free movement of services 
This is one of the most important chapters in the Balance of 
Competences Review, for several reasons. Services account for an 
increasing share of the modern economy and involve a highly 
complex and differentiated set of sub-sectors, with correspondingly 
complex regulatory requirements. The British government is at the 
forefront of those pushing for ‘completion’ of the internal market 
for services, which is currently still fragmented by a huge variety of 
inconsistent national regulations. There are also technological 
trends in the economy that blur the distinction between goods, 
where the internal market is largely completed, versus services, 
where it is less so.  
The Review recounts the evolution of the EU’s competence in 
this field. The free movement of services and freedom of 
establishment for individuals and companies was already 
enshrined in the Treaty of Rome and carried over in successive 
treaties up to the current Treaty of Lisbon. Individuals and 
companies can go to the European Court of Justice to secure 
enforcement of their rights under the treaties, and as a result a wide 
body of case law has developed. From the early days this put much 
emphasis on the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of 
nationality. However, this approach has been progressively 
extended to measures that, while not strictly discriminatory, would 
be liable to impede the supply of services from other member states. 
Nonetheless, many remaining restrictions meant that the 
services sector still lagged some way behind the goods sector in the 
degree of true openness in the single market, and given the growing 
importance of services to the economy it was increasingly felt that a 
more ambitious approach was required. This led to the proposed 
Services Directive of 2004, which sought to radically apply the 
‘country of origin’ principle, or in other words mutual recognition 
of the regulatory regimes of each member state. This went beyond 
what the political market could take, however, and political 
polemics emerged, as famously represented by the ‘Polish plumber’ 
who would be undercutting the native plumber in France.  
As a result a highly complex directive finally emerged in 2006, 
with many sub-sectors securing protection for a host of specific 
national provisions. The directive is nevertheless recognised as 
BRITAIN’S FUTURE IN EUROPE  53 
 
having made a major advance in opening services markets. It 
applies to a very wide range of services that, in spite of various 
exclusions, are estimated to account for 46% of the EU’s GDP. The 
directive is described as being ‘horizontal’ since it sets out general 
principles to be observed for all service sectors that have not been 
explicitly excluded. The included sectors cover the regulated 
professions, craftsmen, business-related services, distributive 
trades, tourism, leisure services, construction services, information 
services, rental and leasing services, hotels and restaurants, real 
estate services etc. The excluded services are in several cases 
regulated separately by the EU under sector-specific legislation 
(financial services, transport, telecommunications, etc.), and the 
main real exclusions from EU competences are public health, public 
education and social services. 
The main substance of the directive consists of two lists, first 
of “prohibitions”, and secondly of “requirements to be evaluated” 
for the service sectors covered. The prohibitions include 
discrimination on grounds of nationality and many detailed 
restrictions on the activities of companies or service providers (e.g. 
a company cannot be required to make its main place of business in 
the member state where it supplies a service, or cannot be required 
to pre-register, or to limit its service for a certain length of time). The 
requirements to be evaluated, to assure that they are not restricting 
the openness of the single market, cover such cases as where the 
service provider should have a certain number of employees, or be 
restricted to one location, or have certain types of shareholders. 
Because of the huge complexity of the task of policing what 
practices might be inconsistent with the directive, there is recourse 
to a ‘mutual evaluation’ process of peer review of each member 
state’s practice by other member states. Member states are also 
required to undertake ‘screening’ exercises to test the compliance of 
their practices with the EU legislation. This has led to the 
elimination of thousands of illegitimate restrictions and, in the view 
of a detailed CEPS) report, the removal of barriers on a scale “far 
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more extensive and rigorous than could reasonably have been 
expected”.20 
For professions the EU has developed legislation for the 
Mutual Recognition of Professional Qualifications (MRPQ). This 
legislation has recently been revised with important new features, 
notably a transparency process to subject national practices to peer 
pressure and possible challenge, and the introduction of the 
European Professional Card, which may be adopted profession-by-
profession. 
The digital single market receives particular attention in the 
Review, and this is an example of an area where the British 
government recognises the need for an important application and 
development of EU competences, and has established a list of six 
priorities for this sector. All of these rely on regulatory action by the 
EU covering copyright, data protection, payment services, high-
speed broadband, telecoms and e-commerce. The digital economy 
is the fastest growing sub-sector of manifest importance for the EU’s 
competitiveness, and for this sector EU regulation is inescapable, as 
is the need for Europe to take a solid common position in 
negotiations with the United States in this area. 
In the area of public procurement the EU has adopted a 
package of new rules, which contributors of evidence to the report 
generally consider to be valuable in improving public procurement 
in the UK itself as well as in opening other markets. The defence 
procurement sector is dealt with separately, however, and is subject 
to efforts by the Commission to extend its effective EU competence. 
While the case for rationalisation of European defence industries is 
widely recognised, various stakeholders treat the prospect of 
enhanced EU competence cautiously, in view of its implications for 
national security.  
Assessment 
There was general support for the current balance of competence in 
this broad area, with the advantages of EU action outweighing the 
disadvantages. There were also calls for greater integration of the 
                                                        
20 Federica Mustilli and Jacques Pelkmans, “Access Barriers to Service 
Markets – Mapping, tracing, understanding and measuring”, CEPS Special 
Report No. 77, CEPS, Brussels, June 2013. 
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single market for services, and the completion of the digital single 
market was cited as an example. It was recognised that even non-
exporting businesses have benefited from the liberalisation of 
domestic service markets, and that any national legislation would 
not be dissimilar to the current EU regime. 
Services are more important to the UK economy than for 
many other member states, and business associations welcome 
liberalisation at the EU level for this reason. The British Chambers 
of Commerce note that “free movement of services is a critical 
aspect of EU membership as it provides our members with access to 
a market of 500 million people. The UK is the second largest 
exporter of services in the world”. The Federation of Small 
Businesses notes that those of its members that do service business 
abroad do so overwhelmingly with other European countries.  
Incomplete or ineffective implementation of existing services 
legislation has hindered the development of the free movement of 
services. There is scope to go further in services liberalisation within 
the current level of EU competence, extending the ‘country of 
origin’ principle further within specific sub-sectors. 
There has to be consistency in the narrative calling for 
completion of the internal market for services and a reduction of 
regulations coming out of Brussels. Popular calls for cutting EU ‘red 
tape’ are often too general and simplistic, failing to recognise that if 
the UK’s national interest in the completion of the services market 
is to be achieved, many inconsistent national regulations will have 
to be replaced by European legislation.  
 
The evidence at a glance – services 
Broad support for EU competence, strong UK economic interests 
UK highly active on the reform agenda to complete internal market 
EU regulation needed to replace inconsistent national regulations 
Digital sector urgently needs more developed EU policy 
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6.4 Free movement of capital and financial services* 
This is one of the most detailed and complex case studies in the 
entire Balance of Competence Review, with a very substantial 
documentation of evidence. This is not surprising, given that 
financial services are vital for the City and the UK economy in 
general. The City is the second largest global financial centre, and a 
leader in many sectors. For a large and diverse financial hub like 
London, free branching and free provision of services across the 
whole of the EU are considerable benefits, and any other regime 
would be a considerable disadvantage for the City. However, the 
overarching need to find solutions to the financial crisis that began 
in 2007 brings huge complexities to the interactions between EU 
financial markets policies and those of the eurozone.  
The EU’s regulatory regime, as with international rules and 
standards in the financial markets sector, has been subject to 
dramatic reform since the onset of the financial crisis in 2007. While 
the EU’s policies before the crisis focused on opening up the EU 
internal market, since the crisis the emphasis has shifted massively 
onto the issues of financial stability and the soundness of banks. 
In response to the global financial crisis, reforms at the EU 
level were initiated in 2009 with the recommendations of the de 
Larosière report,21 which noted the grave shortcomings of the 
existing system of fragmented national supervisory authorities. 
Enhanced EU competence in this field became a strategic imperative 
for the EU economy as a whole and the UK in particular. The 
Review records how the de Larosière report led eventually to the 
establishment of a completely new European System of Financial 
Supervision (ESFS), with several agencies created in 2011, including 
the European Banking Authority (EBA) located in London, and the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) located in 
Paris.  
The EBA is entrusted with devising the European Single 
Rulebook, which had been proposed by the UK government in 2009 
                                                        
* This section was contributed by Karel Lannoo. 
21 Report of “The High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU”, 
chaired by Jacques de Larosière, 25 February 2009 (http://ec.europa.eu/ 
internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf). 
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before its subsequent adoption by the European Council. The Single 
Rulebook aims to provide a set of harmonised rules that financial 
institutions throughout the EU must respect. It allows the EU to 
adopt more directly applicable regulations and implementing rules. 
The disadvantage of such a rulebook may be a lack of 
proportionality, which is certainly an issue for less developed 
financial centres and systems. But it should be noted that the UK 
was at the forefront of advocating the Single Rulebook in order to 
protect the integrity of EU wholesale financial markets, which are at 
the heart of the City’s interests.  
Going beyond these developments in the EU-wide system, 
eurozone  member states have been driven to take more radical 
steps to defend their financial system. Under the heading ‘banking 
union’, these initiatives comprise a Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM) run by the European Central Bank, and a Single Resolution 
Mechanism (SRM) to handle emergency cases of failing banks. The 
UK has negotiated for itself (and any other non-euro member state) 
provisions for it not to participate in the banking union, and at the 
same time to protect its interests against possible discriminatory 
measures taken by the eurozone. These protections concern the role 
of the EBA in relation to the Single Resolution Mechanism, and the 
EBA’s relations with the European Central Bank as bank supervisor. 
The detail of these provisions is about avoiding discrimination, 
sticking to common EU competition policy rules and voting practice 
in the EBA (p.18). Given the volume of interactions between the 
functioning of EU financial markets and that of the eurozone, the 
key point to note here for the UK is that with good will on both sides 
it proved possible to successfully negotiate both non-participation 
in the banking union and non-discrimination against the non-
participating member states.  
The Review still argues that significant reform of the EU’s 
policy-making framework is needed, and that the quality of policy-
making is uneven. These criticisms are no different from what is 
heard in other financial centres or from other players in the EU. It 
should be recalled that many problems with policy-making 
originate from the wishes of UK policy-makers, such as for the 
Single Rulebook, or are a reaction to some controversial practices in 
the UK financial market, notably bonuses (on which more below). 
58  PART III. EVIDENCE 
 
Many of the respondents made detailed and targeted 
criticisms, covering “the quality of the Commission’s impact 
assessments, consultations, and policy-making and policy 
proposals”. However “respondents had few criticisms to make 
where the Commission had consulted properly or faithfully 
transposed international standards” (p.86). These reactions can be 
heard in other countries as well, or in other sectors. It is widely 
acknowledged that re-regulation of the financial sector had to be 
pushed through at lightning speed after the financial crisis, and was 
largely agreed at global level, in the context of the London and 
subsequent G-20 Summits. The EU Commission could have reacted 
faster, but expertise was probably lacking more within the 
European Parliament and many member states in the EU Council. 
The quality of impact assessments can certainly be improved upon, 
but interest groups often have very biased definitions of impact 
assessments. 
The Review refers extensively to the three cases in which the 
UK challenged EU law before the European Court of Justice (CJEU). 
The first concerns the Short Selling Regulation, and the possibility 
for the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to ban 
short selling in emergency situations, which the UK challenged on 
the grounds that the powers conferred to ESMA were unlawful. 
This challenge was dismissed by the Court on all grounds. The 
CJEU found that in an emergency situation such measures taken by 
ESMA would be in the interests of guarding financial stability. The 
review cites the Bar Council’s response to the Court judgment, 
arguing that its reasoning was “very troubling”. 
The second case challenged, but has not yet settled, concerns 
about access to euro-denominated financial instruments outside the 
eurozone, which the UK challenges on single market grounds. The 
location policy of the ECB specifies that clearing houses that clear 
euro-denominated financial instruments above a certain threshold 
must be located in the euro area. However, as this is a monetary 
policy related rule, it seems unlikely that the EU’s challenge will be 
upheld by the Court. 
The third case refers to the ‘bonus cap’ in the Capital 
Requirements Directive (CRD), which is implementing the Basel III 
rules in European law. An amendment introduced by the European 
Parliament in the legislative process caps bonuses to one-times-
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salary (or two-times with shareholders’ approval). The UK 
challenged this on grounds of the treaty base and procedure. The 
relevant provisions lack evidence and were not supported by the 
Commission’s impact assessment, it is argued (p.88). However, the 
UK withdrew its challenge in November 2014 after it became 
apparent that it would not succeed in the European Court.  
Assessment 
The division of competences between the EU and the UK in financial 
services is considered in the Review to be “broadly appropriate” 
(p.5). But in deepening this assessment it is necessary to distinguish 
between matters of strategic reform and system development, 
versus matters of policy improvement. 
At the strategic level, first of all, there is consensus on the need 
for the EU competence to ensure freedom of movement of payments 
and capital. 
Secondly, as regards financial stability consensus also 
emerged that the pre-crisis system of fragmented national 
supervisory authorities was defective and had to be corrected with 
a new European system of financial supervision with several new 
EU agencies. It was also agreed, with strong UK backing, that there 
should be a single rulebook for regulatory standards. These reforms 
were rushed through in response to the emergency.  
Thirdly, it became apparent that the supervisory system of the 
eurozone  system itself needed further reinforcement, which has led 
to the banking union, in which the UK does not participate, but UK 
respondents to the Review show support for the eurozone itself.  
Fourthly, complex issues regarding inter-relations between 
the EU financial market system and the banking union have 
emerged. Here, the UK has effectively negotiated a sophisticated 
system to control for non-discrimination in eurozone measures 
towards non-eurozone member states.  
With respect to the details of EU financial sector regulation, 
respondents raise various criticisms about poor policy-making and 
inadequate impact assessments and consultations, which are 
concerns largely shared by other EU member states. The UK 
government has gone further in challenging the EU over three cases 
before the CJEU, but which most observers would not give (or have 
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given) a good chance of success. The Review concludes that the UK 
should engage earlier and more effectively with the EU institutions, 
as well as with other member states.  
The UK government itself still struggles to find a balanced 
approach to financial sector regulation, seven years after the start of 
the financial crisis. The UK’s financial markets have continued to 
suffer from its light regulation approach, as illustrated recently (in 
November 2014, subsequent to publication of the Review) in the 
fines that had to be levied as a result of the huge foreign exchange 
rate-rigging practices.  
Postscript. Since publication of the Review a new development 
is the capital markets union – an idea floated by the incoming 
President of the Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker. The possible 
content of this initiative will be of keen interest to the UK, and the 
incoming British Commissioner, Jonathan Hill, will be responsible 
for fleshing it out.  
 
The evidence at a glance – financial services 
Single market for financial services strategic for the City and the UK 
EU regulatory approach radically reformed since 2008 crisis 
More emphasis now on financial stability mechanisms, compared to past 
market-opening policies 
Big challenge of reconciling single market with the needs of the eurozone  
UK secures non-participation in banking union and non-discrimination for 
non-euro member states 
Continuing debate over policy details and Court cases  
New capital market union idea to be explored, of interest to the UK 
6.5 Free movement of people* 
Britain’s debate over the free movement of people within the EU has 
generated more heat than light. Nonetheless, it remains at the heart 
of why the UK attitude towards European integration has shifted 
from one of sceptical, but relatively benign neglect, to one of 
                                                        
* This section was contributed by Hugo Brady. 
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officially defensive hostility.22 EU-watchers therefore eagerly 
awaited the government’s Balance of Competences Review on this 
topic, to set out officially how free movement impacts Britain’s 
national interests.23 Publication of the Review was actually delayed 
for several months, divergent views were reported on its implicit 
conclusions, with Conservative ministers taking a more critical view 
of the status quo than their Liberal-Democrat colleagues. 
A key reason why the free movement of people has become 
such a hot political issue for Britain is traced to its decision not to 
restrict access to its labour market in 2004, on the eve of the 
accession of the eight new member states. This meant that the spike 
in arrivals of nationals from these countries to the UK was much 
sharper than for many other member states that retained 
transitional restrictions. Between 2004 and 2012, the number of EU 
citizens resident in Britain more than doubled from 1.1 million to 
2.3 million. Flows were significantly lower from Bulgaria and 
Romania, which received only staggered access to the UK labour 
market until January 2014. The more recent accession of Croatia has 
had no perceptible impact on immigration to the UK.  
The report discusses the impact of free movement on Britain 
in terms of actual numbers, the impact on the welfare state, public 
order and the economy (broken down by sector, such as medicine, 
engineering and architecture). Helpfully, it includes a section on 
how some 1.4-2.2 million Britons abroad make use of, and clearly 
benefit from free movement rights, such as British retirees in Spain 
and France, and how the EU’s social security arrangements operate 
in this respect.24 The analysis here focuses on the need for an even 
application of free- movement-related legislation across all member 
                                                        
22 See, for example, David Cameron’s intervention: “Free movement needs 
to be less free”, Financial Times, 26 November 2013. 
23 The relevant EU legislation under review is the free movement Directive 
(2004); the Council Regulation on the free movement of workers (2011); a 
Directive on the enforcement of the free movement rights (adopted 2014); 
the EU’s social security Regulation (2004) and the Directive on the mutual 
recognition of professional qualifications (latest amendments adopted in 
2013). 
24 The discrepancy between the estimated figures could be because many 
Britons spend part of their year abroad and part at home.  
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states. For example, the decades-long discrimination faced by non-
native EU university lecturers in Italy is highlighted.  
Broadly, the text supports the view that intra-EU migration is 
positive for the UK economy noting that, according to the UK’s 
Office for National Statistics, some 60% of EU migrants coming to 
Britain to work already have job offers on arrival. The Russell Group 
– a UK research consortium that includes Britain’s highest ranked 
universities – points out that non-UK EU nationals make up some 
13.4% of researchers across its members (including Oxford, 
Cambridge, the LSE and Kings College London). 
The City of London mounted a robust defence of intra-EU 
migration, noting that the average EU migrant pays around £23,000 
per year in taxes while spending significantly on UK goods and 
services to the benefit of the wider economy, while being less likely 
to draw on public services such as the National Health Service. 
These facts are becoming more widely acknowledged in the UK 
with the result that the debate has moved on to focus more on the 
exportability of benefits, and questions of housing and school 
places. According to a study cited in the Review, some two-thirds 
of local councils in England expected to experience a shortage of 
school places by September 2016. 
Public opinion in the UK has swung drastically against the 
free movement of people over the last decade, with a YouGov poll 
recording that nearly half the population was against the principle 
in 2013 from a position of two-thirds in favour in 2005. (UK 
unemployment remained low by historical standards, even during 
the 2008-2010 period of economic crisis, but more natives than 
migrants lost their jobs.) Many Britons feel that free movement is no 
longer fair; that it has become massively one-sided in terms of flows. 
EU/EEA immigration rose from 10% of UK net migration in the 
1970s to almost 40% by 2007. So-called ‘benefit tourism’ has become 
a totemic issue in the ‘fairness’ debate, since European migrants 
have the right to draw down universal benefits such as disability or 
children’s allowance, if the children are not resident in the UK (see 
the postscript below).  
The Review stresses the measures that the Cameron 
government has taken to restrict abuse of free movement within the 
bounds of the current legislation, noting also that other EU 
governments such as Germany have also taken action to combat 
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‘poverty immigration’ from elsewhere in the Union. The 
government has tightened up the immigration regulations that give 
effect to EU free movement rules in Britain. For example, since 1st 
April 2014, newly arrived EU migrants are no longer eligible for 
housing benefit in the UK. The UK has also made it harder for 
migrants who lose their ‘right to reside’ in Britain through long 
periods of economic inactivity to re-enter the country after a short 
interregnum. The ‘right to reside’ requirement was introduced to 
Britain’s ‘Habitual Residency Test’ in 2004 as a means of managing 
an expected increase in EU migration. The criteria to qualify for the 
‘right to reside’ are designed to ensure that only those migrants 
whose ‘centre of interest’ is the UK and who have some prospect of 
employment are eligible for benefits.  
The residence test is currently the subject of an infraction 
proceeding against the UK taken by the Commission to the 
European Court of Justice. The Review notes hopefully that CJEU 
case law seems to support the arguments of Britain’s lawyers that 
member states have the right to make access to benefits by EU 
nationals who are not economically active conditional upon them 
meeting the necessary requirements for obtaining a legal right of 
residence in the host member state (see below, the postscript).  
Assessment 
The report on free movement presents a far broader range of facts 
and analysis on this sensitive topic than is usually in evidence in 
Britain’s debate on Europe. For the first time, for example, we read 
evidence from Britons exercising free movement rights abroad 
(there are ‘expat’ pensioners’ associations with chapters in France 
and Spain). Moreover, various professional associations (such as the 
Architects Registration Board), regional governments and large 
firms are supporting the case for free movement.  
On balance, the evidence points toward some changes to a 
free movement regime originally designed to operate between six 
broadly similar countries to better reflect a Union now far more 
diverse in incomes, social security arrangements, work expectations 
and migratory patterns.  
But the Review’s concluding passages lend conspicuous 
weight to the views of a single expert, who considers the UK’s 
opening to Central and Eastern Europe in 2004 an historical error, 
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arguing that free movement has dangerously unbalanced Britain’s 
social contract. He argues that EU rules need to be re-cast to allow 
preference to be given to native workers in certain instances; that 
transitional arrangements for allowing new EU members access to 
Britain’s labour market need to be based on more flexible criteria 
such as income disparity and economic convergence; and that 
governments should be free to impose caps on inward EU 
migration. This last ‘cap’ idea would clearly be unacceptable to the 
EU as a whole, and its retention in the conclusions of the Review is 
a reminder of the highly politicised context that surrounded the 
finalisation and delayed publication of this text.  
Postscript. Subsequent to the publication of the Review there 
have been two significant developments. First, the CJEU made a 
ruling in the Dano case (C-333/13) in November 2014 that 
supported national competences in deciding upon residence 
requirements and their significance in determining eligibility for 
certain social benefits. While the case in point was in Germany, the 
ruling is supporting rather than undermining national competences 
in this field, and the British Prime Minister noted that it was “simple 
common sense”.  
Second, on 28 November 2014, the Prime Minister set out in 
detail what he hopes to negotiate with the EU in order to control 
immigration from the EU more strictly, without breaking the 
principle of free movement of people. These proposals include: 
- denial of tax credits, and housing benefits for EU citizens 
before four years of residence; 
- removal of job seekers if they find no job within six months; 
- stronger measures to deport criminals; 
- no payment of child benefits for children resident abroad; and 
- a longer waiting period for free movement for citizens of 
future acceding states. 
The detailed legal analysis of these proposals are a mixed bag 
of measures, where in some cases the UK is entitled to take freely as 
a matter on national competence, of others that would be more 
difficult in that they require legislation by the EU decided by 
qualified majority, and some that would seem to be virtually 
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impossible in requiring treaty change to be decided unanimously by 
all member states and ratified by all national parliaments.25  
This is the only instance so far where the Prime Minster has 
set out an operational agenda for negotiation or re-negotiation with 
the EU, hinting that some solutions might be either through EU-
wide legislation, or new special provisions for the UK. It is 
significant that these are the Prime Minister’s proposals, not those 
of the coalition government with the Liberal Democrats, signalling 
only partial support from them. As a consequence, the proposals 
would only be formally addressed to the EU after the 2015 general 
election, and only then if there were an outright Conservative Party 
government. Reactions from Brussels indicate a willingness to 
examine these requests, but it would seem that negotiations can 
await the next British government.  
 
The evidence at a glance – free movement of people 
Competence for free movement fundamental in EU as a whole 
Sharply contested views in UK between interest groups and political parties 
2008 enlargement caused immigration spike in UK, heavily impacting public 
opinion 
UK residents in EU states equal number of other EU residents in UK 
CJEU case helpful in clarifying national competences for residence and thence 
access to certain social benefits 
Cameron announces operational reform or re-negotiation proposals, some 
within existing national competences, others requiring EU agreement of 
varying difficulty 
6.6 Competition and consumer policies 
This Review covers both competition policy for which the Treaty 
provides the EU with ‘exclusive competence’ for “establishing the 
competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal 
market” (Article 3, TFEU), and consumer policy for which the 
Treaty provides for “shared competence” (Article 4, TFEU). 
                                                        
25 For a detailed review, see Steve Peers, “EU Law Analysis” 
(http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2014/11/the-nine-labours-of-
cameron-analysis-of.html), 28 November 2014. 
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The competition policy divides between anti-trust provisions 
(Articles 101-106, TFEU) and state aid rules (Articles 107-109, 
TFEU). The competition rules prohibit anti-competitive agreements 
between undertakings and the abusive conduct of dominant 
undertakings.  
The state aid rules prohibit such aids in general, but with 
exemptions allowed for several categories of case: aid to small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); social aid to disabled people; 
regional aid; environmental aid; and research and innovation 
spending. These provisions originated in the Treaty of Rome and 
have not been materially changed since then. However, they have 
been further elaborated through numerous case decisions by the 
CJEU, and a merger control competence was introduced in 1989.  
For state aid, respondents gave evidence that there was broad 
agreement in principle on the current balance of competence (p.42). 
The Commission proposed a reform package in 2012, which 
resulted in Council regulations in 2013 that enlarged the exemptions 
categories and adopted procedures to handle complaints faster and 
more predictably. The Commission has also revised its ‘Guidelines’ 
to enable it to concentrate on cases that have the biggest impact of 
the internal market. There has been debate whether the minimum 
size (actually €200,000) of aid should be raised before EU controls. 
The UK coalition government and the Commission have agreed that 
this would not be really helpful, and that extending exemption 
categories might be a better approach. 
For competition policy the Review explains the relationship 
between the EU’s competences and national competition policies, 
and the UK’s Competition Act of 2008 is a case in point. Member 
states retain considerable autonomy in their enforcement of 
competition rules, and notably over cases that have no impact on 
inter-state trade, for which the EU has no competence. However, the 
UK’s Competition Act was deliberately modelled on EU law in 
order to ease the burden for businesses so that they would not have 
to respect two different regimes. The investigative and sanction 
powers of the UK authorities are similar to those of the Commission.  
Since 2004 the enforcement of EU anti-trust provisions has 
been reformed to allow greater decentralisation of enforcement to 
national competition authorities. There is considerable flexibility in 
the extent to which individual member states may take up these 
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possibilities, reflecting the varying strengths of national 
administrations. Stakeholders and respondents were clearly 
supporting the EU’s competence in this area as corresponding to the 
national interest, in making markets more effective and dynamic 
and ensuring a level playing field. The de-centralisation of 
enforcement was seen to be “an exemplar of subsidiarity working 
well in practice” (p.39). 
The level of fines on companies infringing competition rules 
can be very high; up to 10% of worldwide turnover, with both Intel 
and Microsoft having been fined over €1 billion for abuse of 
dominance. 
The competence for merger control is shared clearly between 
the EU and member states, with the EU only to act where the 
mergers have an ‘EU dimension’.  
Competition policy has an important international 
perspective, with the EU model having proved a significant factor 
in the expansion to 128 countries of competition policy regimes. In 
this regard the Review notes that “the EU system has proved to be 
a more popular transplant than the US one, the only feasible 
alternative, and many overseas competition regimes are modelled 
on EU provisions” (p.64).  
For consumer policy its legal foundations came much later 
with the Single European Act in 1987 and the Maastricht Treaty in 
1993. In this case of ‘shared competence’ between the EU and 
member states there is much scope for debate about how the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality should be applied. 
There has been a lively debate about whether EU consumer rules 
should specify minimum or maximum standards. Minimum 
standards allow for more flexibility in setting higher national 
standards where desired, and many UK stakeholders supported 
this view. The case for maximum standards is based on the need to 
avoid fragmenting the internal market. As a result of negotiations 
on this issue in response to the Commission Green Paper of 2007, 
the outcome was that most provisions should be harmonised at the 
maximum level, but with important exemptions to be allowed for 
certain categories of goods and services.  
A case in 2013 in which the Commission proposed to regulate 
the packaging of olive oil on the tables of restaurants illustrates the 
state of the debate over subsidiarity in the consumer policy domain. 
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The Commission had been lobbied by producers into proposing that 
olive oil had to be displayed in the original producer’s packaging to 
prevent consumers being afflicted by sub-standard olive oil. There 
was instant public outcry that this regulation was not really needed, 
and the proposal was rapidly withdrawn. This conforms to the 
doctrine advanced by the Commission nowadays that the EU 
should do fewer small things, and concentrate on big issues. 
Assessment 
The Review reports strong consensus on the need for centralised 
competences at the EU level for both anti-trust polices and the 
control of state aid. In the case of the UK there is good coherence 
between its national policies and those of the EU, with UK policies 
being modelled on those of the EU.  
Consumer policy is also an essential feature of an effective 
single market, and in ensuring that it works well for consumers and 
society as a whole.  
In all three cases – anti-trust, state aids and consumer policies 
– there has been lively debate about how to optimise the subsidiarity 
principle. In each case there is evidence of policy refinement or 
reform that includes elements of enhanced decentralisation, while 
in all cases there is a reasoned limitation to how far this should go.  
An interesting international aspect is that the EU model of 
competition policy is the one most emulated by other countries 
developing their own policies.  
 
The evidence at a glance – competition and consumer policies 
Stakeholders strongly support EU competition policy competence over cases 
affecting inter-state trade 
2004 reforms provide for greater decentralisation of enforcement, 
‘Exemplar’ of subsidiarity working well in practice 
2013 reforms of ‘Guidelines’ on state aid to focus on big cases 
For consumer policy balance of opinion favourable, with nuances 
Much copying internationally of the EU model as ‘best practice’ 
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6.7 Foreign trade and investment 
Trade policy is a core exclusive competence of the EU. There are 
nonetheless a number of second-order issues that concern the extent 
of this competence for both trade and investment. The report goes 
into these second-order issues in detail. It also reviews the 
hypothetical alternatives, if the UK wished to secede from the EU’s 
trade policy, which would necessarily mean secession from the EU, 
since wholesale repatriation of this competence is inconceivable.  
While the original competence of the EU (or earlier, the EEC) 
essentially concerned trade in goods, the importance of trade in 
services and trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights has 
been growing to the point that much case law of the European Court 
of Justice has enlarged the EU’s competence in these fields. This led 
to a tidying up of these particular competence questions in the 
Treaty of Lisbon, which also opened up investment protection as a 
field with some new exclusive competence for the EU.  
For services, the Treaty of Lisbon clarifies the EU’s exclusive 
competence to negotiate agreements over trade in services as 
defined in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) texts 
of the WTO. Similarly, for intellectual property rights the EU is now 
competent for negotiations in the field covered by the Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) texts of the WTO. 
While the extent of these competences had earlier been the subject 
of much uncertainty alongside many ad hoc rulings of the Court of 
Justice, the extension and clarification of EU competences did not 
meet with particular objections from stakeholders contributing 
evidence to the review.  
The field of investment protection has so far been occupied by 
bilateral investment protection treaties (‘BITs’), of which the 
member states have in force no fewer than 1,200 examples, and the 
UK on its own has 96. The case for an EU competence here is for 
simplification, clarity and a level playing field. However, the precise 
extent of the EU’s new post-Lisbon competence in this field is still 
to be clarified in two respects, namely whether it concerns only 
foreign direct investment or all investment, and whether it concerns 
only investment liberalisation agreements or also protection of 
actual investments. The Review considers that resolution of these 
issues will require rulings by the European Court of Justice.  
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A related question is whether future EU agreements in this 
field will be ‘exclusive’ or ‘mixed’ agreements, with member states 
retaining greater say in the legislative process in the latter case. 
There remain ambiguities over the extent of the EU’s competence to 
negotiate on behalf of member states in areas that remain national 
competences. Since the EU-Japan FTA mandate of 2012 the Council 
has started using a ‘double-decision’ mechanism whereby the 
Council authorises the Commission, in two separate acts, to 
negotiate issues of its exclusive competences on the one hand, and 
on the other its competences ‘shared’ with member states. The 
report remarks that the Commission does not support this 
mechanism, but goes along with it. 
The Review shows that stakeholders felt that trade and 
investment promotion, as opposed to trade policy, should remain a 
national competence, although the EU could provide a useful 
supporting role in this regard. This position would be considered 
uncontroversial in the EU as a whole, and there are no proposals for 
legal competence transfer in this field.  
The alternatives. The Review discusses six hypothetical 
alternatives for how trade policy could be handled from outside the 
EU (which are crucial to the question of secession, to which we 
return in the final chapter).  
i) Going it alone. The UK would have a ‘third country 
relationship’ with the EU, as any WTO member state that does not 
make a preferential agreement with it. Customs duties would be re-
introduced between the UK and the EU, thus diminishing trade 
flows. The UK would be free to negotiate free trade agreements 
(FTAs) with other countries, but whether it would be able to 
negotiate better deals than the EU is open to doubt, since its 
bargaining clout would be so much smaller.  
ii) The UK to make an FTA with the EU for trade in goods. This 
would require that complex ‘rules of origin’ be introduced, to prove 
that UK exports to the EU would have been sufficiently ‘made in the 
UK’. Compliance costs, including a lot of ‘red tape’, would amount 
to a significant non-tariff barrier.  
iii) The UK makes a more comprehensive FTA with the EU. There 
would be additional provisions for services and investment, like the 
EU-Korea agreement. This would still require the ‘rules of origin’ 
red tape, without guaranteeing full access to the single market.  
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iv) The UK joins the EU customs union from the outside, like 
Turkey. In this case the UK would still be bound by the EU’s external 
trade policy, without having fully guaranteed access to the single 
market.  
v) The UK joins the European Economic Area (EEA), like Norway. 
The EU would have the freedom to make its own trade policy with 
third countries, and would retain full guaranteed access to the 
single market. However, it would lose ‘sovereignty’ by having no 
say in the ongoing development of single market policies.  
vi) The UK makes a more flexible agreement with the EU, like 
Switzerland. This consists of a bundle of agreements that would 
almost amount to being in the EEA. This was the ad hoc patching 
up of the system after Switzerland voted in a referendum against 
joining the EEA. The Swiss model is criticised within the EU for its 
cherry-picking, complex nature; it is thus unlikely that the EU 
would be willing to replicate it for the UK.  
Assessment 
The large majority of stakeholders responding to the call for 
evidence expressed the view that the existing competences of the 
EU in the field of trade and investment were “broadly appropriate”, 
or that they saw “no advantages in altering the current balance of 
competences in this area”, although there were a few dissenting 
opinions. The Review traced the evolution of the EU’s competences, 
including the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty that clarified, updated 
and somewhat extended these competences, such as in the services 
area. These developments were not contested, however. 
There remain concerns of a more detailed character. These 
involve the fine-tuning of the competences of the EU alongside 
those of the member states, notably in the area of ‘shared’ 
competences. In addition, there are calls for greater transparency 
and more comprehensive impact assessments to be made by the 
Commission in relation to ongoing negotiations for new free trade 
agreements. The present author concurs with that, having in mind 
the new model of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements 
(DCFTAs) with countries of the European neighbourhood, where 
huge blocks of EU legislation have been included for compliance by 
the partner states, with no evident assessment of where the costs of 
compliance might be unreasonably high.  
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Since any basic repatriation of this competence to member 
states is out of the question, the alternatives have to involve the 
hypothesis of secession by the UK. The report does therefore 
thoroughly review the landscape of alternatives, but on inspection 
they all reveal serious disadvantages or risks attached to them. 
Finally, the Review considers that the EU, with the UK outside it, 
would be more protectionist, and more willing to use trade defence 
instruments, including against the UK.  
 “The evidence received for stakeholders generally suggests 
that the balance of competences in this area allows the UK to achieve 
results that are in the national interest” (p .6). 
 
The evidence at a glance - foreign trade and investment 
Core exclusive competence of EU in trade policy not contested 
No advantages in changing current balance of competence 
No good options for trade policy regimes in the event of secession  
 
7. Sectoral policies 
7.1 Transport* 
Transport is a competence shared between the EU and its member 
states, which means that both may adopt legally binding acts in this 
policy area but the latter only insofar as the former has not exercised 
its competences or has explicitly ceased to do so. Seen through this 
prism, the Department for Transport, which drew up this particular 
Review, rightly uses a broad definition of EU competence in the 
transport context, namely that it is about everything deriving from 
EU law that affects what happens to transport in the UK. As such, 
this Review links in with issues that are covered in others, for 
example those on the standardisation of goods, customs security 
procedures, environmental standards, employment issues, etc. 
In the transport field the Council acts by qualified majority 
voting, meaning that the UK, like any other single member state, 
                                                        
* This section was contributed by Steven Blockmans. 
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does not have the power of veto. The evidence collected suggests 
that, generally speaking, this is not problematic. British domestic 
transport policy and experience is seen as one of the models for EU 
proposals on transport market reforms and liberalisation: “[t]he UK 
has been a leading advocate for the development of the single 
market in transport across all modes, and in the 1980s and 1990s led 
efforts to break down national barriers within the EU to the 
provision of transport services across borders and within other 
countries, to the benefit of UK businesses and consumers” (p.13). 
While respondents perceive the balance of competence to 
heavily favour the EU in legislation, they are generally happy with 
the current legislative framework and do not advocate adjustment 
of that balance. It was acknowledged that EU-level legislation can 
achieve (and has achieved) much more than UK legislation can do 
on its own. 
EU transport policies concern all modes: road, rail, air, water, 
maritime, ports. The Review draws attention to some striking 
achievements, notably in the civil aviation sector. The UK’s largest 
low-cost carrier declared: “EasyJet is a product of the EU’s 
deregulation of the European aviation market. Without 
deregulation we would not exist” (p.24). A graph shows how the 
average fare paid by UK-resident passengers on intra-EU flights 
had fallen by half over the last 15 years, whereas trans-Atlantic fares 
had barely fallen (p.25).  
The British opt-out from the Schengen area is identified as 
posing a challenge: “The prospect of new rail services from points 
of departure across the EU has created a significant challenge for 
both UK and Schengen border control authorities in identifying 
border control solutions for rail which support the rapid transit of 
high speed intercity services” (p.19). 
While the balance of competences in transport is generally 
strongly supported, so too are the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. There is broad support for the leading role of the 
EU in international agreements as it provides consistency, 
standardisation and a level playing field for markets in all 28 EU 
member states and relevant third countries, which in turn provides 
greater legal certainty. The EU is perceived as being able to amplify 
the voices of the component member states (e.g. in international 
organisations) and extract greater commitments to liberalisation of 
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global markets and fair competition from third countries like China 
or the US.  
The UK government was, however, keen to reiterate its stance 
that any EU statement in international organisations on issues 
where competence is shared between the EU and the member states 
must make clear that it is delivered on behalf of the member states 
and the EU. To avoid ‘representation creep’, the UK also takes a 
more restrictive view than the Commission of the extent to which 
EU Delegations may deliver EU statements in line with Article 17 
TEU (see below, on Foreign Policy).  
There is also frustration among stakeholders about EU 
initiatives to legislate in areas where regulation at the global level 
would be preferable to creating regional systems that lead to losses 
of global competitiveness for European industries, e.g. maritime 
port services and the emissions trading system (ETS) in aviation. But 
there also is an awareness that global agreements may be 
unachievable.  
When it comes to non-intra-European issues and greater 
scope for national handling of purely domestic issues, some 
stakeholders (e.g. in the tourism sector) urge the EU to legislate with 
a lighter touch, or not at all. The greater body of evidence from 
across all transport modes shows frustration where the creation of 
a single market has been held back by ineffective implementation. 
EU mechanisms used to implement change were often felt to create 
additional costs and regulatory burdens, or lack enforcement by the 
European Commission across the 28 member states.  
While British industry recognises the value of common 
assessment procedures, operating standards and technical product 
standards in helping to reduce red tape and costs in manufacturing, 
in spurring innovation, facilitating interoperability and increasing 
the potential for exports through opening markets in other member 
states, and that these benefits would not exist across the EU without 
EU action, there was also concern at the perceived use of common 
standards in other fields, such as safety, environment or social 
policy, to claw back market freedoms and allow the potential 
imposition of national barriers, possibly in a protectionist way. 
Many of the responses to the call for evidence were centred on social 
standards in road transport.  
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As concerns the issue of better regulation, a general message 
from stakeholders is that the European Commission should 
recognise the maturity of the EU as an organisation, focusing less on 
making proposals for new legislation and concentrating more on 
enforcement of existing legislation. The Review also states that 
nearly all stakeholders feel that before making proposals for 
legislation, the Commission should undertake more openly 
evidenced impact assessments that set out clearly the potential costs 
and benefits. 
Assessment. The UK has generally been a leading advocate 
for the development of a single market in transport services, which 
is at the core of the EU’s common transport policy. This Review 
suggests that the current balance of EU competences in the field of 
transport is broadly right. Evidence from experts shows that there 
is broad support for the EU common transport policy to continue 
yielding those benefits for Britain. There is no consensus that 
individual areas of EU transport law should fall outside the 
competence of the EU in the future. However, there is a general 
view among stakeholders that the way to achieve further 
liberalisation is, in many cases, through more effective 
implementation and enforcement of existing legislation rather than 
through continually seeking new legislation. There is evidence of 
frustration with some of the social, safety and environmental rules, 
especially where these impinge on purely domestic transport 
without any international dimension. The concerns expressed about 
new regulatory burdens and costs mean that there is still much 
work to be done to find the right level of legislative prescription that 
achieves the stated aims without imposing disproportionate costs 
or prohibiting innovation. 
 
The evidence at a glance – transport 
UK driver of single market in transport, influential policy model 
Striking deregulation results, e.g. UK passenger air fares in EU cut by half 
EU competence broadly right, strongly supported by stakeholders 
EU policy in transport judged ‘mature’ 
Need for enforcement of present laws, more than for new ones 
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7.2 Energy* 
The UK is both the third largest producer and consumer of energy 
in the European Union. However, while final energy consumption 
is picking up as a consequence of economic recovery, domestic 
production of crude oil, natural gas and hard coal continues to 
decrease rapidly.26 Since three-quarters of the UK’s energy mix are 
still based on fossil fuels, import dependency is rising quickly. In 
fact, while the UK has mostly been a net exporter of energy since 
1980, it became a net importer again in 2004 and by 2012 imported 
some 42% of its energy needs. In addition, the heavy dependence on 
fossil fuels causes the UK to remain the second largest emitter of 
greenhouse gases in the EU, with emissions again on the rise since 
2011. Finally, the UK – like other EU member states – has been facing 
increasing oil and electricity prices, in particular since 2003, despite 
full liberalisation of electricity and gas markets in the late 1990s. 
Concerns about energy prices and competition, security of energy 
supplies and climate change have thus increased the attention given 
to energy policy in the UK over the past decade, inter alia leading to 
the establishment of its own government department in October 
2008. 
Most of these concerns, however, are not UK specific but have 
been shared by the majority of other EU member states. From this 
point of view it is not surprising that the UK was a major driver of 
EU energy policy, in particular with the 2005 Hampton Court 
informal European summit being considered as a major new 
impetus for a more common approach to energy at the EU level. In 
fact, it was this summit that led to the European Commission Green 
Paper on “A European strategy for sustainable, competitive and 
secure energy” in 2006, which in turn laid the foundations for the 
EU’s energy and climate change package and the related 2020 
targets agreed upon in 2007 – the centrepiece of EU energy and 
climate policy to this day. 
                                                        
* This section was contributed by Arno Behrens. 
26 For example, UK natural gas production decreased from 98 million 
tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe) in 2000 to 35 Mtoe in 2012. Similarly, UK 
crude oil and natural gas liquids (NGL) production decreased from 128 
Mtoe in 2000 to 46 Mtoe in 2012. 
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While the UK has particular interests as a major producer of 
energy sources (some of which are well guarded in the Lisbon 
Treaty, see below), it also benefits from a more European approach 
towards the European energy market. This is particularly the case 
regarding further integration of the internal market, which has 
always been at the heart of the UK approach towards EU energy 
policy. The energy review is very clear in this respect, highlighting 
the creation of a level playing field for competition within the single 
market as a key benefit for the UK, together with the facilitation of 
cross-border trading, enhancing interconnectivity and improving 
security of supply as a result of physical market integration.  
Although the internal energy market was to be ‘completed’ 
by 2014, slow or partial implementation of the ‘third energy 
package’ by some member states means that many barriers to 
competition are likely to remain for a while. This is rightly criticised 
in the energy review, which calls for more effective monitoring by 
the Commission and appropriate action (infringement procedures) 
where member states fail to implement existing legislation. The 
report also mentions that the UK experienced disadvantages from 
over-implementation (‘gold plating’) of EU internal energy market 
legislation in some areas, and indeed, the UK currently faces no 
infringement procedures, either under the second or the third 
energy package.  
However, the report does not mention the fact that the UK 
itself has more recently deviated from its market-oriented approach 
by adopting the Energy Act in 2013, which includes inter alia 
provisions for so-called Contracts for Difference (CfDs) as well as 
for capacity markets. Such provisions will most likely not only 
increase electricity prices in the future, but – worse than that – will 
increasingly lead to the replacement of market rules with national 
regulations as the basis for investment decisions. Although in 
October 2014 the European Commission found that price support in 
the form of CfD for the new Hinkley Point nuclear power station 
did not contradict EU state aid rules, such measures are designed as 
national policy instruments, thus further undermining the internal 
energy market and efforts to deliver cost-effective solutions through 
competition. 
The Review also reflects the strong interest of UK 
stakeholders in the security of energy supplies. In this respect, the 
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main emphasis of the report is on infrastructure and the exploitation 
of domestic energy sources. Regarding infrastructure, an EU-wide 
approach was found to be particularly effective regarding common 
rules for trans-boundary interconnection projects and EU funding 
through the Connecting Europe Facility, from which the UK will 
also be able to benefit. The first list of ‘Projects of Common Interest’ 
includes several UK clustered electricity interconnection projects, a 
smart grid project and gas projects involving Northern Ireland.  
Enthusiasm for a pan-European approach to energy 
infrastructure was counterbalanced by scepticism towards EU 
action regarding the exploitation of oil and gas reserves in the North 
Sea and the refining of fossil fuels. Article 194 (TFEU) of the Lisbon 
Treaty clearly protects a member state’s right “to determine the 
conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between 
different energy sources and the general structure of its energy 
supply”. Fears of upstream stakeholders are therefore more 
oriented towards EU safety legislation and changes to the technical 
Network Codes. Similarly, the UK energy sector seems to see no 
need for additional EU legislation on shale gas exploitation, 
although environmental groups noted that existing national and EU 
legislation was not sufficient to mitigate potential environmental 
impacts. 
As a result of this dichotomy, the Review reflects a 
contradiction between those who criticise the fact that security of 
supply issues had not been given sufficient weight at EU level and 
those who believe national solutions are more appropriate to secure 
supplies. Declining domestic reserves and increasing import 
dependence may shift future preferences further towards 
strengthening the EU component in security of supply policies. 
Since environment and climate change have already been 
dealt with in the context of a separate review (see the next section), 
the one for energy focuses mainly on renewable energy sources, 
energy efficiency, and carbon capture and storage. Not surprisingly, 
the renewables sector and environmental groups argue that EU 
targets and policies had helped the UK to advance further on 
renewable energy and energy efficiency than it would otherwise 
have done in the absence of such actions.  
But the Review also correctly identifies the need for more 
policy coherence between multiple EU targets (i.e. climate, 
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renewables and energy efficiency). In this respect, the report reflects 
the debate about whether technology-specific targets are a cost-
effective means to achieve emissions reductions. In particular, the 
focus on renewables is said to distort the market by undermining 
the carbon price signal and reducing incentives to invest in carbon 
capture and storage technologies (and other low carbon energy 
sources), which have large potential in the UK. 
Assessment 
Overall, the energy review provides a balanced overview of the 
successes and failures of EU energy policy, as well as its advantages 
and disadvantages for the UK. Looking at the key challenges that lie 
ahead in the energy field from the viewpoint of UK stakeholders 
(see below), the Review concludes that more EU energy policy could 
benefit the UK in addressing these challenges. Cases made for the 
UK to repatriate energy policy issues from the competences of the 
EU are scarce.  
Three prime challenges are identified. The first concerns the 
impact of growing global energy demand and geopolitical 
developments in the security of EU and UK energy supplies. As UK 
import dependency rises, the UK will increasingly benefit from 
more interconnections, EU funding for infrastructure development 
and increasing solidarity between member states, as laid down in 
the TFEU. The interdependence of member states calls for more 
collective action, in particular regarding network development and 
opening up markets, but also regarding a more coherent external 
action. Fears over EU intervention in national energy mixes are 
unfounded as the EU has no competence over such matters, leaving 
it up to the UK to exploit indigenous energy sources such as shale 
gas, nuclear or (clean) coal. 
The second challenge relates to the internal market as the 
means to secure a key objective of EU energy policy from the British 
standpoint, namely to assure a level playing field for competition, 
notably in a context in which there is actually an increasing 
disparity of energy prices between individual member states, with 
consequences for UK competitiveness. Concerns voiced in the 
report about the slow and partial implementation of internal market 
legislation in some member states are thus in stark contrast to the 
UK government’s recent initiatives to introduce more national 
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measures, including Contracts for Difference (CfDs) and capacity 
mechanisms, which will lead to further fragmentation of the 
internal market. This is counterintuitive to the review’s findings that 
a well-functioning internal energy market should place downward 
pressure on gas and electricity prices. More EU rather than less, i.e. 
fully functioning liberalised EU-wide electricity and gas markets, is 
what UK stakeholders seem to prefer. The UK should thus be 
leading this development in its own interest. This can best be done 
proactively from within the EU. A hypothetical EU secession, on the 
other hand, would leave the UK without the possibility to influence 
internal market legislation, even if it still had to implement it should 
it remain part of the single market. 
 
Postscript. Subsequent to publication of the energy review, 
negotiations over the EU’s ‘2030 framework’ were finally concluded 
in October 2014. The UK government initially supported a single 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction target in the context of the EU 
negotiations over its 2030 framework for climate and energy 
policies, which in turn is an essential input into the global climate 
change negotiations currently underway. While the UK advocated 
the adoption of a unilateral EU-wide greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction target of 40% for 2030, it was opposed to specifying 
particular ways in which this target must be achieved. In order to 
preserve flexibility and allow member states to choose the best and 
most cost-effective way to meet their emissions reduction 
commitments, the UK government did not initially support either a 
renewable energy target to be included in the 2030 framework, or a 
binding energy efficiency target.  
The final agreement reached in October 2014 was different, 
but still seems to be a good compromise for the UK. It includes a 
binding 40% greenhouse gas emissions reduction target (to be 
translated into binding targets at member state level for the non-ETS 
sectors), but downgraded the 27% renewables target to an 
obligation only binding on the EU level. What this means precisely 
is still unclear, but there will certainly not be binding commitments 
for member states to reach national targets. The 27% energy 
efficiency target also remains indicative and thus neither binding on 
the EU nor on the member state level. This compromise is 
favourable to the UK position. In particular, it steers a path between 
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those member states that advocated a less ambitious climate target 
on the one hand, and those that favoured higher and binding 
obligations on renewables and energy efficiency on the other. While 
the UK could surely pursue an ambitious national climate policy − 
also outside of the EU − more cost-effective solutions can be found 
through concerted action (e.g. through the EU’s emissions trading 
system, pioneered by the UK as a pilot national scheme from 2002). 
The UK actually received much of what it wanted in the 2030 
framework agreement reached in October 2014. 
  
The evidence at a glance – energy 
Competence justified by common concerns for security of supplies and 
single market  
UK a main driver for EU policy, especially now that own oil and gas 
production declines 
UK drive for fully liberalised and integrated internal market for efficiency 
and security 
Some UK policies are less liberal, but accepted under EU state aid policy 
New 2030 EU framework reforms agreed to boost renewables, but with 
details left to member states, as the UK wanted 
 
7.3 Environment and climate change* 
The review of the development of environmental and climate 
change legislation gives a clear grounding to consider the objectives 
and balance of legislation developed so far, and the options for its 
further development. 
The major turning point for facilitating EU environmental 
legislation came with the 1987 Single European Act, which 
introduced qualified majority (QMV) voting into the legislative 
process, including for environmental legislation. During that 
period, the UK was under considerable pressure from other 
member states on environmental issues. It was no coincidence that 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s promotion of the long-term 
                                                        
* This section was contributed by Michael Wriglesworth. 
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issue of climate change emerged at a time when the pressures in 
favour of QMV voting were building up in the Council. 
The climate change issue has distinctive characteristics, 
including complicated interactions, in particular with energy policy 
and its shared legal competences in the EU. So the balance of 
competences for climate change is best addressed separately, even 
if the legal basis used for much of the EU legislation in this area has 
been environmental. 
Environment. The Review correctly identifies that EU 
environmental legislation started with the purpose of protecting the 
proper functioning of the single market. The fundamental issue is 
over how to achieve environmental objectives, while ensuring a 
level playing field for competition within the single market. 
Whereas the single market objective is clearly a UK priority, the 
competitive consequences of uneven application of environmental 
(and social) legislation within the single market are not well 
understood by the general public or by some in industry. Germany, 
also a strong supporter of the single market, has often taken the lead 
in enacting and promoting strong environmental (and social) 
legislation, while not wanting to be placed at a competitive 
disadvantage as a result. 
The Review reflects the strong interest in environmental 
protection in the UK, even if there is less agreement on how this is 
best achieved, locally, or through EU and international cooperation. 
In the consultation some respondents considered that lack of trans-
boundary impact is a sufficient reason for the EU to abstain from 
individual actions. Other respondents advocated reliance on the 
principles of subsidiarity and/or proportionality. However, there 
was no case made for the UK to repatriate environment from the 
competences of the EU as a general proposition. There was strong 
recognition of the benefits of setting high environmental standards 
at EU level, and of extending such approaches more widely, at UN 
level and in trade agreements, often using the powerful principle of 
the ‘technical equivalence’ of standards. 
A contentious issue concerns the protection of natural 
habitats, and related assessments of environmental impact. At the 
heart of the former are different views about the value of protecting 
the natural environment. In the past there has been some contention 
between the Commission and the UK about the implementation of 
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the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Directive, relating to a 
series of projects, including motorways and a major oil pipeline 
project in Scotland. The tension here is that the UK has led in 
promoting the EIA approach, but fallen foul of implementing the 
EU directive incorporating these principles.  
This is a familiar UK problem, when a UK-supported 
approach becomes burdensome in its implementation at the EU 
level. There is a balance of judgements here between welcoming 
implementation of UK-initiated principles, and recognising that 
implementation at the EU level will inevitably become rather more 
bureaucratic than a UK national approach. 
The Review picks out important tensions between the 
interests of larger exporting companies in the setting of standards 
within the single market, and SMEs’ concerns that increased 
legislation can lead to administrative burdens they can ill afford. 
Linked to this are the twin concerns that implementation of EU 
legislation is both over-elaborate (‘gold-plated’) in the case of the 
UK, and less stringently implemented in some other member states. 
These issues have parallels in other areas, such as in social, health 
and safety legislation. The Review correctly identifies that a balance 
needs to be struck between these tensions, and that this balance 
might be improved. 
The UK originally led in developing the ‘environmental 
quality’ approach to setting standards, based on the view that the 
environmental impact of emissions is key in making cost-effective 
choices to achieve high environmental standards, such as in air and 
water quality. The Review sets out the important development and 
implementation in the EU of the ‘precautionary principle’, and the 
approach grounded in the EU treaty that the polluter must pay. As 
part of the precautionary principle the Review sets out another 
important contribution that the UK has helped to make in 
developing environmental and health legislation; namely assessing 
and managing risk once hazards have been identified.  
This is helpful for resolving tensions over some of the most 
contentious environmental legislation, namely the REACH 
Regulation to control hazardous chemicals, where intrinsic hazard 
is approached by a process of risk assessment and risk management. 
The UK initiated the EU process that led to agreement of the 
REACH, but this is often used as an example of EU legislation that 
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is burdensome for companies, especially SMEs. However, REACH 
does not seem to be an example of the UK over-elaborating, or ‘gold-
plating’, legislation in implementation. REACH is actually an 
example of legislative simplification, replacing a number of 
directives and regulations with a single system to control dangerous 
chemicals. Registration is centralised in a single system through the 
EU Chemical Agency, to allow free movement of chemicals within 
the single market. There is a case now being considered, however, 
for the implementation of REACH to be further simplified, 
especially to make its registration and reporting obligations less 
burdensome for SMEs. 
A major concern about the REACH approach for international 
chemical companies has been that once implemented in Europe, an 
equivalent approach to REACH should be adopted in the US, and 
this has in fact started to happen.  
Overall, the Review makes the case for the EU to further apply 
the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity to environmental 
policy and legislation, which the Netherlands is also supporting, 
rather than identifying scope to repatriate to the UK legal 
competences in this environmental area. 
Climate change. The major characteristic of the climate 
change issue is the need for international agreement and 
cooperation, even though this is proving difficult to achieve. The 
key issues - mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions, transfer of 
technology, and adaptation to expected impacts of climate change - 
all need agreed global responses, both to be effective, and to ensure 
that less developed countries are also able to contribute to global 
effort. 
The Review recognises that the need to agree actions and 
cooperation in implementation calls for shared competences, both 
at global UNFCCC level, and particularly in the EU. Specifically, the 
EU acts as a team in UNFCCC negotiations, first agreeing its own 
positions by EU consensus, before moving on to the more 
challenging UN level. 
The EU, and within it the UK, have a long record of leadership 
roles on these issues, and the UK has been the more effective by 
being an active member of the EU team within the UNFCCC. This 
is recognised in the Review, and expressed as UK influence being 
amplified by the EU. The concern of a minority of respondents that 
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the UK’s voice might not be adequately reflected in EU decisions is 
not borne out by the record of the EU’s role in the UNFCCC, nor in 
EU legislation that has been agreed. Partly, this derives from the 
initiative of former Prime Minister Thatcher to put the UK in a 
leading role, both in UNFCCC and in the EU, including nomination 
of the then head of the UK Meteorological Service as the first chair 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), as part 
of the UN process.  
A fundamental aspect of climate change policy is how closely 
it interacts with energy policy, for which there is also shared 
competence between member states and the EU. In particular, the 
crucial choice of fuel mix, and so carbon emissions, is specifically 
reserved for member states. Germany and the UK have led in 
ensuring that EU team effort on climate change will not compromise 
these national energy priorities. These two member states started 
with rather different views on the suitability of emissions trading as 
the central instrument of EU policy in implementing climate change 
obligations, but they were able to resolve their differences.  
The EU’s Emission Trading System (ETS) is the lynchpin of 
concerted action on climate change, giving the European 
Commission important standing in relation to member state 
strategies. To prepare an ETS allocation plan, a member state must 
prepare a mitigation strategy for all of its emissions, and these 
strategies need to add up to the EU’s overall commitment. Industry 
lobbying resulted in over-allocation of emission allowances, which, 
compounded by the recession, has slashed the price of CO2 
allowances. This does not negate, however, the strategic importance 
of putting a price on carbon, which principle the UK asserted, at the 
UN and EU levels.  
A fundamental point for the UK in climate change policy is 
that for its major interests to be protected, it is vital to remain 
engaged as a full member state. A current example is the UK’s 
concern (shared by other member states) not to have renewable 
energy targets imposed as part of a 2030 climate change and energy 
package. A UK half-engaged, say by remaining within the EU single 
market, but not as a full member state, might find itself having to 
meet EU requirements without being able to represent its major 
concerns in the course of the EU’s legislative process. 
86  PART III. EVIDENCE 
 
Assessment 
The Review has shown that the UK has been both a major driver 
and a beneficiary of EU environmental policy, and a leader on 
climate change policy, both within the EU and at UN level. The 
consequences of a hypothetical UK secession from the EU would 
compromise the UK’s ability to lead and steer effectively, whilst 
leaving it vulnerable to being required to contribute to EU internal 
and international commitments as a condition of continued 
membership of the single market, but without having a say in what 
is agreed.  
Many in the UK welcome the drive to improve EU 
environmental standards. This has been in many fields, including 
coastal bathing and drinking water, urban air quality associated 
with single market standards for vehicles and fuels, waste disposal 
and ground water protection. Improved environmental quality in 
these fields is on the record, as it is for dangerous substances and 
installations (‘Seveso’ Directives), and for chemicals. 
There is an issue over the detail and reach of EU 
environmental legislation, but here the UK can surely join with its 
EU partners in seeking regulatory simplification, whilst 
maintaining high standards. Then there will be the further 
opportunity to join with its EU partners in taking these high 
environmental standards to the global market place. 
Postscript. As reported in the previous section, subsequent to 
publication of the Review, there were important developments in 
October 2014 with agreement on the EU’s ‘2030 framework’ for both 
energy and climate change policies. 
 
The evidence at a glance – environment and climate change 
The UK is a leader of climate change policy in EU and through the EU at 
UN level 
The UK is both a major driver and beneficiary of EU environmental policy 
Need for subsidiarity and proportionality in environmental regulations 
Case for simplifying some regulations (e.g. REACH for chemicals) for 
SMEs 
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7.4 Agriculture* 
Agriculture is a field in which the EU has extensive competences. 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) combines a greater degree 
of regulatory harmonisation, common financing and economic 
integration than any other area of EU activity. Moreover, it is a 
policy that British governments have always considered to be 
disadvantageous to UK interests. Since agriculture is less important 
to the British economy than in other member states, and British 
farms are generally larger in size, the UK receives relatively little 
benefit from CAP rules designed to support market prices and 
farmers’ incomes. For British commentators agricultural policy is 
often perceived as the most negative aspect of EU membership, both 
from a general economic point of view (transfer of resources to 
inefficient producers) and financially (for many years agriculture 
took the largest share of the EU budget, and for the period 2014-2020 
it still takes 36%). In fact, the high level of EU expenditure on 
agriculture, combined with Britain’s limited receipts, was and 
continues to be the main justification for the UK’s demand for a 
budgetary ‘rebate’. 
Against this background, it is not surprising that the Review 
contains strong criticism of the EU’s agricultural policy. The 
majority of respondents argued that “the CAP remains misdirected, 
cumbersome, costly and bureaucratic”, or that “the CAP’s objectives 
remain unclear and the criteria for allocation of funding are 
irrational and disconnected from what the policy should be aiming 
to achieve” (p.5).  
Nevertheless, there is “a recognition that the CAP) has 
changed significantly, particularly over the past 30 years. The most 
damaging and trade-distorting elements have been removed and 
the UK has played a significant role in driving reform” (p.5). The 
focus of the CAP has switched decisively from indiscriminate 
support of market prices to direct support of farm incomes and 
enhancement of the environment: Europe’s butter mountains and 
wine lakes have long since disappeared. The practice of dumping 
agricultural products on world markets ended with the progressive 
reduction of export refunds from 1993 to practically zero by 2010. 
                                                        
* This section was contributed by Graham Avery. 
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The reform process has had several major episodes, starting with 
the MacSharry reforms from 1992, which cut back on market 
support measures in exchange for income support. In 1999 market 
intervention prices were reduced and brought closer to world 
market prices, and from 2006 income support was decoupled from 
production levels. 
The report on agriculture, like other reports, includes no 
explicit conclusions and makes no proposals. It explains 
scrupulously that it does not predetermine or prejudge proposals in 
the future for changes to the EU or about the appropriate balance of 
competences. 
The first question addressed is: “Should decisions on 
agricultural policy be made at the European, national, or other 
levels?” On this, the conclusions to be drawn from the Review are 
rather clear. In view of the single market for agricultural goods, and 
the EU’s role in international negotiations on agricultural trade, the 
EU’s competence in agricultural policy is justified. On the question 
of external competence, the evidence of the Scotch Whisky 
Association is particularly robust: it has “identified over 450 tariff 
and non-tariff barriers affecting Scotch in more than 150 of its export 
markets outside the EU. Future export growth for Scotch Whisky is 
therefore heavily dependent on the removal of trade barriers 
through the trade policy and market access work of the 
Commission” (p.51). 
But in relation to other objectives of agricultural policy, such 
as income support for the farming community, rural development, 
and the supply of environmental goods, the question of competence 
is more debatable. The Review suggests that more account should 
be taken under the CAP of the principle of subsidiarity. It quotes the 
powerful argument of Harald Grethe (Professor at Hohenheim 
University) that “the economic nature of direct payments has 
changed fundamentally, from a production subsidy to a sectoral 
and personal income policy” and that “sectoral and personal 
income transfer policies are generally designed and financed at the 
Member State level, not at the EU level” (p.52).  
In the same line of argument, the report suggests more 
flexibility for national and regional implementation of EU rules, 
observing that diverse regional situations exist within the UK itself 
(England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland) and that some 
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competences are already devolved to regional governments. But it 
warns that more flexibility could lead to problems of unequal 
application: greater discretion for member states can lead farmers 
to suspect that ‘the grass is greener on the other side’. It recalls that 
a fundamental aim of the policy is to ensure fair competition 
between farmers in different member states and to avoid a subsidy 
race; it remarks that this tension between the need for recognition 
of local circumstances (‘one size cannot fit all’) and the need for fair 
competition (‘the level playing field’) has been identified in many 
other balance of competences reviews. 
On environmental aspects of the CAP), the report remarks 
that agri-environment schemes have been beneficial across Europe 
and provide a regime for conservation that might not otherwise 
exist. Positive arguments are offered by the Royal Society for the 
Protection of Birds (RSPB) - with more than 1 million members, 
Europe’s largest voluntary environmental organisation. The RSPB 
says that shared natural resources such as biodiversity, air, carbon 
stores and water require a cross-border approach, and that EU 
competence for agriculture, land management and plant health is 
clearly justified because these resources require an international 
framework for environmental protection. It also argues that the EU 
can take a longer-term view, and that its competence for agriculture 
helps to shield environmental investment from changes in 
government, and political priorities at national level.  
The second major question addressed is “What are the 
policy’s advantages or disadvantages from the point of view of the 
UK’s interests?” The budgetary cost of the CAP) has always been a 
focus of criticism in Britain. The report correctly remarks that “the 
UK contribution to EU expenditure on agriculture is complicated by 
the fact that it does not contribute to the CAP but to the overall EU 
budget; and its contribution is net of the UK abatement, sometimes 
called the rebate” (p.37). However the report also cautions that “this 
makes it difficult to estimate a net UK contribution to the CAP, but 
it also reports the more direct assessment that the rebate “has 
neutralised for UK taxpayers a major part of the CAP’s net costs” 
(p.38). 
An interesting aspect of the Review is its examination of the 
implications for the UK of radical options such as leaving the 
Common Agricultural Policy), or leaving the European Union 
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altogether. Here a key question is the level of national agricultural 
support that would replace the CAP: most respondents argued that 
it would be lower, but others noted that outside the EU both 
Norway and Switzerland have higher levels of agricultural support 
than the EU. 
A group of former British government officials (the Senior 
European Experts Group) suggested that with a return to separate 
national subsidies, there would be such a wide variation in the 
degrees of subsidy that a level playing field would be impossible; 
without EU action, there would either be a subsidy race between 
member states determined to protect their farmers, or a breakdown 
of the single market, or both. 
Several respondents argued that if the UK left the EU and 
followed the ‘Norway option’ (membership of the EEA) it would 
not have to apply the CAP but would nevertheless have to follow 
most single market rules, with no vote or influence over shaping 
them. The National Farmers Union commented that this would be 
“hugely risky to farmers, leading to lower farm prices, loss of the 
UK’s major export market, and reduced protection from imports 
produced to a lower standard” (p.79). 
On the question of British influence on the CAP) today, the 
report relays the plaintive comment that “the low number of UK 
nationals within the Commission means that our knowledge of 
agricultural economics and perspective on trade and the role of the 
market is not influencing the formulation of EU policy” (p.59). 
Assessment 
The Review on Agriculture, although critical of the CAP, shows that 
the policy has developed in ways that successive British 
governments have advocated; that the EU’s role in this sector is 
justified in relation to the internal market and external trade; that 
there are limits to the extent to which the subsidiarity principle can 
be applied in a sector such as agriculture; and that if Britain left the 
EU, it would still be directly affected by EU rules. This is a balanced 
and realistic approach, which will not be what British Eurosceptics 
expected. 
For the future, although the CAP is likely to remain a focus of 
British criticism, we can expect its long-term development to 
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respond to the dynamics of the EU’s economic and political 
situation. The need to focus the European budget’s limited 
resources on policies that promote growth and investment, the 
requirement to adapt agricultural policy mechanisms to diverse 
national and regional situations, and the logic of financing social 
income aids at the national level, will continue to drive reform of 
the CAP in a rational direction. 
 
The evidence at a glance – agriculture 
Competence justified for single market and external trade reasons 
Policy severely criticised, but reforms since 1990s are in directions 
advocated by the UK 
Shift from production to income support  
No more butter mountains, wine lakes and dumping on foreign markets 
Repatriation of farm income support has some minority advocates 
7.5 Fisheries* 
The European Union has an unhappy record in fisheries. For many 
years policy-makers, including European Commissioners for 
Fisheries, denounced the failure of the Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP) to achieve its objectives: fish stocks and employment in 
fisheries have been in constant decline. For the British, the policy 
had an inauspicious origin: it was adopted in 1970 by the ‘Six’ just 
before opening membership negotiations with the UK, which has 
more fisheries resources than any other EU member state. 
Successive attempts at reform failed to grasp the nettle of 
conserving fish stocks in order to support a sustainable industry. It 
is hardly surprising that British governments have been critical of 
the EU’s role in the management of fisheries policy, and British 
Eurosceptics have targeted the CFP as a candidate for ‘repatriation’ 
of powers from the EU to the national level. 
But as a result of the decisions on reform of the CFP taken in 
2013, this negative picture has changed. These decisions, taken 
                                                        
* This section was contributed by Graham Avery. 
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jointly by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, 
include fundamental changes: 
- a ban on ‘discards’ of fish at sea, to take effect between 2015 
and 2019 
- a legally binding commitment to fish at sustainable levels to 
achieve ‘maximum sustainable yield’ by 2015 where possible, 
and by 2020 at latest 
- decisions on annual quotas to be underpinned by scientific 
advice 
- decentralised decision-making, with regionalisation of 
fisheries management consistent with the principle of 
subsidiarity. 
The results of these reforms, which came into force only in 
January 2014, are yet to be seen, and their success will depend on 
effective implementation and rigorous enforcement throughout the 
EU. However, they were welcomed by the British government, and 
have been perceived by British commentators as a successful case of 
UK advocacy of EU reform, aided by enlightened support from the 
European Parliament. 
Against this background, the British government’s Balance of 
Competences report on fisheries is positive in tone, declaring that 
“the recent reforms, for which the UK Government pressed, are 
considered by many to have taken major steps to address the 
policy’s fundamental problems.” Many respondents “highlighted 
the opportunities presented by the new regionalisation process” 
and hoped that it would “end micromanagement, decentralise 
decision-making and allow more responsive fisheries management, 
yet still offer the benefits of central EU coordination” (p.26).” 
This report focuses on two questions: i) the balance of 
competences between the EU and the UK, and ii) the more general 
question of how the EU affects the UK and its national interests. 
The first question addressed is “Should decisions on fisheries 
policy be made at the European, national, or other levels?” On this, 
the report states that the majority of respondents support some form 
of supranational management of fisheries, due to the trans-
boundary nature of fish stocks. Many respondents considered it 
essential to have a central coordinator to set conservation objectives 
for all countries with an interest in a particular fishery. It is not 
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possible for one member state to achieve sustainable fisheries if 
another continues unsustainable practices, and conservation 
decisions at the EU level provide the opportunity to raise standards 
for fisheries management over a wider geographic area than the UK 
acting alone. 
Many criticisms are made of the way in which decisions have 
been taken by the EU on the setting of catch limits, with annual 
negotiations leading to unsatisfactory political compromises. Here 
the government’s report prudently refrains from comment, since 
British ministers took part in those political decisions. Concerning 
the quota system, the prize for candour goes to the Cornish Fish 
Producers Organisation, which states that although the system has 
many problems “it is very far from clear if any superior alternative 
is available.” 
A small number of respondents suggested alternative models 
of competence. A Conservative Party Green Paper and a report by 
the Tax-Payers’ Alliance on “What Powers David Cameron Would 
Need to Repatriate” suggested that fisheries policy should revert to 
exclusive national control of fisheries resources. The United 
Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) claimed that this would be 
worth £2.5 billion per year to the British economy. 
But others questioned whether these benefits could be 
achievable, given the shared nature of fisheries and the reduced 
strength of the UK’s negotiating position. A group of former British 
government officials (Senior European Experts Group) argued that 
if competence for fisheries is repatriated, the UK would need to 
negotiate with other countries (including EU countries) who 
currently share access to stocks, and that it could not mount a 
credible case for an increase in quotas at the expense of other 
countries, given that the current shares have been unchanged for 
over 30 years and are themselves based on historical fishing activity. 
The second question addressed is “What are the policy’s 
advantages or disadvantages from the point of view of the UK’s 
interests?” On the economic and social consequences of the CFP), 
the report notes the decreasing numbers of vessels and fishermen in 
the UK, in line with the trends seen across the EU, although the 
extent to which this reflects more effective fishing techniques and 
technology is unclear. However, other evidence suggests that the 
declining trend preceded the UK’s accession to the EU and was a 
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global phenomenon; countries outside of the CFP had also seen 
similar declines in vessel numbers. 
An interesting aspect of the report is its review of the 
implications of EU competence for reciprocal fisheries agreements 
with non-EU countries. Respondents pointed out that EU fisheries 
agreements with Norway and the Faroe Islands have delivered 
benefits for the UK. Thus British fishing opportunities in Norwegian 
waters are currently ‘paid for’ mostly by transfers of fishing 
opportunities from other member states to Norway. The report itself 
comments that the UK could reap benefits in the region of 
£17million per annum from the Norway Agreement. 
Assessment 
The Review contains many justified criticisms of the Common 
Fisheries Policy, but is positive about the EU’s recent decisions on 
reform. It is instructive in showing that, in British fisheries circles, 
the logic of EU competence and EU coordination is generally 
accepted. The European fisheries industry now has the prospect of 
a period of policy stability in which the various elements of the 
reform can be applied, and hopefully achieve the desired results. 
The report also demonstrates that, in this sector, reform of a 
common policy has been successfully advocated and negotiated by 
the British government with its EU partners, with the aid of the 
European Parliament. This has wider implications for the British 
political debate on the EU. Statements of ministers quoted in the 
report are much more positive than what we usually hear from the 
British government.  
According to the Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, “for 
years people said the Common Fisheries Policy was beyond reform. 
Yet we led the way on a historic agreement that will transform 
fishing practices across Europe, and end micro-management from 
Brussels, massively benefiting our fishing industry and our marine 
environment” (p.26). The Minister for Europe, David Lidington, 
declares “this has shown how the UK can work successfully with 
European partners to deliver significant reforms that benefit our 
country” (p.26). These are political messages that, in the British 
context, should have a wider resonance. 
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The evidence at a glance – fisheries 
Competence justified to prevent unsustainable over-fishing and external 
negotiations 
Early policy severely criticised, but repatriation would be highly 
problematic 
Radically reformed in 2013, with ban on discards at sea, binding 
sustainability constraints and more decentralised management  
7.6 Food safety and animal welfare 
There is a large amount of very detailed EU regulation here, and the 
Review lists almost one hundred regulations or directives. The 
summary conclusion of the Review was: “While many respondents 
expressed support for the current balance, the evidence also 
demonstrated several areas for improvement” (p.56). Respondents 
from the farm industry and related civil society organisations 
considered a harmonised approach to food safety and animal health 
as essential, and a competence for animal welfare at the EU level as 
“vital”. The Consumer Advisory Panel of the UK Food Safety 
Agency felt that the UK benefits from being part of EU food law, 
with no rationale for operating alone. It was thought unlikely that 
national legislation by the UK would be less rigorous than current 
EU practice. 
The UK’s trade in food and beverages with the EU is twice 
that with the rest of the world. The industry is now structured with 
extensive cross-border supply chains across the EU, which could 
not function without common technical standards and/or mutual 
recognition. Moreover, for food safety these supply chains must 
observe strict hygiene controls.  
Since 2003 the EU has been developing a far-reaching reform 
of its food law to tackle the problems of complex supply chains, 
establishing traceability obligations from covering ‘farm to fork’. 
The horse-meat scandal of 2013, which reverberated around the EU, 
demonstrated the need for correct enforcement of EU regulations, 
and not a lightening repatriation of EU competence. This case 
illustrated a broader political point; that while there is much 
political rhetoric about over-regulation by Brussels, whenever a 
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serious problem arises in the area of food safety the call is invariably 
to strengthen EU rules and/or their implementation.  
The outbreak of so-called ‘mad cow disease’ (BSE) has been 
the most serious instance of a food safety problem of European and 
international concern originating in the UK, resulting in widespread 
banning of UK beef exports. When the problem was overcome EU 
legislation enforced the re-opening of EU markets in 2006, with the 
aid of a European Court of Justice to make a dissenting member 
state comply. Russia’s ban lasted six years longer, however, while 
the US and Japanese markets remained closed. 
Respondents for Scottish whisky interests and producers of 
regionally branded products noted the strength of EU branding 
protection both within the EU and in international markets. 
The issue of whether the EU over-regulates or imposes 
excessive implementation burdens is discussed in the Review. The 
UK has been in the lead in advocating that the Commission progress 
with better and now smart regulation, with impact assessments 
needed to accompany all proposals. The Commission has been 
responding with new impact assessment guidelines, and annual 
publication of a report on application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality.27 Key concepts are ‘risk 
assessment’ and ‘risk management’, given that regulations that seek 
to be too absolute in eliminating food safety problems will lead to 
unduly heavy burdens. EU food law recognises these concepts, but 
some respondents argued that the EU (and the European 
Parliament in particular) was at times inclined to be unduly 
prescriptive and embrace proposals insufficiently based on 
scientific evidence. Important instances here involve highly 
controversial cases such as cloning and GMO elements in the food 
chain. 
The olive oil packaging affair of 2013, already described in 
section 6.6 above) has become an iconic case of a proposed 
regulation that failed to take the subsidiarity principle seriously. 
While the Commission was at fault for embracing the proposal, its 
response to the public outcry in rapid withdrawal of the proposal 
                                                        
27 The Commission produces an annual report on subsidiarity and 
proportionality, of which the latest for 2014 was published in July 2015 at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/better_regulation/reports_en.htm  
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illustrates the checks and balances that now exist around issue of 
subsidiarity.  
Animal welfare respondents indicated the importance of the 
UK having influenced the shaping of EU standards in a progressive 
direction. This brings out an interesting aspect of defining ‘British 
interests’. In this case the objective is to develop norms of 
significance for animal welfare as widely as possible, i.e. chickens in 
cages in general, not just ‘British chickens’. While progress on this 
account worldwide is extremely difficult to secure, at the EU level 
the UK’s leading advocacy has had a real impact.  
Assessment 
One of the most striking points made by the Review is that only 20% 
of consumers were aware that the EU was largely responsible for 
food safety regulation, while 75% preferred that it be a UK 
responsibility. This implies that the UK could do perfectly well by 
going it alone.  
The evidence presented is the opposite on both accounts. The 
EU is largely responsible for food safety and animal welfare law, 
and the prospects of a seceding UK going it alone would pose huge 
problems, disrupting now well-established industrial networks and 
trading structures, without any apparent case for either raising or 
lowering standards. For these reasons respondents broadly 
endorsed the present attribution of competences to the EU. 
The UK has been one of the most progressive influences 
within the EU on two accounts, first the case for ‘smart’ risk-
contingent regulation, and second, for animal welfare.  
Under the secession hypothesis it seems most probable that 
the UK would choose to keep EU standards on its books, at least 
initially. But if it then chose not to follow new EU legislation and to 
innovate with its own, there would be the perennial question of 
whether this would prejudice access to the single market.  
The food safety and animal welfare sector illustrates the huge 
disconnect between, on the one hand, professionally informed 
opinion in the UK, and on the other hand the present state of public 
opinion, and indeed the hazards of resolving this difference by an 
‘in-or-out’ referendum vote.  
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The evidence at a glance – food safety and animal welfare 
Agri-food industry considers harmonised EU approach essential 
No rationale for national competence 
UK regulations would not be less rigorous 
Since 2003 far-reaching reform establishing ‘traceability’ in the food chain 
Scotch whisky sector values protection of branding in EU and world 
markets 
UK advocates smart regulation, with risk assessment methodology 
UK plays leading role in shaping EU animal welfare standards 
7.7 Public health 
Although public health is a relatively new EU competence at the 
level of treaty provisions, standards for products involved in public 
health care have long been subject to EU legislation under its single 
market competence (medicines, medical devices, organs, nutrition 
and labelling, tobacco and alcohol, etc.). In addition, there are 
important EU legislation implications for public health policies in 
the area of free movement of persons, the provision of services, and 
employment policy. While these activities are of considerable 
importance, the treaties nonetheless make it clear that the 
competence for organising and delivering health care lies with the 
member states. 
This Review is notably rich in content and in the contributions 
by professional stakeholders, including medical and nursing 
professions and industries supplying medicines and medical 
devices. Overall, on the basis of evidence submitted, it was observed 
that stakeholders considered the present balance of competences to 
be “broadly appropriate” (p.8).  
For medicines and medical devices, the majority of 
respondents felt that the balance of competences was right. “The EU 
helps ensure a high standard of health safety across the EU, early 
launch in the UK of new medicines and medical technologies, and 
the competitiveness of the UK life sciences industry” (p.27).  
The EU works on selected public health issues. EU directives 
now assure the free movement of blood, organs, tissues and cells, 
subject to minimum standards. This is recognised to be beneficial 
for patients. EU activity for nutrition and food labelling, which has 
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been harmonised for over 30 years, is judged by respondents, 
including the government, to be appropriate, serving the UK well. 
As regards action over tobacco that stresses its harmful effects on 
health, most respondents felt the current balance of competences 
was working well. Similar views are expressed as regards alcohol, 
with harmful drinking a particular challenge in the UK.  
The EU has established systems for the surveillance and early 
warning of communicable diseases. This is appreciated by 
respondents, including the government, as adding real value.  
The impact of the Working Time Directive on the public 
health sector is a well-known subject of criticism from the UK. The 
Review makes a balanced assessment, noting the benefits that may 
be provided for the work-life balance of medical staff, and 
avoidance of treatment by tired staff. The main criticism is over the 
lack of flexibility in the directive to accommodate the needs of 
different operating environments, and in particular problems for 
the supply of continuous care, avoiding too much staff turnover.  
The relevant EU directive assures recognition of professional 
qualifications, such that there are in general no restrictions on EU 
nationals to move within the EU labour market. This is of particular 
importance to the UK as a substantial net importer of health 
professionals. Gaps in skills within the UK can be rapidly filled. The 
nursing profession now relies heavily on nurses from other EU 
countries.  
An EU directive clarifies the rights of citizens to purchase 
health care in ‘other’ EU countries and to claim reimbursement from 
their home country. The UK makes good use of this provision, with 
400,000 British pensioners in Spain, for example.  
The UK is the largest beneficiary of EU funding of health 
research under the Framework programmes, which are a significant 
driver of cross-border partnerships and information dissemination 
in the heath sector. 
Assessment 
The EU’s competences in the public health sector consist of a 
portfolio of very specific activities, which do not impinge on the 
responsibilities of the member states to run their own health 
services. EU actions are clearly complementary to national 
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competences, and address issues that cannot be easily or efficiently 
handled at the national level. There are some friction points with 
respect to details, and maybe most of all over the Working Time 
Directive, but these should not obscure the main message that the 
EU is adding value, and that the balance of competences is judged 
to be broadly appropriate.  
The Review reveals quite a number of specific fields in which 
the UK clearly benefits from EU activity, ranging from medical 
product standardisation to research. While UK public opinion 
decries excessive immigration in general, the National Health 
Service would be in much greater difficulty without the free 
movement of labour within the EU, given that it is a considerable 
net importer of health professionals.  
 
The evidence at a glance – public health 
Valuable niche competences judged broadly appropriate by stakeholders 
Do not impinge on national competence for health services 
Regulation by EU important for UK life sciences industries 
Free movement of doctors and nurses fills gaps in skills  
Cross-border health care system arrangements significant, e.g. for 400,000 
British citizens retired in Spain 
7.8 Digital information rights  
This is the most future-oriented of all the Reviews, and addresses 
the twin concerns of data protection and access to information in the 
digital era now associated with the rise of Big Data, Cloud 
Computing, and the Internet of Things (IoT). Action at EU and/or 
international level was generally argued by respondents to be 
needed for two reasons; first because data flows know no national 
borders, and secondly because of the need for common standards 
for business and consumers (p.6). 
Data protection. The core legal basis for EU competence in the 
field of data protection lies in Article 16 (TFEU) of the Lisbon Treaty: 
“Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data 
concerning them”. The text goes on to say that the EU should lay 
down the rules for this purpose as regards activities that fall within 
the scope of EU law and rules relating to the free movement of such 
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data. The EU’s key legislation in this field, the Data Protection 
Directive of 1995, was based on somewhat narrower earlier treaty 
provisions. This directive was in turn transposed into UK law with 
the Data Protection Act of 1998. The substantive provisions are 
about the rights of the individual to access data held by data 
processors about them, a right to object to such data being 
processed, to have such data rectified if inaccurate, or to be erased, 
and to claim compensation for breaches of such rights. 
A key debate among respondents was over how to strike the 
right balance between harmonisation and flexibility, which in the 
EU’s legal context focuses on the choice between the directive 
versus the regulation as an instrument of action; the former allows 
for greater flexibility but implies higher compliance costs for 
businesses operating in the 28 member states. The main point here 
is that the arguments are not about whether the EU should have a 
competence in this field or not – that debate has a clear conclusion, 
namely that EU action is required. The real issue is about striking 
the optimal balance between harmonisation versus degrees of 
freedom for individual member states to implement common rules 
in ways that suit national traditions or cultures.  
Many respondents felt that “the current Directive struck a 
good balance between the interests of data controllers and citizens. 
…. However, almost all respondents felt that the Directive has not 
kept pace with technological changes. This is particularly relevant 
in the light of complex developments such as cloud computing” 
(p.3). This question of balance is also one of the rights of individuals 
versus the objective of promoting economic growth with advanced 
digital technologies, which many respondents felt to be well 
satisfied (p.29). 
A further debate concerns the balance between EU versus 
international action, and here many respondents argued that the EU 
was well positioned to develop common rules and thence to 
promote its standards globally (p.50). While a global regime would 
be impossible to enforce, the EU was much better placed than 
individual member states to influence the shaping of important 
global trends, notably through ongoing negotiations with the US in 
the TTIP framework, and potentially through cooperation with 
Asian-Pacific countries in the APEC framework. 
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The European Court of Justice has been active in various cases 
over some of the finer but still major issues of interpretation of the 
law. For example, in 2014 the CJEU ruled in a case referred to it by 
the Spanish data protection agency where an individual wanted the 
Google search engine to delete personal information about him. In 
May 2014 the Court found against Google, even in an instance where 
the data processing of the search engine was performed outside the 
EU. The case became known as being about ‘the right to be 
forgotten’. There followed in November 2014 (too late to be referred 
to in the Review) a decision by the European Commission’s 
competition authority to open an antitrust investigation into 
allegations that Google Inc. had abused a dominant position in online 
search, in violation of European Union rules (Article 102 TFEU).  
The Review goes into some detail about the future challenges 
for the data protection regulator posed by three inter-related digital 
phenomena: ‘big data’, i.e. very large data sets characterised by the 
‘3 Vs’ – volume, variety and velocity combined with the frequent 
use of algorithms. This includes such phenomena as cloud 
computing, which involves ubiquitous network access to powerful 
computing resources, and ‘the internet of things’, which 
encompasses the IT content of virtually all goods and services such 
as phones, medical devices, smart home appliances, banking 
services, cars etc.  
The Review highlights the UK’s keen interest in being a world 
leader in these technologies.  
It goes on to discuss the complex data protection issues that 
rapidly emerge alongside the spectacular growth of the digital 
economy under these various headings. Revision and updating of 
the EU’s regulatory framework is currently work in progress with 
negotiations over Commission proposals, published in January 
2012, for a comprehensive new Data Protection Regulation to 
replace the existing 1995 Directive. There is also a proposal for a new 
directive on police and judicial cooperation aspects. 
The Review reports the UK government view that the most 
suitable instrument of EU action is the directive rather than a 
regulation, on the grounds that the former allows for more 
flexibility to take into account varying national cultures and legal 
practices. However, the debate among independent respondents 
was more nuanced, with harmonisation through a regulation 
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offering advantages of legal clarity and economy for 
implementation across the 28 member states. 
Access to information. The EU has established its own freedom 
of information act. This was first set out in the Amsterdam Treaty 
of 1995, and carried over in Article 15 (TFEU) of the Lisbon Treaty, 
which states that “Any citizens of the Union, and any natural or 
legal person residing in or having its registered office in a Member 
State, shall have the right of access to documents of the Union 
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, whatever their 
medium….”. The detailed rules for implementing these treaty 
provisions have been established in the Public Access to Documents 
Regulation (1049/2011). 
Respondents “from a broad range of sectors highlighted the 
positive impact of the … Regulation to the extent that it increases 
the transparency of EU policy-making” (p.44), although it was 
reported to be often difficult to obtain documents through this 
regulation. On the other hand, some respondents reported that 
access to EU documents allowed them to influence EU policy before 
it became legislation. Many respondents felt there was no need to 
change EU competence in this field, or to reduce or augment it.  
Assessment 
The data protection agenda has acquired hugely increased 
importance as a function of the spectacular growth of the digital 
economy. The Review is essentially about how to regulate this 
increasingly complex technological environment at the EU level, 
since the need for EU competence in this field was not contested. 
The real issues are about how best to regulate, with the choice of 
legal mode being between a directive versus a regulation for the 
new EU legislation. This approximates to choice being between 
more or less strictly harmonised approaches. Negotiations are 
ongoing for a proposed EU law on this matter. 
The EU’s own ‘freedom of information act’ proves to be a 
rather simple affair. It was welcomed on grounds of improving 
transparency of EU policy-making, with no pressures for changing 
the EU’s competence here.  
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Various respondents pointed out that in the hypothesis of 
secession the UK would still need in practice to comply with EU 
data protection requirements.  
 
The evidence at a glance – information rights 
Data protection as a matter of EU competence is uncontested. 
The issues concern: 
… how strictly harmonised EU law should be (including the directive v. 
regulation question),  
… how regulatory policy should best cope with the rapid pace of 
technological change and 
… how the EU can best influence emerging global standards. 
The regulation on public access to EU documents is broadly positive, 
favouring transparency in EU policy-making 
 
8. Economic, monetary and social policies 
8.1 Economic and monetary union* 
This Review surveys the macroeconomic policy landscape of the 
EU, and in particular that of the eurozone, in considerable detail. 
Given the seriousness of the problems of the eurozone, but also the 
UK’s detachment from it, we choose to tackle head-on the 
outstanding issues, more than is sometimes the case in the Review.  
Macroeconomic policy coordination mechanisms. The Review 
provides a detailed account of the mechanisms of macroeconomic 
policy coordination within the EU as a whole, and of the eurozone 
in particular. The treaty provisions on economic and monetary 
policy apply in principle to all member states that have signed up 
to treat economic policy as a common concern. In reality, however, 
only members of the euro area have subjected themselves to binding 
provisions. The UK government thus remains completely free to set 
its own monetary and fiscal policies.  
                                                        
* This section was contributed by Daniel Gros. 
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The Review affirms the UK’s interest in seeing a successful 
and dynamic eurozone, but underlines that this will require 
systemic reforms with closer economic and fiscal integration for its 
members. It would seem that the current system of economic policy 
coordination does not work properly, or in the more polite language 
of the Review, “ha[s] not always been effective” (p.2). In particular, 
this applies to the coercive elements that concern only the eurozone 
in the Stability Pact, the Fiscal Compact and the Macroeconomic 
Imbalances Procedure. The Stability Pact with its (in)famous limit 
on deficits of 3% of GDP has been in force since the start of EMU. 
But its modus operandi has changed several times; and when ‘push 
came to shove’ with Germany and France in 2003-04 it was in effect 
put into abeyance by a majority in the Council. The latest revision 
of the Stability Pact introduced under the so-called ‘Six Pack’ was 
supposed to make it ‘smarter’ by emphasising deficits adjusted for 
the economic cycle or the output gap. However, the dispute over the 
calculation of the output gap for Italy in 2014 showed that this 
change only made it more difficult to enforce a continuing fiscal 
adjustment in weak economies because the governments of the 
countries with poor growth put forward the argument that the 
Commission had not chosen the proper method for calculating the 
cyclical adjustment.  
The inverse majority rule that was introduced under the so-
called Six Pack was supposed to give the Commission a stronger 
position in enforcing the Stability Pact requirements, given that 
member countries are unlikely to vote for sanctions on their peers, 
fearing that next time around they might be on the receiving end. 
However, the way in which the Commission acquiesced to the 
arguments of France and Italy in late 2014 that their fiscal 
adjustments should be considered satisfactory, although arguably 
in both cases they were incompatible with their previous 
commitments, shows that the Commission did not dare to use the 
formal power it had been given. The decision to accept the Italian 
and French budget proposals was essentially taken by the President 
of the Commission, overriding the opinions of the technical staff in 
the competent DG ECFIN. The coercive part of the Stability Pact has 
thus de facto again been put aside. 
The Fiscal Compact, which introduces a requirement for 
lowering the debt ratio, is as yet untested, but its application would 
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appear to be challenging in an environment characterised by slow 
growth and deflation, which makes a reduction in the debt ratio 
extremely difficult. The underlying assumption under the 
numerical rule of the Fiscal Compact (a reduction in the debt/GDP 
ratio to reduce the excess of the actual debt/GDP ratio over 60% by 
1/20 per year) was that nominal GDP would grow by 5% per 
annum. 
The Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) was 
introduced after the 2008 crisis to prevent the recurrence of a boom 
like that in Spain or Ireland. However, no such boom with rapid 
domestic demand growth and large current account deficits is 
expected for the time being, and the MIP has so far been applied in 
an asymmetric manner. Countries with current account surpluses 
above the norm of 6% (like the Netherlands or Germany) have not 
been asked to adjust policies. 
Overall, the coercive elements in the eurozone’s system of 
coordination have not de facto been used effectively, except when 
combined with conditional macro-financial assistance. 
Systemic reform of the eurozone. While the reforms to the 
eurozone’s economic governance framework appear to have been 
ineffective so far, the response to the crisis has produced two key 
institutional innovations, which have been or promise to be, very 
effective and important.  
The first innovation was the creation of a permanent rescue 
fund, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which operates 
outside the treaty framework, but has been instrumental in 
providing financing for the adjustment in five (counting Spain with 
its limited support for the banking sector) countries. In four cases 
the adjustment has been successful in the sense that the recipient 
countries have been able to exit the programme with a resumption 
of market access, a recovery in the economy and an improvement in 
the fiscal balances and the current account. Greece constitutes the 
only case where the problems continue (on which more below).  
The second institutional innovation in reaction to the crisis is 
the complex phenomenon named Banking Union. A key element 
here is the shift of the responsibility for the supervision of the largest 
120+ banks to the ECB, which has become the direct supervisor of 
the bulk of the euro area’s banking system since November of 2014. 
Another element is the gradual creation of a common ‘Single 
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Resolution Fund’ (SRF) to finance the resolution of failing banks (i.e. 
a fund to prevent a repetition of the disorderly Lehman insolvency). 
There has been much debate about the adequacy of its size and the 
absence of a fiscal backstop. All one can say at this point is that by 
about 2020 the SRF, which will be four- to five-times larger than the 
corresponding UK fund, will be strong enough to deal with 
problems at any one of even the largest euro area banks, or with 
problems of the entire banking system of a small- to medium-sized 
country.  
The Banking Union is, however, incomplete in the sense that 
there is no common fund for deposit insurance. But the two 
elements that have been put in place should make the eurozone  
much more resilient to national financial shocks. The ‘Balkanisation’ 
of the eurozone’s banking markets, which was observed in 2011-13, 
should thus not be repeated in future. The combination of the ESM 
plus the two elements of the Banking Union represent the key 
innovations that should allow the euro area to deal with future 
shocks, both from irresponsible governments and regional financial 
market disruptions.  
Postscript 
Prospects for macroeconomic recovery of the eurozone. The Review 
largely abstains from the currently vital question of whether or 
when the eurozone  might finally return to a sustained recovery. At 
the time of writing, January 2015, this may have become likely at 
last, not so much because of adequate economic policies, but 
because of two favourable external shocks, namely the depreciation 
of the euro against the dollar and the steep fall in the oil price. 
However, the latter is likely to reinforce the deflationary tendencies 
anyway latent in the euro area where internal demand remains 
structurally weak. The deflationary impact of the oil price is likely 
to be stronger than the slightly inflationary impulse resulting from 
the depreciation of the euro against the dollar, mainly because the 
effective exchange rate of the euro has moved very little since most 
trading partners of the euro area have also depreciated against the 
dollar. The ECB so far seems to have been losing the fight to reach 
its inflation target of 2%, leading to the debate about whether or 
what kind of quantitative easing (QE) should be introduced. The 
issue here is how far the bank-based structure of the euro area’s 
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financial system makes the prime weapon against deflation, namely 
QE, less effective. However, at the end of January 2015 the ECB did 
announce a substantial programme of asset purchases. The 
intention is to buy €60 billion worth of assets each month until the 
end of 2016, of which about €50 billion are likely to be government 
bonds. The ECB also announced that the asset purchases could 
continue if the path of inflation had not converged, by the end of the 
schedule of asset purchases, towards the ECB's goal of below, but 
close to 2%. Another contributing factor to the recovery of the euro 
area has been the surprise decision of the Swiss National Bank to 
end the policy of defending a lower bound for the Swiss franc 
exchange rate against the euro.  The immediate appreciation of the 
Swiss franc led to a fall in the effective exchange rate of the euro of 
almost 2%.   
The continuing Greek crisis. The Review makes only a passing 
reference to events in Greece, and deserves further comment. 
Greece has distinguished itself by the slow and unwilling 
implementation of reforms since the start of its adjustment 
programme, which had to be changed regularly, with five reviews 
by 2014. The snap elections of January 2015 led to a new government 
dominated by Syriza, which had consistently campaigned against 
austerity and the adjustment programme imposed, in their eyes, by 
the Troika.  Given the explicit request of the new government for 
debt relief and the renewed large-scale deposit withdrawals, 
concerns have resurfaced about Greece possibly leaving the euro 
area. Opinion polls have consistently revealed that 60% of the Greek 
population wishes to keep the euro, however, and most political 
parties agree on this. At the same time, a large part of the Greek 
population seems to support the request to reduce the debt burden 
for the country and to end austerity. These demands appear to be in 
stark contrast to the obligations that Greece undertook under the 
adjustment programme. 
A typical ‘euro-fudge’ might solve this apparent 
contradiction through a limited rescheduling of some official debt 
payments, combined with a relaxation of the fiscal targets. In the 
end, the difference between governments that have never 
implemented promises to pay and a new government that promises 
not to pay might not be that great. It is, of course, possible that a 
bank run sets in if clashes between the Greek authorities and 
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Brussels and Berlin become too heated. However, even if Greek 
depositors were to panic, an exit from the eurozone is not inevitable, 
as the experience of Cyprus shows. The solution might then consist 
of some capital controls to pretend that Greece is still part of the 
eurozone. The Greek problem might thus be contained, at least in 
the short run. 
Assessment 
The UK’s opt-out, not only from the eurozone’s monetary regime, 
but also from the coercive elements of its fiscal policy coordination 
arrangements, mean that it stands aside from the difficult ongoing 
task of reforming the eurozone  system. The Review noted some 
blurring of competences for the eurozone between the EU 
institutions and member states, but while justified this does not 
concern the UK.  
It is difficult to determine how far the UK may have benefited 
from not joining the euro area. Recent growth figures show the UK 
as emerging much more quickly from the Great Financial Crisis 
than eurozone members. But if one looks at a longer time period the 
picture is not so clear. Figure 1 shows the UK GDP per capita at PPP 
relative to that of the eurozone from the early 1990s, when the UK 
did better than the continent, probably because it benefited from the 
boom in global finance. When the financial crisis occurred the UK 
initially suffered more, but more recently it has partly caught up 
again. It remains to be seen whether the better performance over the 
last few years represents just a temporary phenomenon, or a more 
permanent advantage for the UK, for example if the eurozone were 
to be inherently condemned to deflation and secular stagnation. 
The present divergence in the external positions of the UK 
and the euro area is also very striking. The UK has run a current-
account deficit for over a decade now and even the substantial 
devaluations of the pound against the euro after 2008 have not 
changed this. Exchange rate flexibility has thus apparently had little 
impact on the external balance of the UK, which has continued to 
deteriorate with a current-account deficit rising to around 4% of 
GDP, while the eurozone’s surplus has continued to improve to 
over €200 billion, or close to 2.5% of the euro area’s GDP. The UK, 
with its continuing current-account deficit and thus an ever-
increasing foreign debt, will naturally choose different policy 
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priorities from the eurozone, with its large surplus. A question not 
discussed in the Review is whether this UK external deficit is storing 
up a problem for the future.  
Figure 1. UK economic performance relative to the eurozone, 1993-2016  
 
Source: D. Gros and M. Busse, own calculations. 
The Review concludes with a summary of the risks for the UK 
of the eurozone moving increasingly towards ‘caucusing’ on 
macroeconomic policy and on financial market matters, leading to 
discriminatory treatment of British interests (p.99). The Review 
stresses the need for vigilance on this point, but might more clearly 
have drawn the conclusion that to minimise these risks the UK 
needs to position itself as a constructive member state, whereas the 
secession scenario would only maximise these risks. 
 
The evidence at a glance – economic and monetary policy 
UK has opt-out for both eurozone and coercive aspects of fiscal policy 
coordination 
Coercive rules for eurozone fiscal policy, aside from conditional financial 
assistance, have proved ineffective 
Systemic reforms of eurozone (funding mechanisms and Banking Union) are 
more effective 
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Eurozone macroeconomic recovery now more likely, due to the oil shock, plus 
new quantitative easing measures 
UK benefits from earlier economic recovery, but longer term prospects are 
not so clear 
UK concerns over discriminatory ‘caucusing’ by eurozone members not 
evident so far 
 
8.2 Social and employment policy* 
This review of a notoriously controversial field of EU competence – 
social and employment policy – starts with a chronological map of 
its development. In the beginning, social and employment policy 
did not have its own legal base. When social objectives were 
pursued, it was always with reference to the economic union, i.e. 
they were issues that were covered to the extent that they related to 
the primary goal of the union, which was the sound functioning of 
the common market. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty was the first to 
recognise social and employment policy as an objective worthy of 
pursuit not merely with regard to its relation to the common market, 
but as a goal in itself. The Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty, 
which broadened the EU competence in the field of social policy 
legislation, met with strong opposition from the UK Conservative 
government, which secured an opt-out provision for itself. The UK 
came to be bound by the Social Chapter only in 1997, as a result of 
its Labour government’s agreement to accede to it as part of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam.  
Discussion of the development of the EU competence within 
the social and employment policy ends with the conclusion that the 
2009 Lisbon Treaty ultimately broadened the scope of EU 
competences by adding the “well-being of its people” to the 
objectives of the Union, and fully acknowledging the importance of 
the pursuit of social justice and social progress. Furthermore, it 
stresses the combat against social discrimination and inequalities.  
Before the Review moves to the views of the respondents, it 
introduces the main articles in the EU treaties that serve as a basis 
                                                        
* This section was contributed by Miroslav Beblavý and Alzbeta Hájková. 
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for the directives and regulations in social and employment policy. 
It frames the competence the EU has within those fields as the 
“competence to adopt measures in health and safety at work, 
conditions of work and social security, and competence to ensure 
cooperation between Member States”. With regard to this range of 
competences, it is interesting to note that while the UK frequently 
resisted adoption of the pertinent EU legislation, in many cases the 
UK's own pre-existing legislation was already adhering to these 
principles. The illustration of such a case used by the Review is a 
Health and Safety at Work Act (1974), which in fact inspired the 
European directive on measures to encourage improvements in the 
safety and health of workers, although the directive was more 
prescriptive in its nature than the original act. 
The next part of the Review, dealing with results of the public 
consultation, confirms that this area of EU policy is highly 
controversial, and respondents’ views range from the 
uncompromisingly negative to the resoundingly positive and offer 
no clear median. Interestingly, the previously discussed link 
between the EU as a primarily economic union and the EU as a 
community that ought to promote social progress was also explored 
by the respondents. Many argue that setting minimum 
requirements in the social policy area guarantees that businesses 
and workers within the single market have the same basic level of 
protection. On the other hand, various business respondents 
considered EU-level social and employment policy to be a burden, 
and were convinced that their business would benefit if EU 
regulations were lifted.  
Upon being called to assess the role of social partners, 
respondents were not negative in principle about their role in the 
defining of market rules as such. Rather, they expressed worries that 
certain types of business and workers (e.g. small or micro 
businesses, and part-time workers) are often disenfranchised, which 
decreases the overall representativeness of the negotiations. 
The Review makes it clear that the feedback from the 
respondents was quite negative when it came to adoption of 
minimum requirements. The general view is that the EU often goes 
beyond what would be a proper EU-wide minimum in the realm of 
health and safety at work issues, and imposes higher standards than 
are necessary. These standards are, in the opinion of many 
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respondents, excessively prescriptive, opaque, and 
disproportionate with regard to the different economies of 
individual member states. In addition, they often represent 
additional costs for businesses. The Working Time and Temporary 
Agency Workers Directives are the ones that were marked as the 
costliest, with a negative impact on business. 
Respondents also felt that when it comes to implementation 
of the EU directives, the UK is particularly careful about applying 
the legislation ‘to the letter’. The Review claims that there is a 
commonly held belief in the UK that it is more thorough in 
enforcing the EU legislation than other member states, which 
supposedly puts it at a disadvantage, precisely because EU 
legislation is perceived as something burdensome. The Review also 
notes that this sentiment is generally not supported by evidence. 
The European Court of Justice is also seen as an element that 
is harmful to national interests in its interpretation of the EU laws 
in the fields of employment and discrimination. On the other hand, 
the Review makes an important observation that the Court tends to 
side with individuals, hence giving them a chance to have a full 
reliance on and take advantage of the rights guaranteed by the EU 
law. It is precisely individuals that, according to the Review, profit 
the most from EU social and employment rules. While businesses 
might perceive many aspects of EU policy as burdensome, a number 
of respondents indicated that the same policy contributed to 
creating a better work environment in terms of equal pay, anti-
discrimination, the status of part-time workers, worker protection 
and health and safety at work. Another notable positive point made 
is that as a whole, EU law is more stable than national law and hence 
provides a solid basis for a business to plan its future. 
Assessment 
Three major conclusions emerge from the Review. First, while there 
are many anecdotes and case studies available, claims about either 
the positive or negative effects of EU competences in social and 
employment policy on the British economy or its workers are hardly 
ever supported by quantitative evidence. This often means that 
partisans resort to arguments based on ‘first principles’. The Review 
was not intended to and could not, produce original datasets or 
evidence to remedy this.  
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Secondly, a small number of regulations appear to account for 
much of the controversy. It is obvious from the text that the 
directives on working time and agency workers are where EU 
legislation causes many stakeholders discomfort, or, at the very 
least, much irritation. Any renegotiation of the UK’s relationship 
with the EU in social and employment policy would likely focus on 
this area. 
Thirdly, the British self-image of exceptionalism both does 
and does not match reality. The Review demonstrated two types of 
British exceptionalism – one real and one probably fictional. The 
first is in how employment is organised in the UK compared to most 
continental countries – being less focused as it is on full-time work 
and the traditional employer-employee relationship. The second is 
the perception, which can probably also be found in a number of 
member states, that “others do much less implementation and 
enforcement than ‘we’ do”.  
 
The evidence at a glance – social and employment policies 
Strong support for ‘social Europe’ competence in much of EU  
Contested in the UK, but divergences in political parties and interest groups 
History of UK policy zig-zags, with opt-out of Social Chapter in 1992, opt-
back-in in 1997, and current pressures for selective opt-outs  
Loudest UK complaints over small number of regulations (working time 
and agency workers) 
 
8.3 Cohesion policy* 
This Review examines the objectives of the EU’s cohesion policy, its 
performance, the impacts within the EU, and the potential costs and 
benefits for the UK in the development of regions. Given the large 
number of objectives and measures covered by the policy policies, 
its evaluation is complex. The policy comprises a number of 
instruments with different territorial dimensions and objectives, 
namely the Structural Funds, composed of the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), the 
                                                        
* This section was contributed by Jorge Núñez Ferrer. 
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Cohesion Fund, the Connecting Europe Facility (formerly the Trans-
European networks), the European Solidarity Fund and the 
European Aid to the Most Deprived Persons.  
The main objective has always been balanced territorial 
development across the EU, but over the years it has become 
something of a tool to achieve a multiplicity of other EU objectives, 
such as those for sustainable growth, energy and climate change, 
with contributions to industrial policy and the completion of the 
single market. As a result, all regions in the EU are now eligible for 
funding from cohesion policy, albeit with different intensities.  
The Review starts with an historical account of the 
development of the policy and the latest reforms undertaken for the 
Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020 and follows with a 
review of evidence on its rationale and performance.  
The report has to contend with the lack of clear evidence in 
favour or against the cohesion policy. There are a large number of 
position papers either defending or condemning the policy, but 
studies with solid results on the impact of the policy are 
inconclusive, principally because the financial size of the cohesion 
policy is small compared to the EU GDP and that of most member 
states. There is, however, evidence that in some areas the policy is 
important for recipient regions. However, this does not solve the 
problem of the right distribution of competences and it is left to the 
reader to reach a conclusion.  
For the Review, the following questions were at the core of 
the analysis: 
- Should the EU have a cohesion policy, in particular with 
regional redistributive aspects, or should redistribution be 
entirely a national competence? 
- Should the EU be financing programmes in rich member 
states, in particular those that are not for cross-border 
objectives? 
- Are the programmes yielding value for money? 
- Are the management of funds and administrative 
requirements reasonable and proportional to the level of EU 
support? 
For poorer member states there seems to be a general 
consensus that the cohesion policy is a good thing. Only a minority 
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of the views submitted defends the thesis that the policy should be 
focusing more strictly on promoting economic growth, given that 
the returns on investment tend to be higher in the most developed 
regions. The policy should thus be reformed to focus on growth 
poles. The prevailing view was that the solidarity principle at EU 
level should be supported. Solidly researched counterfactual 
analysis comparing the situation to one without the support has not 
proved feasible, however.  
The second question is the core issue in the report, with a 
considerable number of experts giving evidence favouring the 
elimination of support to richer countries, even if most support the 
distributive role for the poorest member states. The central 
argument presented is simply the circular nature of the financial 
flows. The money spent in the UK seems to correspond to the 
contribution of the beneficiary regions to the EU budget in this 
policy area. The argument goes that the money could have been 
spent directly in the regions without the costs and burden of 
sending it through Brussels. Estimates show that the average 
contribution of the beneficiary regions to the cohesion policy 
through the UK budget contribution is nearly identical to the 
amount they receive in return.  
In the negotiations the British government used this 
argument in negotiations over the Multiannual Financial 
Framework for 2014-2020, namely the challenge to the notion that 
cohesion policy should also be spent in richer member states. 
Should the EU have a redistributive role from richer to poorer 
regions within richer countries? This depends on the interpretation 
of the main objectives of the policy. According to the Commission, 
the EU budget also has an important allocative role, not only a 
redistributive one. It is designed to promote EU priorities that 
would not be pursued separately by member states, or would be 
less efficient. National programmes would not replace EU ones, but 
would pursue objectives influenced by potentially narrower local 
priorities that risk being less valuable in the longer term and lead to 
lower growth in the EU as a whole. It also severs the cohesion 
policy’s links with the EU’s industrial policy. 
The Review finds little evidence of the superiority of a policy 
administered through Brussels from one run domestically. 
However, the local government authorities of the UK are strong 
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defenders of the cohesion policy programmes. The Welsh 
government argued that the strong redistributive nature of EU 
regional policy was necessary, given the absence of a robust 
national regional policy. There is a reasonable doubt expressed by 
local authorities whether, if the cohesion policy ended, London 
would spend the money saved to support the lagging regions to the 
same extent. Another argument favouring EU operations in the 
regions is the multiannual structure of the policy, allowing 
programmes to be protected from national annual budgetary cycles 
and thus offering stability. Some experts point to benefits of having 
a coordinated policy approach across the EU through the benefits of 
best-practice exchange.  
Regarding value for money, the report considers that the 
evidence is inconclusive for the policy as a whole, but there is some 
evidence that the UK benefits from EU policies targeting the 
development of the single market, in particular for cross-border 
networks and from economic improvements in poorer member 
states. For other investments the report sees little benefit. It also asks 
whether some measures of the policy, particularly distributive 
policies of the European Social Fund, should be exclusively for 
national bodies. Some social policies have been introduced that the 
UK government considers to go beyond the remit of the cohesion 
policy. 
Finally, there is a concern over the administrative burden of 
EU funding. The UK agrees that EU funding needs solid controls, 
but does question some of the measures in place. A particular 
mention has been placed for cumbersome auditing requirements in 
member states that have already well-established and functioning 
auditing structures. 
Assessment 
The Review does not present an explicit government position on the 
right balance of competences, and principally presents the evidence 
submitted by experts, regional authorities, administrators of the 
policy, parliamentarians and other interested parties. However, the 
concluding chapter on the way forward draws some careful final 
recommendations, which are very similar to existing positions of 
the UK government. 
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The main argument of the Review, from a balance of 
competences point of view, is the lack of rationale for the EU to 
spend cohesion policy resources in richer member states. It tends to 
support, in line with the existing position of the government, the 
ending of support to richer member states, with the exception of 
trans-European network projects and some limited specific 
programmes in favour of promoting competitiveness at EU level. 
The report does acknowledge that ending the funding to richer 
member states would require the agreement of all member states, 
and that this is unlikely. The report also indicates that the cohesion 
funds are strongly supported in Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland. In the highly charged political climate surrounding and 
following the September 2014 referendum in Scotland, the evident 
sensitivity of proposals to scrap the cohesion funds in richer states 
deserves due understanding in London.  
More plausibly, the UK could push for reform in the sense of 
procedural simplification. Some of the administrative requirements 
of the policy are excessive where member states have solid domestic 
institutions and control systems. It is possible that agreements could 
be reached on the accreditation of national auditing authorities and 
practices for such countries. It may also manage to convince the EU 
to allow for less bureaucratic but more results-oriented, risk-based 
approaches to auditing. On this the UK may be able to win the 
support of other member states. 
The evidence at a glance – cohesion policy 
Competence for a regional solidarity policy generally supported 
UK advocates restriction to less rich member states, not accepted by all 
Multiplicity of objectives (regional, energy, climate, industrial policy) 
makes evaluation difficult 
Lack of clear evidence on impact on regional disparities  
Procedural simplification advocated, in which well performing national 
auditing bodies are accredited to use their own controls  
8.4 EU budget 
The EU budget serves principally to support several specific 
policies, including agriculture, the structural funds, research and 
external relations, and these are reviewed in their respective sector 
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reports, without being duplicated here. The present Review is 
therefore confined to cross-cutting issues raised by the budget. 
Among the issues considered by the British government to be 
of the highest priority is the aggregate evolution of the budget, 
which currently amounts to €142 billion per year. The British 
government has worked hard this past year to restrain the growth 
of the budget, and claimed a major reform in securing the first ever 
reduction in real terms in the new Multiannual Financial 
Framework (MFF) for 2014-2020. The report notes the agreed real 
cut of 3.4% as an example of how the UK can work for reform of the 
EU through regular procedures, even qualifying this somewhat 
euphorically as an ‘historic’ achievement. Alongside important cuts 
being made in national budgets, the MFF saw the EU make 
commitments to reducing staff numbers in the institutions by 5%, 
and to increase the retirement age for EU civil servants from 65 to 
66 years. 
The report recognises that the budget is of a very modest size 
compared to that found in federal economic and monetary unions. 
There is debate about whether the eurozone  should have its own 
budget of significant macroeconomic size, and if so whether this 
should become part of the EU budget. The UK Treasury has, from 
outside the eurozone, argued that this should be the case. While 
there is little political momentum in favour of such a development, 
it would in any case be irrelevant for the UK as it remains outside 
the eurozone. 
The second issue highlighted is the distinction between what 
the report calls ‘high EU-value added’ expenditure versus low value 
added categories. Research and innovation, and expenditure under 
the heading ‘connecting Europe’ (transport infrastructures, energy 
networks) are placed in the high category, with agriculture in the 
low category, and the cohesion policy of the Structural Funds 
somewhere in between (see section 3.3 above). In fact, the 
proportions between the major blocks of spending have been very 
slowly undergoing significant change over the years in the direction 
of high value added policies. For example, in 1984 agriculture 
accounted for 66% of the budget. By 2014 it had declined to 40% and 
by 2020 it is planned to further decline to 34%. It is noted that the 
build-up of the structural funds started with the creation of the 
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Regional Fund in the 1970s as an initiative promoted notably by the 
UK and Italy.  
These changing expenditure structures are key to the debate 
around a third major issue, namely the British rebate, or ‘abatement’ 
in EU jargon, which returns to the UK a significant amount of its net 
contribution to the budget. The origin of the rebate goes back to the 
first British renegotiation of 1973-74, when the predominance of 
agricultural spending in the budget, and the relatively small size of 
the British farming sector, resulted in the UK paying the highest 
amount of net contributions per capita. This rebate (or ‘corrective 
mechanism’) has been enhanced and revised over time, while 
becoming more complicated as other big net payers also sought a 
degree of compensation. The Review shows that in 2012 the UK 
received the lowest amount of EU expenditure per capita of all 
member states, and that its net contribution to the budget before the 
rebate was correspondingly the highest; but after the rebate the 
UK’s net contribution was the fifth largest and the middle of a core 
group of ‘old’ member states, including Germany, France, Italy, 
Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands.  
The Review sets out the debate around whether the rebate is 
a good idea or not. Academics criticise it for distorting incentives 
between member states in their negotiations over policy-making, 
while recognising that it is a political response to an unbalanced 
expenditure structure. If this were corrected, then the rebate could 
be scrapped. The British government’s view is that as long as the 
expenditure imbalances persist, the rebate is justified. The EU has 
accepted successive revisions of the UK net contribution, and 
secured the rebate mechanism with treaty status (i.e. these 
provisions cannot be cancelled or changed without unanimous 
agreement, thus including that of the UK).  
The fourth issue concerns the funding of the budget, known 
as its ‘own resources’. Over time the structure of funding has 
changed with an increasing dependence of contributions on a gross 
national income key. There is a longstanding debate about 
endowing the EU budget with truly ‘own’ fiscal resources, beyond 
the present modest contribution of pooled customs revenues. In this 
regard the UK government is content with the present balance of 
competences, in which the idea of granting the EU new taxing 
powers has little political traction. The most recent attempt to create 
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a new EU tax has been the proposed Financial Transaction (‘Tobin’) 
Tax, which the Commission proposed in 2011, but was opposed, 
notably by the UK and Sweden. As a result 11 member states that 
supported the proposal decided to proceed with an action under the 
‘enhanced cooperation’ procedure, but this has yet to be definitively 
agreed.  
The fifth issue that receives considerable attention in the 
review is that of financial management. The British government is 
concerned that the European Court of Auditors has for many years 
been refusing to grant complete ‘discharge’ for the budget, on the 
grounds that the incidence of ‘errors’ has been too high. The report 
notes that the Court of Auditors estimates that there is a 4.8% error 
rate, which is comparable to the 4.4% error rate found in the US 
federal budget. The report notes that ‘error’ and ‘fraud’ are two 
different things, and the fraud rate is estimated at a low 0.2% rate. 
‘Error’ is where there has been a degree of non-compliance with EU 
rules such as for public procurement, or through the incorrect 
calculation of costs eligible for funding, and such cases are not 
necessarily fraudulent. The errors are largely committed by the 
administrations of member states in their execution of about 80% of 
all EU spending instruments. Yet there remains a problem of public 
perception, since the Eurobarometer poll shows that three-quarters 
of EU citizens consider there to be corruption in the EU institutions 
themselves, for which there is zero evidence.28 
Assessment 
The report notes that stakeholders on the whole considered that 
“while the balance of competences in the budget was broadly 
appropriate, the application of these competences could be 
improved by reform of budget structures, though improving 
financial management of the EU budget in member states and EU 
institutions alike and particularly through reform of budget 
expenditure, focusing on areas of genuine added value” (p.5).  
                                                        
28 The Santer Commission was famously forced to resign by the European 
Parliament in 1999 for alleged financial mismanagement, but the nearest 
thing to corruption found was the case of Commissioner Edith Cresson, 
who hired her dentist as a scientific adviser without following official 
procedures properly.  
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British interests have been strongly represented in the 
evolution of the EU budget, starting, however, from a very 
disadvantageous initial position upon accession in 1973 when the 
budget structure adopted before UK accession saw a huge pre-
dominance of agricultural spending. This initial disadvantage was 
largely compensated by the rebate mechanism, while the build-up 
of the structural funds originated in the regional fund that was 
strongly advocated by the UK. In recent negotiations the UK has 
been effective in leading pressure to restrain the growth of the 
budget for the years ahead until 2020. There have been no new tax 
competences that the UK would have been doctrinally opposed to, 
while other ideas such as the Financial Transaction Tax or, more 
remotely, a specific eurozone budget, would not apply to the UK.  
 
The evidence at a glance – EU budget 
EU competence considered broadly appropriate 
Major UK complaint over net contribution met by permanent rebate 
Long-term structural reform agenda to switch from low to high value added 
activities (e.g. less agriculture and more research and innovation) 
UK achieves reform objectives to reverse growth of real expenditure volume 
8.5 Taxation 
The EU’s tax regime is characterised by strong harmonisation of the 
main indirect taxes (VAT and excises), but much more limited 
actions in the field of direct taxation. The whole field is covered by 
the unanimity decision-making rule.  
Overall “respondents and interested parties were content 
with the current balance of competences, taking into account the 
protections offered by unanimity voting” (p.6). EU level action is 
judged appropriate where there is an internal market justification 
and the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are respected.  
The indirect tax regime for VAT has a largely harmonised tax 
base. Member states retain freedom to set the rates subject to 
minima (not less 15% for the standard rate, and 5% for reduced 
rates). Respondents generally welcomed this as ensuring a level 
playing field in the single market and facilitating cross-border trade. 
In addition, from accession the UK has enjoyed a special derogation 
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allowing the zero rating for VAT of some products. Excise duties on 
tobacco, alcohol and energy are subject to minimum rates, but above 
that the member states are free to set the actual rates. This basic 
regime for indirect taxes is not contested. 
In the fields of direct taxation, both for persons and 
corporations, the EU’s actions have been confined to easing cross-
border problems rather than touching the main issues of tax bases 
and tax rates. There is currently one proposal for a common 
consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB) under discussion as a 
possible action under ‘enhanced cooperation’. The UK opposes this, 
seemingly to avoid any major increase in EU fiscal powers, whereas 
the case for the CCCTB is to reduce business tax accounting 
overhead costs and to improve fiscal transparency, without 
constraining national powers to set tax rates. This proposal has 
encountered objections from other member states, however, and 
appears to be stuck. 
In the business tax field three measures to lessen obstacles for 
business across borders are highlighted: the Mergers Directive, the 
Parent-Subsidiary Directive, and the Interest and Royalties 
Directive. 
The view of respondents was generally to welcome these 
measures as reducing various tax liabilities hindering cross-border 
business. Respondents welcomed the role of EU law in enforcing the 
fundamental freedoms, including the illegality of fiscal 
discrimination against individuals or corporations on grounds of 
nationality.  
Three particular concerns stand out in the Review. The first 
concerns the inclusion of tax aspects in various sectoral policy 
initiatives, which themselves are subject to qualified majority 
voting. Examples quoted include fiscal aspects of the European 
Emissions Trading Directive and the Eurovignette Directive for 
road freight, which were adopted on non-tax legal bases. This is 
seen as eroding the unanimity principle for taxation.  
Second, there is concern over the role of the European Court 
of Justice. While its positive role in enforcing EU law in the tax area 
is noted in several decisions, some respondents also view it as 
making rulings that go beyond its competence, effectively making 
legislative decisions that escape the veto power of member states, 
for example in details of the VAT regime. One respondent noted a 
124  PART III. EVIDENCE 
 
change in the Court’s approach since 2005, however, which 
attenuates this problem.  
Third, there is concern over the use of enhanced cooperation 
in the tax field, as exemplified by both the CCCTB) idea already 
mentioned, and the proposed Financial Transaction Tax (FTT). The 
concern of the City of London is that the FTT would impose 
requirements on non-participating member states, and the UK in 
particular because of the size and structure of its financial markets. 
However, this proposal also seems to be held up amid widespread 
disagreements over its desirability or feasibility, and the present 
authors also consider it to be unsound.  
There are further detailed concerns regarding the need for 
timely updating of EU law in the fiscal field and for better impact 
assessment to accompany proposals. 
Assessment 
As noted, the overall assessment is that UK respondents find the 
broad level of EU competences to be about right.  
The fundamentals of the EU’s tax regime are supported by the 
respondents; namely limited and clearly demarcated competences 
in the indirect and direct tax field, and ongoing measures at the level 
of details to facilitate cross-border business. The UK’s strong 
preference for the unanimity principle in this field is not seriously 
challenged by the rest of the EU. Neither is the UK’s special 
derogation in the VAT field under any threat. While there has been 
some debate about creating new ‘own resources’ for the EU budget, 
this is not an operationally live issue at present.  
The several areas of concern mentioned are typically issues 
for ongoing negotiation, with a thorough debate of the pros and 
cons. For example, the present authors would join in criticism of the 
proposed Financial Transaction Tax, which should be dropped. But 
we would support the Common Consolidated Corporation Tax 
Base (CCCTB) proposal, and find the UK’s objections unconvincing, 
especially in view of the new Luxembourg affair (see further, 
below).  
As regards the concern that EU actions under enhanced 
cooperation risks prejudicing the interests of non-participating EU 
member states, two comments are in order. On the one hand, 
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procedures are in place to protect the interests of the non-
participating member states: there have to be at least nine states to 
take part in the action, and its authorisation has to be decided 
unanimously by the Council (Article 329, TFEU)). On the other 
hand, and even more important for the UK but not made clear in the 
Review, in the hypothesis of secession these risks would be 
categorically higher, since from the outside there would be no 
protection at all.  
Postscript. Subsequent to publication of the Review, and 
shortly after the new Juncker Commission took office on 1 
November 2014, the Luxembourg corporation tax affair erupted, 
under which many multinational corporations (including Amazon, 
Microsoft, and Apple) had negotiated special tax deals with 
Luxembourg in exchange for setting up operations there. The lack 
of coherent tax base policies in Europe has resulted in huge losses 
of tax revenue for other countries where these companies were 
operating. But the proposal for the Common Consolidated 
Corporation Tax Base) is well suited to bring this major anomaly 
under control, without necessarily affecting tax rates. This would be 
an important tax reform.  
The evidence at a glance – taxation 
Respondents content with limited competences, unanimity rule 
Harmonised VAT, assures level playing field, not contested 
Several useful business tax measures 
Financial Transaction Tax proposal opposed by UK and others  
Corporation tax base proposal (CCCTB) now, in our view, a plausible 
reform 
9. Justice and home affairs 
9.1 Fundamental rights* 
The 1993 Treaty of Maastricht codified standing case law developed 
by the EU’s Luxembourg-based European Court of Justice (CJEU) 
in previous decades, stating in Article F that: “The Union shall 
                                                        
* This section was contributed by Steven Blockmans. 
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respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed 
in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of 
Community law”.29 
The Review on fundamental rights soberly presents a state of 
play on a topic that has become highly contentious in the political 
debate. The Review does not concern any specific EU competence 
on individual rights, since the treaties do not confer express 
competence on the EU to adopt legislation or to take specific action 
in this field. Instead, it addresses the EU’s overarching competence 
on fundamental rights. The most important feature of this 
competence is the obligation resting on the shoulders of the EU, i.e. 
its institutions and the member states in their role as agents of the 
Union, to respect fundamental rights, which are recognised by the 
CJEU as general principles of EU law, and reaffirmed in the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the EU.  
The Review sets out how the EU legal order protected the 
fundamental rights of individuals long before the Charter was first 
proclaimed. The UK government’s position is that the Charter did 
not alter the legal effect (meaning and scope) of fundamental rights 
in EU law: “they are not two distinct groups of rights in EU law that 
are potentially subject to disparate interpretations. Both the Charter 
and the general principles of EU law are part of the EU’s primary 
law. The courts can therefore refer to the Charter and the general 
principles interchangeably when applying fundamental rights to 
EU institutions and member states” (p.34). This view is largely 
reflected in the evidence. 
The most contentious issue discussed in the Review concerns 
the question of whether Protocol 30 to the Lisbon Treaty (on the 
Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union to Poland and the United Kingdom) presents an opt-out of 
                                                        
29 To be clear on the basics of the complicated institutional set-up, the 
European Union’s Court of Justice CJEU is quite separate from the 
Strasbourg-based European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which is part 
of the Council of Europe. The Strasbourg Court guards and implements the 
European Convention for Human Rights (ECHR), which also, however, 
figures in the jurisprudence of the EU, as the above quote shows, and this 
text further explains below. 
BRITAIN’S FUTURE IN EUROPE  127 
 
the Charter. The Review states that “the Protocol is not, and never 
has been, an opt-out for the UK from the application of the Charter” 
(p.25). While it only applies to the UK and Poland (the Czech 
Republic having rescinded its initial inclusion under the Protocol) 
its purpose is rather to clarify, in legally binding terms, how the 
Charter applies to the EU institutions and member states. The UK 
government’s position is that the Charter reaffirms the rights, 
freedoms and principles recognised in EU law, but does not create 
new rights or principles. This view is almost unanimously 
supported in the evidence and is consistent with the preamble to the 
Charter itself.  
Chapter 4 of the Review is of most interest as it summarises 
the wide range of evidence submitted on the impact on the UK of 
the EU’s competence on fundamental rights, in the following terms. 
“Beyond recognition that when [EU institutions and member states 
(within the scope of EU law)] act they should do so consistently with 
some form of human rights protection, [the evidence shows] little 
consensus on what constitutes the UK interest in this context. Views on 
whether the EU’s competence on fundamental rights is being exercised 
consistently with the interests of the UK vary depending on 
perspectives on the role of supranational human rights mechanisms 
and national sovereignty” (p.45).  
This is particularly evident in the widely differing 
assessments of how the CJEU exercises its jurisdiction in high-
profile cases, with the following formulations quoted in the report: 
from “naked grab of territory by the [CJEU]” to “there is little or no 
evidence of competence creep”, and “the protection afforded to 
citizens’ fundamental rights by the CJEU is insufficient when 
balanced against the rights enjoyed by business under EU law” 
(p.48). 
Whereas EU law contains a wider array of rights than those 
protected under the UK’s 1998 Human Rights Act or the 1950 
Convention (ECHR), the evidence presented in the report indicates 
that EU fundamental rights have so far had a limited impact on 
domestic case law. Yet, respondents from civil society, academia 
and the legal profession have suggested that the EU guarantees that 
could offer a greater standard of protection are the right to a fair 
hearing (especially in the sphere of immigration and asylum) and 
the prohibition on discrimination. 
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An inherent problem with the multi-layered order of 
fundamental rights protection is that this partially overlapping 
system compromises legal certainty. Moreover, the complexity of 
the system means that enforcing fundamental rights is expensive for 
both litigants and the public purse. The evidence collected in the 
report nevertheless indicates a high degree of consistency between 
the level of protection afforded by EU fundamental rights and that 
afforded by the Convention. In part this is due to the CJEU 
following the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court.  
As a founding member of the Council of Europe, the UK was 
one of the first to sign the Convention and it has been an ardent 
supporter of the Strasbourg-based court for decades. However, in 
recent years, a number of deeply unpopular judgments have 
sparked complaints against the overall binding nature of ECtHR 
judgments on British law, notably declaring illegal the ban on 
prisoners in jail from voting in elections, and the barring the 
deportation of alleged al-Qaeda terrorist Abu Qatada (who was 
repeatedly imprisoned but never prosecuted for any crime). With 
the rise of UKIP and anti-immigration sentiment, a storm has been 
brewing over ‘European’ oversight of the UK’s human rights track 
record. 
Subsequent to the publication of the Review, an eight-page 
strategy paper of the Conservative Party (i.e. not the government) 
was published in October 2014 entitled “Protecting Human Rights 
in the UK”, in relation to which Justice Secretary Chris Grayling of 
the Conservatives stated: “We can no longer tolerate this mission 
creep. What we have effectively got is a legal blank cheque, where 
the court can go where it chooses to go. We will put in place a 
provision that will say that the rulings of Strasbourg will not have 
legal effect in the UK without the consent of parliament. Effectively, 
what we are doing is turning Strasbourg into an advisory body.”30 
Grayling added that a new Conservative government (i.e. 
without the coalition with the Liberal Democrats) would withdraw 
from the ECHR if Parliament failed to secure the right to veto 
judgments from the ECtHR. Prime Minister Cameron had 
summarised the policy at a party conference in Birmingham in 
                                                        
30 www.theguardian.com/politics/interactive/2014/oct/03/ 
conservatives-human-rights-act-full-document  
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September 2014: “Let me put this very clearly: we do not require 
instruction on this from judges in Strasbourg.”  
Arguments about the alleged undue influence of the Court on 
national matters may be put into perspective with some statistics 
from the Strasbourg court. Between 1959 and 2013, the number of 
judgments involving the UK totalled 499 judgments, of which only 
3% were found against the British government. By comparison, 
France has had 913 cases, Russia 1,475 (since 1996), Italy 2,268, and 
Turkey 2,994. The number of cases found against the UK is both 
quite small and arguably of secondary gravity compared to the 
many arising in Russia or Turkey. However, the collateral damage 
done to the ECtHR by the UK’s withdrawal could be of major 
importance, with Russia and others exploiting the precedent.  
Assessment 
The evidence gathered by this Review shows that there is broad 
consensus that respect for human rights is in the national interest of 
the UK, which in 2015 proudly celebrates the 800th anniversary of 
the Magna Carta. As much as the EU fundamental rights system has 
been deemed beneficial to all sectors in the UK because it keeps the 
EU in check, so too is the ECtHR’s primary function to provide 
external (independent, impartial and expert) scrutiny to prevent 
any member state from acting or mandating to act in a manner that 
is inconsistent with 21st century levels of human rights protection in 
Europe.  
Conservative Party threats to withdraw from the Convention 
and ECHR are, in our view, a populist overreaction to a handful of 
adverse rulings from the Strasbourg Court and would be a major 
reversal of the human rights cause in Europe as a whole. The idea 
that the status of the Court’s judgments could be reduced to advice 
for the British parliament has no chance of general acceptance by 
the member states in the Council of Europe.  
Withdrawal from the Convention would link into the debate 
about Britain’s possible exit from the EU. After all, respect for the 
rights and freedoms as guaranteed by the ECHR, as part of the 
general principles of EU law, is one of the pre-conditions for EU 
membership. Domestic protection of rights and freedoms under a 
new British Bill of Rights and Responsibilities might be less than 
130  PART III. EVIDENCE 
 
under the Convention, and thus raise the question whether it was 
good enough to continue to satisfy EU membership criteria. 
In other words, while the Conservative Party’s target is 
mainly the ECtHR in Strasbourg, secession from the Convention 
there could have highly complicated and damaging impacts on the 
UK’s relations with the EU, as well as undermining the general 
human rights system in Europe as a whole.  
Postscript. The Lisbon Treaty sought to clarify the relationship 
between the EU and the Strasbourg Court by deciding in Article 6 
TEU that: “The Union shall accede to the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such 
accession shall not affect the Union’s competences as defined in the 
Treaties”. Negotiations between the EU and the Council of Europe 
were therefore undertaken, and a draft agreement was drawn up. 
Subsequent to publication of this Review, however, in December 
2014 the CJEU declared this draft agreement to be incompatible with 
EU law on a number of grounds (Opinion 2/13). This leads into 
complex legal arguments that have been analysed elsewhere.31 
Suffice here to observe that the draft agreement is now at least put 
on hold, possibly indefinitely. 
 
The evidence at a glance – fundamental rights 
UK a strong supporter of human rights, going back to the Magna Carta 
EU law links to Council of Europe’s Convention and Court 
A few Strasbourg judgments against UK prompts Tory ire 
Secession from Strasbourg would spill over into EU competence 
It would also damage the human rights system in wider Europe 
9.2 Civil judicial cooperation* 
The broad area of Freedom, Security and Justice is relatively new 
and fast-growing area of EU competence, driven by the combination 
                                                        
31 Adam Łazowski and Ramses A. Wessel, “The European Court of Justice 
blocks the EU’s accession to the ECHR3”, CEPS Commentary, 8 January 
2015. 
* This section was contributed by Steve Peers. 
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of suppression of border controls within the Schengen area, 
alongside the manifest growth of cross-border crime and 
international terrorism. Cooperation started in the justice and home 
affairs domain in 1975 with the inter-governmental Trevi Group 
that saw however no EU competence. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty 
brought it into EU competence under the Third Pillar, where 
however the process remained essentially inter-governmental with 
no role for the Commission or European Parliament. But then the 
1997 Amsterdam Treaty and 2009 Lisbon Treaty progressively 
moved the whole domain into the mainstream EU shared 
competences. With the Lisbon Treaty the Third Pillar was finally 
abolished and all police and criminal law matters are now subject to 
regular QMV voting in the Council and jurisdiction of the CJEU. The 
UK negotiated special opt-out provisions in both the Amsterdam 
and Lisbon Treaties, and in Protocol 21 of the Lisbon Treaty the UK 
has a general opt-out, coupled to the possibility to opt-in selectively 
on a case-by-case basis.  
Civil judicial cooperation is one of the chapters of Title V of 
the Lisbon Treaty (TFEU) that defines the EU’s competences in the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.32 According to Protocol 21 
the whole of this area however sees the UK, with Ireland, having 
opted out of the EU’s actions, unless they specifically request to opt 
in on an itemised basis. This is the essential background to the 
discussion that follows on where the UK’s participation can be 
considered advantageous or not. 
The contributors to this Review took different views as to 
whether the EU’s measures in this area were an improvement on 
intergovernmental cooperation. One group of contributors argued 
that they were, on the grounds that the UK would have difficulty 
replicating the results by means of bilateral arrangements with 
member states. A smaller group argued the contrary.  
Many contributors agreed with the scope of Article 81 TFEU 
(the legal base for measures in this field), although others were 
worried that it left too much scope for measures that were not 
limited to cross-border cooperation.  
                                                        
32 Other chapters concern border checks, asylum and immigration, and 
police cooperation. See the next two sections below. 
132  PART III. EVIDENCE 
 
Most contributors were supportive of the flagship measure in 
this area, the Brussels I Regulation, which has the effect of 
promoting English law for international contracts, and ensures legal 
certainty and enforceability of judgments in international disputes. 
There was some concern about certain judgments of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the regulation, for example 
with respect to arbitration disputes, third-country jurisdiction and 
choice-of-court clauses in contracts, but those concerns had been 
addressed by recent amendments to the legislation.  
Many also supported the EU regulations on the choice of law 
in contract and in tort, although some had doubts about their 
uniform interpretation, or the problems that would arise if a foreign 
court tried to interpret English law.  
As for EU family law rules, most stated that the Brussels II 
Regulation had simplified cross-border divorce proceedings, but it 
was still open to litigants to ‘rush to court’ rather than consider 
mediation. The rules in the regulation regarding children were also 
broadly supported, although they could be improved for children 
in care or with foster families. Some had doubts about EU rules on 
maintenance proceedings, since their interaction with the rules on 
divorce could be complex.  
There were also views about other measures: support for the 
evidence regulation; opposing views about the usefulness of the 
legislation on service of documents; and support for the potential 
use of the small claims regulation and the mediation directive. 
There was a general view that awareness of these measures should 
be raised, since the available statistics showed that they were not 
used very often. There was also support for the regulation on 
insolvency proceedings.  
Some contributors were critical of certain judgments of the 
CJEU on civil law matters, suggesting improvements in the Court’s 
proceedings.  
A large majority of contributors took the view that the EU 
measures in this area were helpful for the single market, given that 
they promoted legal certainty in the context of cross-border trade 
relationships and contracts.  
Most contributors supported the opt-out for the UK, although 
some disagreed with its use in particular cases. For instance, some 
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legal associations wanted the UK to opt in to the latest justice 
programme, and the succession regulation.  
Opinions were divided about the EU’s external role in this 
area, given that it often has exclusive external competence to enter 
into agreements in this field. A number of contributors questioned 
the Commission’s claim that the EU has exclusive competence to 
decide on the extension of The Hague Convention on child 
abduction to new countries (as far as member states are concerned), 
or complained about the delay in EU ratification of international 
treaties.  
Finally, as for future measures, contributors called for the EU 
to focus on reform and consolidation of existing rules, rather than 
the development of new measures affecting civil law and family law 
more generally.  
Assessment 
The overwhelming majority of contributors appeared to support 
civil law cooperation as an important issue linked to the single 
market for business and trade and (as regards family law) the 
movement of persons. This support no doubt wane if it were not for 
the UK’s opt-out, which has enabled it either to stay entirely outside 
of measures that it considered undesirable, or at least to ‘hedge its 
bets’ by staying out when a measure was first proposed, and then 
opting in after its adoption if it was satisfied with the result. There 
were some doubts, however, as to whether this approach was 
sustainable in the long term.  
Having said that, British contributors have a number of 
detailed suggestions to improve the EU measures that would 
facilitate the accomplishment of their objectives, particularly in 
cases involving divorce and children. Awareness-raising would 
increase the public use of these measures.  
It should be noted that some of the issues raised by 
contributors have been addressed in practice. As the contributors 
themselves noted, the recent amendments to the Brussels I 
Regulation addressed many of the complaints that practitioners had 
about the CJEU’s case law. It would seem that when British 
practitioners make a detailed and reasonable critique of an EU 
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measure, they can be successful in convincing others in the EU to 
share their point of view.  
A number of issues raised in this part of the Balance of 
Competences Review have also been addressed since it was carried 
out. The issue of competence regarding extension of The Hague 
Convention on child abduction should soon be resolved by the 
CJEU, after that Court held a hearing on the issue earlier this year. 
In late 2013, the Commission proposed amendments to the small 
claims regulation to improve its use, including a large increase in 
the threshold for application of that regulation. The EU has now 
ratified The Hague Convention on maintenance, and the 
Commission has recently proposed that it ratify The Hague 
Convention on choice-of-court clauses, which will bring that 
Convention into force. A proposal to improve the insolvency 
regulation is also under discussion. The Commission recently began 
a public consultation on improving the rules on child abduction and 
divorce jurisdiction, the CJEU has now been seized with cases 
concerning the maintenance regulation, which might clarify the 
issues concerning interpretation of that regulation, and there is no 
sign that the EU legislature will take a broad view of the scope of 
competence under Article 81 and apply it to proceedings that do not 
have a cross-border element. 
All in all, the UK has been able to select from the civil 
proceedings measures those which are best adapted to the common 
law system (and the Scottish hybrid system) and which best serve 
the needs of British business and the legal profession. It has also 
been able to shape the amendment of those measures when 
necessary, and avoid their application if it disagreed with them.  
 
The evidence at a glance – civil judicial cooperation 
UK secured a block opt-out, with possibility for selective opt-ins 
UK enjoys exceptional flexibility in EU to pick and choose 
Majority support for civil law cooperation on single market matters 
Detailed proposals for improvements of EU measures  
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9.3 Police and criminal law cooperation* 
The contributors to the Review in this area address the overlapping 
issues of the UK’s opt-out and the usefulness of individual 
measures. Some support changing the longstanding government 
position (dating from the original JHA opt-out in 1999) that the UK 
should decide to use the opt-out on a case-by-case basis, either by 
switching to opting in as the default measure, or to opting out as the 
default measure (a detailed account of this debate is found on pages 
33-38 of the Review). In our opinion such a change would be 
possible without treaty amendment, and could take the form either 
of a political commitment by the government, or of specific 
provisions in an Act of Parliament. It would also be possible to 
adopt the Irish system, where each decision to opt in has to be 
approved by Parliament.  
The case for a default opt-in is that it would increase goodwill 
towards the UK among other member states, while leaving 
flexibility for the government to opt out in individual cases where 
the criteria for doing so are met. It would also make the 
government’s decisions more consistent and transparent.  
The group supporting a default opt-out points to cases where 
the UK was able to ensure that it was satisfied with measures before 
opting in, and observes that the UK was still able to influence the 
content of discussions because other member states were anxious to 
have the UK participate, by means of opting in to a measure after its 
adoption. However, there have been a relatively modest number of 
such cases, i.e. where the UK opted out but indicated that it might 
still opt in after adoption. In one such case (a civil law regulation on 
succession), the UK negotiated its position at length but ultimately 
decided not to opt in; this might well have lost it some goodwill 
among other member states. Moving to a default opt-out strategy 
might also lose the UK some of its influence in this area and, in 
particular, a more frequent use of the strategy of opting out of 
measures to which the UK would actually prefer to opt in could 
irritate other member states greatly. 
As for specific measures in this area, contributors reserved 
particular criticism for the proposed Regulations on Europol (due 
                                                        
* This section was contributed by Steve Peers. 
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to the rules on access to police information); the European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO); and Eurojust (due to the links between 
Eurojust and the EPPO). In practice, however, the UK’s concerns on 
the first of these measures seem to have been addressed during the 
negotiations.  
There were mixed views on EU legislation regarding issues 
such as criminal procedure, substantive criminal law and mutual 
recognition. On criminal procedure, some supported it in principle, 
some were opposed in principle and some believed that insufficient 
account had been taken of practical questions, particularly the 
directive on interpretation and translation for criminal suspects. 
This points to a greater need for the legal profession and other 
practitioners to put across their points of view during negotiations.  
On substantive criminal law, there was concern in the Review 
about the tendency in a few recent measures to include proposals 
for minimum sentences. However, it should be noted that the 
provisions in question were removed during negotiations in the 
Council. Others pointed to United Nations treaties in this area. It 
should be noted, however, that the EU is party to some of the 
treaties referred to (notably the UN Convention on organised crime 
and its protocols) and much EU law aims to implement the other 
treaties (such as the Lanzarote Convention on offences against 
children) in detail. The latter Convention is in any event still not in 
force in nine member states: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Poland, Slovakia and the United 
Kingdom. Also, there are no international treaties on some of the 
issues addressed by EU law, such as environmental crime and fraud 
against the EU budget. 
On mutual recognition, some pointed instead to the 
international legal framework (Council of Europe) or to bilateral 
arrangements, as an alternative. On the first point, it should be 
noted that some issues are not governed by the Council of Europe 
system, such as pre-trial supervision. Other issues are regulated by 
Council of Europe treaties, which a limited number of member 
states have ratified, i.e. probation and parole and mutual 
recognition of criminal convictions. A third category of issues is 
indeed regulated by Council of Europe treaties, which all member 
states have ratified (extradition, mutual assistance, transfer of 
prisoners), but those treaties are a patchwork, since there are 
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protocols that not all states have ratified, and there are a large 
number of reservations and options within each Convention. By 
comparison, EU measures have fewer options and deadlines to take 
action, resulting in (for instance) a huge increase in the number of 
people extradited between member states, and a much shorter time 
period for the average extradition.  
On the second point, it is doubtful whether a series of bilateral 
agreements with member states is a realistic alternative. The 
existence of EU measures in this area gives rise to EU external 
competence in the field, which might possibly be exclusive to some 
extent (there is no CJEU case law on this issue yet). The same rules 
apply to bilateral agreements between member states (see the 
CJEU’s Pringle judgment). So it would be necessary to negotiate a 
treaty between the UK and the EU as a whole (assuming that the EU 
can sign a treaty at all with a member state), or for the EU to 
authorise its member states to sign treaties with the UK as regards 
the issues concerned.  
Regarding the role of the CJEU, opinions were again mixed, 
with some supporting the role of the Court in this field and some 
raising fears that the Court would interfere too much in national 
legal systems. In effect, the Court has been delivering judgments on 
criminal law issues since 2001, since about two-thirds of member 
states opted in to the Court’s jurisdiction under the arrangements 
set out in the Treaty of Amsterdam. Critics of the Court’s 
jurisdiction do not point to any particular judgment to justify their 
argument. Any change to the Court’s jurisdiction would require a 
treaty amendment. 
Finally, the summary of the law in this area is not fully 
accurate. In the event that the UK seeks to opt in to a measure after 
it has been adopted, there is no treaty provision that gives the 
Commission the power to “impos[e] conditions” (point 1.30). 
Equally, in the event of a Commission refusal to let the UK opt in, a 
possible UK appeal to the Council is not limited to objecting to such 
conditions. Rather, Article 331 TFEU states that the Commission 
shall “note where necessary that any conditions of participation 
have been fulfilled”; this can only be a reference to the “conditions 
of participation” laid down in the original Council Decision 
authorising enhanced cooperation, as occurs Article 328 TFEU. 
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Postscript. Following the murderous attack in Paris on the 
staff of Charlie Hebdo magazine on 7 January 2015, an intensification 
of EU measures on police and criminal law matters seems likely. 
The UK will remain able to decide on whether to opt in to each 
measure on a case by case basis. It might also be useful to review 
whether the UK should opt in to some existing EU measures that 
concern the fight against terrorism. However, at first sight the UK 
already seems to apply all relevant EU measures, except for the 
substantive criminal laws concerning terrorism offences, which in 
any event match UK domestic law.  
Assessment  
All in all, the UK has been able to select from EU criminal law those 
measures that are best adapted to the common law system (and the 
Scottish hybrid system) and which it believes are advantageous to 
cooperation with other member states. There has been no case of the 
UK being outvoted (in practice, despite the extension of qualified 
majority voting, criminal law measures are not pushed through 
against a member state’s opposition), and no judgment of the CJEU 
that contradicts the principles of the UK criminal justice system has 
been identified.  
 
The evidence at a glance: police and criminal law cooperation 
A growing domain of EU policy, driven by manifest threats of terrorism 
and cross-border crime. 
Opt-out and opt-in arrangements for the UK allows for a best fit with its 
common law system.  
Variants among opt-out/opt-in systems discussed, with these options 
remaining open to UK.  
No cases of UK being outvoted, or contradicting its criminal justice system. 
Alternatives such as relying on the Council of Europe or bilateral treaties 
appear less adequate.  
9.4 Asylum and non-EU immigration 
This Review deals with border controls, asylum and immigration, 
which involve shared competences of the EU and member states, 
and is an important part of the EU’s broader Area of Freedom, 
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Security and Justice. This is an area with substantial growth of the 
content of EU competences over the last decades. 
The present legal basis is set out in Articles 77 to 79 of the 
TFEU, which empowers the EU to minimise border controls, adopt 
a common visa policy and measures on passports, and develop a 
common asylum policy and a common immigration policy.  
The strategic basis for this complex of policies originated in 
the decision taken in 1985 by continental EU states to abolish 
frontier controls in the Schengen system, whereas the UK and 
Ireland opted to retain their national border controls, given their 
island geography. While the Schengen system originally lay outside 
the EU treaties, it is now fully integrated in EU law (Article 77 of 
TFEU), and the UK’s opt-out is enshrined in Protocol No. 20 of the 
TFEU.  
With regard to asylum and immigration policies (Articles 78 
and 79 of TFEU) the UK, along with Ireland, enjoys special 
provisions (under Protocol 21 of TFEU) under which it is only 
bound by EU legal acts if it chooses to opt in. Even if the UK chooses 
not to opt in when a measure is introduced it retains the option to 
do so at any later stage, subject to Commission approval.  
Border controls. The UK does not participate in core features 
of the Schengen system, namely the Schengen Borders Code 
establishing common external border checks, or the Visa 
Information System (VIS), which is a database to serve security 
purposes. It partly participates in the Schengen Information System 
(SIS), which is used to issue alerts over suspected criminals. These 
limitations mean that UK security interests may not be optimised. 
The UK does participate in some other Schengen measures, such as 
the Advance Passenger Information Directive, and the Carriers 
Liability law. The UK also has limited involvement in the workings 
of the FRONTEX agency, and may do so also with the European 
Border Surveillance System (Eurosur). The UK has opted in to the 
Biometrics Residence Permit Regulation.  
Asylum. European norms for the handling of asylum seekers 
originated with the Dublin Convention of 1990, which, however, 
was an intergovernmental agreement of the then 12 member states 
outside EU law, whose core principle was that an asylum seeker has 
to be handled by the member state he/she first enters. Following the 
rapid growth of EU competences in this area a revised version of the 
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Dublin Convention was integrated into EU law in 2003 (‘Dublin II’). 
A related development was the creation of the EURODAC, namely 
a biometric fingerprint database to enable individual member states 
to verify whether asylum seekers have already applied elsewhere. 
The UK has opted in to both Dublin II and EURODAC. The UK is 
currently making use of an important European Court of Human 
Rights ruling that refines the basic Dublin rule, in saying that 
asylum seekers should only be returned to the country of first entry 
if there are no “systemic deficiencies” in that state’s capacity to 
handle the asylum seekers properly; as a result, the UK does not 
currently return asylum seekers to Greece. On the other hand, the 
UK has not opted in to other measures such as the Reception 
Conditions Directive, the Qualifications Directive or the Asylum 
Procedures Directive.  
Immigration. The EU has legislation creating certain funds for 
dealing with immigration, but the UK has not opted in to the 
External Borders Fund, for example. The EU makes readmission 
agreements with many countries, and the UK opts in to many of 
these, but not all. The UK has not opted in to a set of nine directives 
concerning criteria for acceptance of migrants, including the Blue 
Card system for highly qualified persons and other detailed 
provisions concerning social security rights of immigrants and 
measures to counter illegal migration. The UK government 
generally feels that details of its own rules are better suited to its 
needs and perceptions.  
Overall, this is a complex set of policies where the UK has 
negotiated a status quo characterised by large-scale opt-outs, 
together with various continuing opt-in possibilities; i.e. a 
remarkable combination of selectivity and flexibility. The Review 
reports that the UK has chosen to opt in to roughly one-third of EU 
measures in this whole field, with fewer more recently, however, as 
the EU has extended its activities. The opt-in/out arrangements 
allow for successive adjustments of the UK’s relationship with the 
core EU that in principle mean that it can choose, to a high degree 
unilaterally, its optimal policy package, and to recalibrate it at times. 
This selectivity and flexibility has to be considered a privilege, since 
the EU knows full well that a generalisation of these options would 
make the system unworkable to the point of disintegration. For this 
reason the EU is in principle extremely reluctant to agree to 
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measures that are commonly described as ‘cherry-picking’. The 
island geography of the UK and Ireland provides some objective 
foundations for this special deal, however.  
Assessment 
Given the UK’s strategic non-participation in the Schengen system 
and related matters of border controls and immigration policy, 
subject only to some specific elements of cooperation with the EU, 
this Review chose not to assess whether the EU’s overall 
competences in these fields was appropriate. The Review notes that 
for the UK the balance of competences in these areas lies mainly 
with the UK itself, and the government does not intend to change 
this. The Review concentrates on assessing whether the UK’s opt-
outs and special provisions are in the national interest.  
The Review reiterates the UK government’s view that, while 
these large exclusions from EU competences entail certain costs, 
they are largely outweighed by the benefits of enhanced border 
security. While this cost-benefit conclusion appears to be of an 
assertion than based on evidence, there is little argument to the 
contrary presented by independent stakeholders. Moreover, the 
Review notes that the opt-outs are largely supported by public 
opinion.  
On various details, even from a purely British standpoint, 
there may be grounds for debating whether the UK has optimised 
all its options in this area. For example, while the keeping of border 
controls is generally supported in the UK, the costs to the tourist 
sector and the transport industry of having a separate visa system 
are seen as being considerable: a visa mutual recognition agreement 
between the EU and the Schengen system might cut these costs 
without the UK losing control of its borders (the UK might accept 
foreign travellers with Schengen visas, for example).  
 
The evidence at a glance – asylum and non-EU immigration 
UK stakeholders content with opt-out from Schengen zone 
Further opt-outs also for asylum and immigration rules 
But selective opt-back-ins (some asylum rules and biometric data) 
UK secured a remarkable combination of selectivity and flexibility 
142  PART III. EVIDENCE 
 
10. Education, research and culture 
10.1 Education, vocational training and youth  
The EU has a ‘supporting competence’ in the broad field of 
education, which means that national policies predominate. This 
attribution of competences is not contested in the UK or elsewhere 
in the EU. The EU’s activities in this domain fall into three very 
different categories, i) policy coordination under the so-called Open 
Method of Coordination (OMC), which is based on ‘soft law’ or non-
binding guidelines and peer review, ii) the directly operational 
mobility programmes funded by the EU budget, notably Erasmus+, 
and iii) voluntary mutual recognition frameworks for vocational 
qualifications. The evolution of these various types of competence 
has proceeded in a pragmatic manner with relatively little EU 
legislation and correspondingly little political controversy. Overall, 
the UK and other member states remain free to make their own laws 
and policies in the area of education, and are also free to enter into 
bilateral or multilateral international agreements as long as these do 
not override specific EU competences. 
Policy coordination in the areas of education and training has 
acquired a higher profile since 2000 under the influence of the 
‘Lisbon strategy’, which set objectives for the period 2000 to 2010 as 
a competitive knowledge-based economy, to raise the employment 
rate, and thus contribute to overall economic growth. This was 
followed by ‘Europe 2020’, proposed in 2010 for the following ten-
year period, with advances in education forming a central part of 
the strategy. This initiative could not be based on legislative action 
by the EU in the field of education, however, since that would have 
meant radically increasing EU competences in this field, which for 
member states was out of the question. The choice was therefore to 
rely on the OMC. Under this method the Europe 2020 strategy set 
many targets in the educational area, such as for 95% of children to 
participate in early childhood education before compulsory 
schooling; 40% of people to complete some form of higher 
education; 15% of adults to participate in life-long learning, etc. 
Member states are expected to set national targets consistent with 
these EU-level targets.  
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All member states except the UK did so, many of them placing 
the targets at the heart of their educational reform programmes. For 
its part the UK declined on grounds that the target-setting was not 
in line with UK government policy and that it was not appropriate 
for the EU to set targets in areas in which it did not have 
competence. The comment of one respondent was “the UK has 
chosen to be more on the margins rather than [at] the centre” of the 
European education agenda (p.32). There is certainly a wider debate 
on how far the EU’s target-setting is an effective instrument of 
policy in this field, but here the UK has secured another opt-out to 
suit its political preference, albeit a less prominent one because the 
instruments of EU action in question are ‘soft’ rather than hard law.  
On the other hand, the UK has been at the heart of the Bologna 
process, initiated in 1998 by the education ministers of France, 
Germany, Italy and the UK. This is a voluntary inter-governmental 
process outside the EU framework, and is extended to include 47 
European countries. Its flagship achievement has been to establish 
norms for the three basic levels of higher education qualifications: 
Bachelors, Masters and Doctorates, and so facilitate comparability 
and exchange between university systems.  
The EU’s flagship project in the education field is 
undoubtedly its student mobility programmes, notably Erasmus, 
which has been highly operational and even of transformative 
importance. The expression ‘Erasmus generation’ has been coined 
to refer to the young Europeans who are part of the new ‘normal’, 
in which a university student spends a year of studies away from 
his or her home country. Erasmus was started in the 1980s and built 
up through several iterations, with various programmes 
consolidated in 2014 under the ‘Erasmus+’ banner. The budget of 
€14.7 billion for Erasmus+ for the seven-year 2014-2020 period 
represents an increase of 40% over the previous budgetary period, 
which the British government views as a successful example of 
shifting the budget more into activities where the EU contributes 
high added value. The majority of the Review respondents “were 
strongly in favour of managing and funding mobility programmes 
at the EU level” (p.40).  
Recent statistics show that 14,607 UK students and 2,178 
academic staff spent the year 2012-2013 at universities in other EU 
countries. Numbers have been rising steadily. At the same time 
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there are almost twice as many students from other EU countries 
visiting the UK (25,750 in 2011-2012). The reasons for this imbalance 
seem plausibly related to the English language factor, with its value 
as a second language for students from other EU countries, while 
the poor foreign language competence of UK students limits their 
opportunities to study abroad (a survey of 14 EU countries reported 
in the Review shows UK students to be ‘bottom of the class’ in 
foreign language skills, p.38).  
As regards the practical impact of the Erasmus programme 
on individual participants, results of a survey are cited in which 64% 
of employers consider international experience to be important 
when recruiting employees, while participants in the Erasmus 
programme are half as likely to suffer long-term unemployment 
compared to non-participants, and more likely to start their own 
businesses (p.41). 
The EU is active in the area of vocational education and 
training, but here the accent is on voluntary frameworks conducive 
to the mutual recognition of professional qualifications. These 
include the European Qualifications Framework (EQF), the 
European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System (ECTS), the 
Europass and others.  
The Review notes the administrative burdens of EU 
programmes, summed up as follows: “While there was recognition 
of the need for appropriate controls to ensure both value for money 
and propriety, there was also the near universal belief that these 
goals could be achieved with reduced and more streamlined 
administrative burdens” (p.56).  
Assessment 
While the education sector covers a wide spectrum of EU activity, 
ranging from highly operational ‘niche’ activities, notably for 
student mobility, through to policy engagement aiming at such 
strategic objectives as a competitive knowledge-based economy, 
there are no real disagreements over the EU’s competences in this 
field. The ‘niche’ activities for student mobility are valued highly, 
with the UK profiting considerably because of its strong university 
system and English language advantage. On the other hand, activity 
aimed at fundamental educational policy objectives is kept securely 
in the field of national policy competence, and subject mainly to 
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peer review and comparative analysis. To the extent that the UK is 
wary that such activity might see the EU creeping into national 
competence, it has itself opted out of the setting of targets under the 
Europe 2020 programme, whereas all other member states are 
moving ahead with this. Broad issues of higher education models 
and reform are also pursued under the Bologna Process, which is a 
voluntary inter-governmental activity outside and wider than the 
EU, with which the UK is comfortable. EU activity in the field of 
vocational training is also essentially voluntary.  
For these reasons, while the education field represents a 
differentiated set of elements, overall the current national-EU 
balance of competences is one that suits the UK quite well.  
 
The evidence at a glance – education and vocational training 
Education a ‘supporting competence’ of the EU; the primary competence of 
member states is not challenged 
EU activities span a broad range under this ‘supporting’ competence:  
- Overall educational policy issues subject to ‘soft law’, i.e. non-binding 
guidelines and peer review 
- Erasmus+ as a major operational mobility programme, and valued ‘niche’ 
activity 
- Vocational training objectives pursued through voluntary frameworks  
10.2 Research and space 
The UK prides itself on having a highly competitive research 
capacity in a wide range of fields. The UK does exceptionally well 
at winning EU research funding, and under the current seven-year 
budget (2007-2013, Framework Programme 7, or FP7) it has received 
€6.1 billion, or 15.4% of the total, second only to Germany’s share of 
16.1%.  
The EU’s legal basis for action in the research area is its 
‘shared competence’. However, it is an unusual hybrid variant on 
the standard shared competence in that it does not limit the 
competence of member states to act in this field. Prior to the Lisbon 
Treaty the EU’s competence was in a supporting capacity only. 
While the Lisbon Treaty was in theory upgrading this into a shared 
competence, the hybrid factor has limited the significance of this 
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change. The Review comments that this has added rather than 
removed confusion around the competence question.  
In concrete terms, however, the EU is increasingly influencing 
strategic decisions about which research area to prioritise through 
the weight of its funding programmes. The FP7 programme has had 
a budget of €50.5 billion, making it the world’s largest research 
programme. The ten priority sectors covered are quite vast in extent: 
health, food, agriculture and fisheries, biotechnology, information 
and communications technologies, nanosciences, nanotechnologies, 
materials and new production technologies, energy, environment 
including climate change, transport including aeronautics, socio-
economic sciences and the humanities, space, and security.  
The EU’s latest research programme for the years 2014-2020, 
(Framework Programme 8, dubbed ‘Horizon 2020’) has a larger 
budget than ever, with €79 billion. Its priorities are placed under the 
headings of excellent science, enabling technologies to support 
industry, and a number of European and global challenges such as 
energy security, food security and climate change. 
The Lisbon Treaty also embraced the idea of the European 
Research Area (ERA), which is an umbrella concept for promoting 
mobility among European scientists and researchers, and reinforced 
partnerships between member states and the Commission’s 
programmes. The added value of this concept, beyond the major 
operating programmes, is not so clear, however. 
The EU has a longstanding competence in the field of space, 
funding flagship projects such as the Galileo satellite programme, 
and the Copernicus programme that undertakes environmental 
monitoring from space. The European Space Agency (ESA) is a 
major partner for the EU, but it is institutionally separate from the 
EU. Integration of the ESA into EU structures has been discussed, 
but is not currently being pursued. In the latest call for space 
projects under the FP7 around 80% of successful bids include a UK 
partner and around 24% are led by a UK partner. 
There is a significant international cooperation dimension to 
the Framework Programmes, with 13 countries having made 
agreements with the EU to participate in projects and contribute to 
the budget. 
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The Review reported widespread stakeholder frustration 
with the heavy bureaucratic procedures involved in applying for 
grants, in the programming of deliverables, and reporting 
requirements. The Review further suggested that stakeholders may 
have to advocate recourse to the simpler arrangements that might 
come with national funding, but that this case was not made. There 
was recognition that a certain degree of bureaucracy was 
unavoidable to ensure fair completion and minimise fraud; national 
funding has its own bureaucracy, of course, and there was no 
certainty that under a national funding regime comparable 
resources would be made available. Most stakeholders seemed 
confident that the Commission was addressing these problems and 
that improvements were anticipated under Horizon 2020.  
A strong message from stakeholders is that the UK’s 
reputation with international partners, both in business and 
research, is enhanced by being part of the EU. Views were expressed 
to the effect that ‘the European brand can also give an additional 
guarantee in dealings with parties in non-EU countries’, and that 
EU funding made it possible to build more international 
partnerships than otherwise would have been possible.  
Assessment 
The Review’s summary assessment was as follows: “The majority 
of respondents felt that a combination of local, national, EU, 
bilateral and international policies and collaborations was the most 
effective way of managing the complex needs of differing research 
fields. To this end, current arrangements, while not perfect, were 
broadly considered or provide a good foundation” (p.6).  
The present authors’ experience of European research 
institutes working in the social sciences highlights two points. First, 
it is true that the bureaucratic burden of EU funding procedures is 
disagreeable for the grantee; by comparison funding from private 
foundations is a rather different experience because such 
foundations generally set out much simpler project funding criteria. 
It is important that the Commission try to simplify procedures 
without prejudicing the academic objectivity and freedom from 
national bias in decisions. At the same time, we acknowledge that 
the Framework Programmes are generally thought to be well 
protected against unfair bias through the use of independent 
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assessors, and the rigorous financial reporting requirements are an 
effective barrier to corruption.  
Secondly, the Review perhaps fails to underline sufficiently 
how in the space of a few decades the European research area has 
effectively come into being, replacing the prior system of national 
research communities that were largely operating in isolation from 
each other. The community of European researchers is nowadays 
highly integrated. This is now taken for granted; any idea of 
reverting to the old regime of nationally segmented research 
structures receives little or no support.  
 
The evidence at a glance – research and space 
Balance of competences (national, EU and international) broadly sound 
UK strong beneficiary from EU research funding  
Frustrations over heavy bureaucratic procedures 
UK reputation with international partners enhanced by EU 
10.3 Culture, tourism and sport 
The EU’s competences in the fields of culture, tourism and sport are 
relatively new. The Lisbon Treaty provides that they are all 
“supporting competences” (TFEU, Articles 165, 167 and 195), which 
means that while the EU may decide certain actions under these 
headings, this does not restrict what the member states decide 
under their own competences.  
Culture. It is explicitly excluded that the EU legislate in order 
to harmonise national laws in the field of culture. The EU’s main 
actions in this field include the MEDIA programme for supporting 
the European film industry, and the European programme to 
digitise cultural materials in European libraries and museums. The 
British Museum, for example, contributes to the European 
programme, which now includes 1.5 million digital assets from the 
UK. Other measures include the Cultural Objects Directive 
(93/7/EEC), which provides a cooperative procedure for returning 
national treasures that have been unlawfully removed from a 
member state. The Capitals for Culture programme, from which 
Glasgow and Liverpool have been beneficiaries, has been 
particularly appreciated. 
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The report says that “The 30 contributors from the culture 
sector were the most unequivocal in their support of EU activity 
under its competence” (p.27), with various contributors stressing 
the comparative success of UK cultural organisations in securing EU 
funding. There was emphasis on how the bringing together of 
cultural communities across member states delivers benefits that are 
not achievable at national level, and on how such programmes 
could achieve a critical mass allowing the UK and European 
partners to compete on the global stage and project ‘soft power’.  
Tourism. Actions in this sector are not very extensive. There 
are several measures effectively protecting the rights of travellers 
and tourists, such as the Denied Boarding Regulation protecting air 
travellers in the event of delays, and the Package Travel Directive, 
which protects consumers in the event of a travel operator going 
into liquidation.  
The European Tour Operators Association noted the risk that 
the UK’s self-exclusion from the Schengen visa system may have a 
negative impact on the UK tourist sector, through the UK being 
dropped out of multi-country itineraries. 
Overall, contributors felt that the impact of EU measures in 
this field were quite modest.  
Sport. In this there have been some important specific 
measures, influenced by the case law of the European Court of 
Justice relating to the free movement of workers. In particular, as a 
result of the Bosman case in 2005, UEFA and FIFA were obliged to 
make far-reaching changes to their regulations on transfer systems 
for footballers, preventing restrictions on the freedom of footballers 
to move clubs once their contracts expire. In the broadcasting 
domain the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (2010/13/EU) 
lists major events that are to be made available for free TV viewing, 
including major football, rugby, athletic and golfing 
championships. The huge increase in following of European 
football championships makes it essential that there be organised 
discussions over policy in this area, while stakeholders were 
unequivocal in their view that the EU’s new competence in relation 
to sport was a positive development for both professional and 
grassroots sport. The UK is extremely well represented in EU Expert 
Groups on sport, providing the chair for three of them: Good 
Governance in Sport, Sustainable Financing of Sport, and Education 
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and Training in Sport. All contributors who expressed a view felt 
that the current balance of competences in the field of sports was 
appropriate.  
Assessment 
Culture, tourism and sport are relatively new and secondary (niche) 
competences of the EU, particularly in the fields of culture and 
sports. All the contributors who submitted evidence held the view 
that the EU’s current supporting competence in culture, tourism 
and sport was on balance either beneficial to the future 
development of these sectors and UK national interest or had the 
potential to be so. On the other hand, none of the contributors 
argued in favour of extending EU competences in these sectors, and 
advised vigilance over moves by the EU to extend these 
competences (p.45).  
 
The evidence at a glance – culture, tourism and sport  
Niche competences appropriate and valuable for culture and sport 
UK cultural organisations successful in securing EU funding 
Important steps for free movement of footballers, and TV distribution  
UK very well represented in sports governance bodies 
 
11. External relations 
11.1 Foreign and security policy* 
This Review examines the EU’s foreign policy, or to use formal 
language its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 
including Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). After 
giving an overview of Britain’s foreign policy interests, the Review 
gives a richly documented account of the complex legal and 
institutional framework for the EU’s foreign policy, its instruments 
and tools. 
                                                        
* This section was contributed by Steven Blockmans. 
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The Review does not go into the EU’s external action under 
non-CFSP competences, which are covered in other, sector-specific 
Reviews (e.g. issues pertaining to trade and investment, EU 
enlargement, or the defence industry for that matter). The Review 
does cover civil protection, however, and the solidarity clause in the 
event of terrorist attacks or natural disasters, which fall outside of 
the scope of CFSP).  
These editorial choices highlight important legal points. First, 
they underline the legal specificity of the CFSP. Indeed the CFSP is 
the only policy area covered explicitly in the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU) because it is “subject to specific rules and procedures” 
(Article 24(1), TEU), whereas all other competences are defined in 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The 
CFSP is an area characterised by the intergovernmental method of 
decision-making (largely by unanimity voting). The Review 
expresses this most vocally with respect to the CSDP: “each Member 
State has a power of veto, not least over the deployment of EU 
military operations and civilian missions. (…) The Member States 
can also act unilaterally, or via other international organisations, not 
least NATO, when they see fit (p.5)”. Moreover, the roles of the 
Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice 
remain limited in CFSP. In other words, the member states retain a 
high degree of sovereignty and control over the CFSP and CSDP. 
There are no powers to be repatriated here. 
Second, they expose problems related to competence 
delimitation between areas (CFSP and non-CFSP), which are 
governed by the different procedures and instruments. Whereas the 
EU’s specific competences in the defence field (CSDP) are more or 
less clearly defined (Articles 42–46 TEU), the open-ended notion of 
“all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s 
security” (Article 24(1) TEU) is rather unhelpful in determining the 
scope of CFSP. The sphere of the CFSP) does not extend to those 
external competences attributed to the Union under the TFEU 
(trade, financial and technical assistance, etc.). In the event of 
different interpretations among EU institutions and member states, 
it will eventually be up to the Court of Justice to settle the 
boundaries between CFSP/CSDP and the other EU external policy 
domains. Such disputes are currently pending judgment before the 
Court. 
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Third, the CFSP is a non-exclusive EU competence, since it 
runs concurrently with national competences in the same field. To 
make sure that the CFSP would not affect national competences, 
Declaration Nos. 13 and 14 to this effect were, upon the insistence 
of the UK,33 attached to the Lisbon Treaty. In the same spirit the 
Review offers an ex post justification of the UK’s controversial stance 
over ‘representation creep’ in the EU institutions’ role in 
international organisations, which it is argued can lead to 
‘competence creep’ (to use British political language). The criticism 
was made that High Representative Ashton was incrementally 
expanding her competence in external representation on behalf of 
the EU and its member states. For this reason, and much to the 
annoyance of the other 26 member states, in 2011 the UK held up 
the adoption of approximately 100 CFSP declarations, causing them 
to expire. The issue was supposedly resolved at the Council meeting 
of 22 October 2011 when there was endorsement of the “General 
Arrangements for EU Statements in multilateral organisations”, 
although its content seems little more than a statement of the duty 
of sincere cooperation between EU institutions and member states 
(Articles 4(3) and 24(3) TEU).  
Fourth, there is the need to reconcile such differences in order 
to enhance coherence in policy-making and the visibility and 
effectiveness of EU external action (writ large). This is illustrated 
with a set of case studies of prominent foreign policy issues in which 
the EU has been or is involved: the so-called strategic partnerships 
with China, Russia and the US; the Arab Spring; Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions; human rights in Burma; restoring order in Mali; the 
stabilisation of Somalia; ensuring long-term stability in the Western 
Balkans; and rebuilding Afghanistan. These case studies show, in 
various ways, how the political, security and defence aspects of the 
EU’s external action (led by the member states and External Action 
Service and decided by consensus in the Council) are increasingly 
interdependent with non-CFSP aspects of foreign policy, such as 
trade, energy, and transport relationships (which are largely led by 
                                                        
33 See House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee (2008) Foreign 
Affairs Policy Aspects of the Lisbon Treaty, Third Report of Session 2007-
8, London, 16 January 2008. 
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the Commission and, in general, decided by qualified majority vote 
in the Council and majority vote in the EP).  
Based on analysis of the evidence, the Review draws 
conclusions about the value added and the disadvantages for the 
UK of working through the EU in foreign policy. The key benefits 
include: “increased impact from acting in concert with 27 other 
countries; greater influence with non-EU powers, derived from [the 
UK’s] position as a leading EU country; the international weight of 
the EU’s single market, including its power to deliver commercially 
beneficial trade agreements; the reach and magnitude of EU 
financial instruments, such as for development and economic 
partnerships; the range and versatility of the EU’s tools, as 
compared with other international organisations; and the EU’s 
perceived political neutrality, which enables it to act in some cases 
where other countries or international organisations might not” 
(p.6).  
The disadvantages of operating through the EU are: 
“challenges in formulating strong, clear strategy; uneven 
leadership; institutional divisions, and a complexity of funding 
instruments, which can impede implementation of policy; and 
sometimes slow or ineffective decision-making, due to complicated 
internal relationships and differing interests” (p.6).  
Assessment 
On foreign policy in general, “the majority of correspondents 
argued that it is “strongly in the UK’s interests to work through the 
EU” (p.87), (with the detailed arguments cited above). The 
disadvantages of slow and complicated decision-making (as cited 
above) are largely the result of the multiple and differentiated sets 
of competences and decision-making rules. The unanimity rule for 
all ‘pure’ foreign policy is in itself a major constraint, but this is often 
compounded by the need to join up with other EU competences that 
have external impacts.  
On the other hand, the complexity of bringing together the 
EU’s many external relations capabilities is also a reminder that the 
global governance challenges of the 21st century are profoundly 
changing the nature of foreign policy. The need for more effective 
global regulatory policies fits well with the broad development of 
the EU’s own regulatory competences in recent decades. By 
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contrast, in the hypothesis of UK secession from the EU, its residual 
national capabilities would (in the view of the present author) be 
thin and carry little weight by comparison. The view that secession 
by the UK would see a downgrading of its standing internationally 
has already been openly stated by the United States at the highest 
level, or as several commentators in the Review put it, the UK would 
be deprived of the EU serving as a ‘force multiplier’ for its foreign 
policy interests. 
On defence, stakeholders were unanimous in the view that 
CSDP) operations could be improved, and that “most 
commentators” considered that this “came down to Member States’ 
political will, both to deploy their personnel and invest in 
capabilities” (p.76), rather than a matter of institutions and legal 
competences.  
The Review presents no proposals for changing EU 
competences in this domain. Effectiveness and efficiency are 
paramount objectives for whoever holds the competences, but 
simply to advocate better coordination and more political will 
seems to reflect more of a political preference to retain the status quo 
rather than to try to engineer solutions.  
In its summary, the Review says that it “suggested ways in 
which the EU could reform its external action to be more effective 
in playing its part” (p.7). While all can agree that there is room for 
qualitative improvement the Review is not so clear about how to do 
this, beyond saying that it is not a matter of changing legal 
competences. By contrast, 11 foreign ministers of the EU, including 
all the founding member states, issued a declaration in September 
2012 favouring more majority voting in the foreign and defence 
fields.34 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
34 Eleven EU foreign ministers, “Future of Europe” communiqué, 18 
September 2012. 
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The evidence at a glance – foreign and security policy 
Majority view, strongly in UK interest to work through the EU 
EU as multiplier of UK interests 
UK sovereignty guarded by unanimity rule and right to own national 
foreign policy; but disadvantage of slow decision-making 
In global context, clear case to align EU international regulatory policies 
with foreign policy 
Under secession hypothesis, the UK would carry little weight 
 
11.2 Development cooperation and humanitarian aid* 
In both development cooperation and humanitarian aid the EU has 
‘parallel competences’, meaning that it has competence to carry out 
activities and conduct a common policy, but that this does not 
prevent member states from exercising theirs (Article 4(4)TFEU). As 
a result there is nothing to repatriate in the sense of the member 
states regaining freedom of action for their own policies. The 
general view projected in the report is in support of this parallel 
competences regime. Critics make the case for improved 
implementation, not repatriation of competences.  
Parallel policy-making at the EU level and at the national 
level, however, has the potential to result in conflicting policies. 
Member states have a tendency to 'upload' their development 
policies and objectives to the Union level, resulting in an EU 
development programme with an overloaded agenda, operating in 
almost every country in the world.  
The EU and its member states account for about 60% of global 
Official Development Assistance (ODA). The Review acknowledges 
that the Commission's large aid budget provides economies of scale 
and strength in key areas such as infrastructure and regional 
projects. It leverages contributions from member states that might 
not otherwise commit equivalent funds to international 
development. Because EU aid is allocated over seven-year cycles, it 
provides a more predictable and longer-term source of finance than 
aid provided by donor countries (including the UK) or other 
                                                        
* This section was contributed by Steven Blockmans. 
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organisations. The EU's global reach is much greater than that of 
any member state acting individually. 
The EU is by far the UK's largest multilateral aid partner: £1.2 
billion of UK aid was managed through the European Commission 
in 2011-12. Most of this aid (£812 million) is non-discretionary 
because it forms part of the UK's overall contribution to the EU 
general budget, which it is legally obliged to pay by virtue of being 
a member state. The rest is channelled through the European 
Development Fund (EDF), which is governed by the Cotonou 
Agreement. The UK spends the remainder of its aid budget 
bilaterally, working directly with 28 priority countries. 
The fact that the EU is a major contributor to global efforts to 
reduce poverty; that it is perceived to be politically neutral; that it 
provides a platform for collective action and seeks to coordinate the 
efforts of its member states is seen by many respondents to be a 
major advantage of working through the EU. These attributes add 
value and have a multiplier effect on the UK's efforts to achieve its 
own policy objectives, as exemplified by the UK's role in negotiating 
the EU’s ‘Agenda for Change’ programme of reform proposals for 
a more strategic EU approach to reducing poverty, including a more 
targeted allocation of funding. 
The EU’s competences in development cooperation and 
humanitarian aid link or overlap with related areas of EU 
competence in trade, neighbourhood relations, democracy and 
human rights, agriculture, fisheries, energy, environment, climate 
change and migration. This illustrates the richness of the EU's 
toolbox compared to other multilateral organisations, but also the 
challenges of coordination that this poses.  
Since the introduction of the European External Action 
Service (EEAS) in 2011, responsibility for managing and disbursing 
EU aid has been split between the EEAS and two Directorates-
General of the European Commission: that for Development and 
Cooperation (DEVCO), and that for Humanitarian Aid and Civil 
Protection (ECHO). In this collaborative framework, the 
Commission retains responsibility for developing policy proposals 
and for the overall management of the external instruments, 
whereas the EEAS contributes to the programming and 
management of these instruments. In doing so, the EEAS works 
with the Commission throughout the process and submits 
BRITAIN’S FUTURE IN EUROPE  157 
 
proposals to the Commission for adoption. The High 
Representative (and therefore the EEAS) is also tasked with 
ensuring the overall political coordination, as well as the unity, 
consistency and effectiveness of the EU's external actions and 
instruments. The report paints a fair picture of the well-documented 
difficulties that exist in finding the right working relationship 
between DG DEVCO and the EEAS, in particular.  
These issues are well known in the member states themselves, 
which have experience of various models for the integration of 
development policy and management under foreign offices, or their 
separation. In the new EU system the argument has been made for 
DEVCO, and maybe also ECHO, to be integrated with the EEAS. 
Debate over these issues will doubtless continue. The division of 
roles between these two EU bodies is indeed far from simple.  
The Review’s biggest lament is that the EU development 
programme management and delivery is overly complex and 
inefficient. The checks built into the financial management systems 
(and the Financial Regulation in particular) have contributed to a 
common criticism of the Commission that it is overly bureaucratic. 
Commission rules are inflexible and cumbersome, hampering 
management’s ability to achieve results; there is no clear overall 
system for demonstrating the results of EU-funded activities; and 
limited flexibility once funds have been committed to specific 
activities. This engenders the risk of steep falls in support once EU 
funding ends. The fact that the EU does not systematically measure 
the results that EU aid achieves is regarded as a major disadvantage. 
Assessment 
The ‘parallel competence’ regime or development cooperation is not 
challenged. Member states retain the freedom to run their own 
development policies, and there is no argument made that the EU 
should cease its activity in this field; on the contrary, the main 
argument is that the EU’s programmes serve as a multiplier for UK 
(and other member states) policy objectives both in scale and range. 
The main criticism about efficiency leads into the well-known 
matter of cumbersome procedures at EU level, but here (in the 
opinion of the present author) the member states and European 
Parliament have to take their responsibilities for imposing on the 
Commission so many checks and constraints, which the 
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Commission itself often considers to be excessive. The new 
institutional arrangements between the EEAS and the Commission 
(DEVCO and ECHO) remain the subject of uneasy concern, and 
may require revision in due course. 
 
The evidence at a glance – development cooperation and 
humanitarian aid 
Support for ‘parallel competence’, not limiting national competence 
EU aid serves as multiplier of UK interests 
Main criticism is over cumbersome procedures for EU aid 
11.3 Enlargement* 
As a subject of the first enlargement of the original European 
Communities, the UK continues to be a supporter of EU 
enlargement and the conditionality-based process of adaptation by 
candidates to the acquis (organised in 35 chapters, similar to the 32 
Balance of Competence Reviews). As EU enlargement is, by its very 
nature, an issue that cuts across multiple policy areas, the evidence 
here links in with many other Reviews, but most topically regards 
the free movement of persons, on which more below.  
Enlargement policy cannot be categorised under the 
competence typology of Article 4 TFEU (exclusive, shared or 
supporting). Accession to the EU is achieved by way of a treaty 
between all member states and the applicant country, after 
following the procedure set out in the EU’s membership clause of 
Article 49 TEU. This provision delineates the balance of 
competences between the member states and the EU institutions. It 
does not, however, spell out all eligibility conditions, nor does it 
codify the minutiae of the various stages in the pre-accession 
process. These details have been developed along the way. 
In terms of the process, the member states in the (European) 
Council remain in control of every stage, from the definition of the 
membership criteria, to the direction of the enlargement strategy; 
whether to accept a membership application; to grant candidate 
country status; to open accession negotiations; to open individual 
negotiation chapters; to agree screening reports; to set 
                                                        
* This section was contributed by Steven Blockmans. 
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opening/interim/closing benchmarks; or to conclude the 
negotiations, etc. The requirement of unanimity in decision-making 
means that, at each of these stages, individual member states may 
exercise a veto to block or hold up the progress of an aspirant 
country on its pre-accession track. Moreover, through their national 
ratification procedures for accession treaties, each national 
parliament also has a veto on new members joining the EU. There is 
therefore no ‘repatriation’ question here. 
The report shows that there is hardly any support for a change 
in this balance of competences, even if unanimity has at times 
worked against UK interests, with some other member states 
blocking or upholding accession negotiations (such as Greece in the 
case of Macedonia and France in the case of Turkey). British 
stakeholders generally believe that member states and the EU 
institutions have been effective in managing the enlargement 
process, and in learning and implementing lessons from previous 
accession waves. They note how the UK has been at the forefront of 
driving these reforms. Moreover, the EU institutions have 
continued to function satisfactorily in the wake of successive 
enlargement rounds, in spite of earlier concerns about gridlock in 
decision-making.  
Much of the evidence in the Review focuses on the use of pre-
accession conditionality. Stakeholders generally support the 
increasing emphasis placed by the EU on overcoming bilateral 
disputes, improving regional cooperation, and ensuring the 
implementation of reforms. There is also support for the 
Commission's more recent move to 'front-load' requirements for the 
rule of law (including fighting organised crime and corruption), 
public administration reform, and economic governance and 
competitiveness, which is an approach advocated by the UK and 
like-minded member states.  
Most contributors believe that the enlargement process has 
generally worked well in ensuring that candidate countries 
transpose the EU's acquis in full. There is, however, awareness that 
the EU’s conditionality has been less effective in ensuring post-
accession compliance with the political accession criteria and the 
EU's values (as in the cases of Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania). 
Some contributors made the point that the enlargement process has 
not yet been able to overcome more daunting political obstacles, 
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such as in the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and 
Turkey. 
With regard to the impact of enlargement on UK interests, the 
evidence suggests that, while there have been undesirable effects in 
some areas, the EU’s widening has been and is likely to continue to 
be seen as generally beneficial to the UK. Contributors point out that 
the UK has enjoyed significant influence among new and aspirant 
member states as a result of promoting EU enlargement. The 
Review notes that many contributors believe that the enlarged EU 
has become a more comfortable environment for the UK, with the 
accession of many countries that share its liberal trading and 
Atlanticist outlook, and have a preference for English as a working 
language. Many contributors feel that the UK has benefited from a 
larger EU, more able − as an ‘influence-multiplier’ − to deal on equal 
terms with other world powers, notably in negotiations on trade. A 
great majority of contributors agree that British business has 
benefited from access to an enlarged single market of more than 500 
million consumers. However, some evidence suggests that British 
SMEs have not yet fully exploited opportunities in new member 
states. 
Some contributors suggest that enlargement, by lowering 
barriers, may have made it easier for international crime to reach the 
UK. Others believe that widening the EU has in fact extended the 
reach of law enforcement and judicial cooperation across the 
continent, thus strengthening the UK's external defences against 
organised crime and terrorism. 
The UK government points out that enlargement can have 
deleterious consequences in some areas, with growing cross-party 
agreement that the impact on migratory flows to the UK should be 
addressed. The UK was among the few member states willing to 
remove all restrictions on free movement from the moment of the 
‘big bang’ accession of new member states in 2004, whereas many 
other member states insisted on transitional regimes. As a result, the 
UK experienced a particularly large spike in immigration, which 
has now pushed it into the more restrictive camp. Prime Minister 
Cameron has called for reform of the temporary post-accession 
controls on free movement, in order to ensure continued public 
confidence in and support for the process. He suggests that 
achievement of a certain level of GDP per capita in relation to the 
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EU average should be used as a condition for removing all 
transitional restrictions on free movement.  
Assessment 
Enlargement has been dubbed the EU’s most successful foreign 
policy, having contributed crucially to the democratic and economic 
transformation of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Enlargement has also fitted with the UK's vision of a wider, 
looser, more flexible Europe. It is perceived as benefiting the UK 
because, inter alia, it increases the number of member states not 
(yet) in the eurozone, thus reducing the risk of Britain's isolation. 
Given the leading role of the member states on EU 
enlargement, it comes as no surprise that the Review produces no 
case for changing the current balance of competences in this area. 
On the contrary, there seems to be evidence of some 'creeping 
nationalisation' in the process, with each member state able to use 
its veto power to protect its interests.35 The Review even suggests 
that individual capitals may at times have abused the enlargement 
process to extract bilateral concessions from candidate countries. 
This has consequences for the EU's credibility and ability to exercise 
leverage to promote reforms. Moreover, such practices undermine 
the mandate given to the Commission to run the day-to-day process 
on behalf of the Council in the EU's collective interest.  
A key theme emerging from the evidence is that, unless public 
confidence can be maintained, enlargement is at risk of grinding to 
a halt, with the issue of immigration from newly acceding EU 
member states having risen to the top of the agenda in the UK, and 
to a lesser degree in some other member states. This has cast a 
shadow over enlargement policy for the future. How to phase in 
free movement is certainly an issue for ongoing or new negotiations 
with candidate countries. It is difficult to predict when and where 
serious problems may arise in the future, however. The very recent 
Croatian accession saw no marked influx of migrants, for example, 
                                                        
35 Christophe Hillion, “The Creeping Nationalisation of the EU 
Enlargement Policy”, SIEPS Report No. 6, Swedish Institute for European 
Policy Studies, Stockholm, November 2010. 
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and the next most plausible accession candidates, Serbia and 
Montenegro, are unlikely to do so either. Bigger issues would no 
doubt arise with a populous country such as Turkey, whose GDP 
per capita has been rising in relation to the EU average, but whose 
accession is not yet on the political horizon. The unanimity rules 
governing the accession process leave all member states with full 
powers to control the process.  
 
The evidence at a glance – enlargement 
No competence question, member states control accession process at every 
stage 
Crucial achievements in democratic transformation of Central and Eastern 
Europe  
UK traditionally a strong supporter of EU enlargement 
Suits UK interests in a liberal Atlanticist Europe 
More non-eurozone countries (for the time being) reduces risks of isolation 
Recent stiffening of UK position on immigration from new member states: 
a matter for negotiation if a new accession candidate threatens large-scale 
migration 
12. General issues 
12.1 Voting, consular services and statistics 
This is a mixed bag of important issues. The overall pattern of 
evidence is that current arrangements are broadly satisfactory. 
While there are demands for reforms that go further than what the 
British government would support, there are no prospects of major 
pressure for such changes.  
Voting 
From 2002 it was decided that there should be a uniform electoral 
process in elections for the European Parliament, based on common 
principles. This requires a proportional representation system, but 
with an open choice to be made between a list versus a single 
transferable vote system. For the UK this meant a move away from 
its established single-member constituency system for the House of 
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Commons. This innovation seems to have passed into effect without 
notable objections.  
In March 2013 the Commission published a non-binding 
recommendation that there be a common voting day, given that 
while most member states vote on Sunday, a few vote on Thursday 
(including the UK), Friday or Saturday. The Review records the 
British government’s view that this traditional voting day should 
not be changed. While many people may feel this to be an 
uninteresting matter to defend, there has been no forcing of the 
issue, and Thursday voting remains intact.  
One issue discussed was whether EU citizens resident in a 
member state other than their own should be able to vote in national 
elections, but this would require the unanimous agreement of 
member states. The UK government considers that the status quo, 
with such EU citizens able to vote in local and European Parliament 
elections only, strikes the right balance.  
The Review discusses various theoretical options for the 
future of the European Parliament, including having a second 
chamber made up of national MPs. But there was no strong 
evidence to support changing the status quo here either.  
Overall, the evidence suggested that there was no need for 
significant reform of the present balance of competences in this 
field. 
Consular Services 
The main EU provision regarding consular services concerns 
assistance to ‘unrepresented EU citizens’, i.e. EU nationals requiring 
assistance in a foreign country where their own government was 
not represented. A Council Decision of 1995 requires that such 
assistance should be provided on a non-discriminatory basis. The 
evidence received suggested that this was the appropriate level of 
EU competence. The European External Action Service is not 
equipped to deliver consular assistance, but may play a useful 
coordinating role, especially in crisis situations. 
However, there is discussion on how consular services should 
be provided in the future, especially for those many smaller member 
states that do not have the virtually global cover of consular services 
enjoyed by France, Germany and the UK. There is already a move 
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towards co-location, with the UK having 14 locations co-located 
with other EU or Commonwealth countries, and a further 20 
locations being prepared for similar arrangements. 
The more radical option would be to establish ‘European 
consulates’, an idea the European Commission has circulated since 
2006. In the long run such offices could issue visas and legalise 
documents. EU High Representative Baroness Ashton reported to 
the Council in 2011 that a number of member states favoured the 
EU Delegations developing such functions, whereas others, 
including the UK, were opposed to such developments. Within the 
Schengen area there is already a trend towards an increasing 
number of shared visa processing offices hosted in the consulate of 
a single member state, from which the UK stands aside, for obvious 
reasons.  
There seems to be no imminent change in present 
arrangements, although the combination of rising demand for 
consular services and increasingly severe budgetary constraints 
may lead to more important developments towards common 
consular services in due course.  
Statistics 
There is no doubt about the essential importance of comparable 
statistics for sound policy-making at both national and EU levels. 
Among examples cited in the Review, strictly comparable data on 
gross national income are the basis for budgetary contributions to 
the EU, and more broadly the harmonised system of national 
accounts are vital to economic policy surveillance. Energy, 
environment and climate change policies depend on sound data. 
Almost every line of policy-making has similar needs.  
Data collection costs are considerable, and there is a clear 
trade-off between the substantial benefits of comparability and 
assured quality of UK and European statistics on the one hand, and 
the potential burden on UK respondents and costs to UK statistical 
producers on the other. The Review reports that “the balance of the 
evidence received indicates that the current competence results in a 
broadly acceptable trade-off for UK interests” (p.117). 
One noted concern is the Intrastat system for collecting data 
on trade internal to the EU. This has to be collected through surveys 
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of firms, since intra-EU customs controls have been scrapped, and 
this source of data only exists now for the EU’s external trade. The 
Intrastat system involves threshold levels of trade that require 
reporting. There is general recognition of the need to reform 
Intrastat, with the Council calling for “a substantial reduction in the 
response burden…, while maintaining a sound level of quality…” 
(p.112). While these are no doubt laudable objectives, it should be 
remembered that the costs of the Intrastat system have to be 
compared with the much higher costs of the paperwork and delays 
of former customs procedures that were abolished though 
completion of the single market.  
Another reform objective is to improve the basic statistics 
Regulation (223/2009) in order to make the system more robust and 
independent of political pressures. This follows the serious problem 
of fraudulent statistics uncovered in the case of Greece when basic 
national accounts data were found to have been manipulated in 
2004 for purposes related to the monitoring of economic policy 
within the eurozone. While this case is an extreme one, the general 
issue of optimal independence of statistics producers is an ongoing 
debate, with the proposed new regulation not yet adopted because 
of differences of view on this point between the European 
Parliament and Commission. 
 
The evidence at a glance – voting, consular services, statistics 
Voting 
Present competences considered satisfactory 
UK accepted proportional representation for European Parliament elections 
Proposal for common voting day not supported by UK, and not pursued 
Discussion of question of voting rights of EU citizens in national elections 
of ‘other’ member states, but no consensus for change 
Consular services 
Main current arrangement is for consular assistance for ‘unrepresented EU 
citizens’ on a non-discriminatory basis 
Budgetary pressures lead to co-location of consulates, which the UK does 
increasingly 
Longer-term case for ‘Europe consulates’ has support of some member 
states, but opposition from others 
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Statistics 
Need for comparable statistics generally recognised to aid sound policy-
making 
Reforms desired to minimise reporting burdens, but current competence 
broadly acceptable  
12.2 Subsidiarity and proportionality (S&P) 
This Review, about whether and how far the EU should act, 
structures the arguments according to a logical framework of three, 
tiered principles: 
- First, the principle of conferral, i.e. whether the EU has the 
legal competence to act in a certain area of policy; 
- Second, the principle of subsidiarity. Thus “subsidiarity is not 
a type competence, but rather a principle that must be 
followed by the EU when considering whether or not to 
exercise competence” (p.18); and 
- Third, the principle of proportionality, i.e. whether, when an 
action is justified, the EU acts with due regard to avoid 
unnecessary burdensome regulations.  
The principle of subsidiarity has seen a steady increase in its 
standing in the EU’s legal and operational order over the last three 
decades. Subsidiarity was first introduced, but only implicitly, into 
the EU’s legal order with the Single European Act of 1987, but then 
reinforced explicitly in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993. In the 
Treaty of Amsterdam of 1999 there followed a Protocol (No 20) that 
further defined how the principles of both subsidiarity and 
proportionality should be applied. Finally, in 2007 the Lisbon Treaty 
(in Protocol No 2) enhanced the role of national parliaments in 
controlling the application in practice of the subsidiarity principle, 
introducing the so-called ‘yellow card’ and ‘orange card’ 
procedures. The ‘yellow card’ provides that one-third of national 
parliaments can require a legislative proposal to be reviewed, while 
the ‘orange card’ provides that a simple majority of national 
parliaments may impose more onerous conditions on the 
Commission to proceed with a contested proposal. The yellow card 
procedure has been used twice, but the orange card has not yet been 
used. In addition, the Lisbon Treaty introduced provisions for 
national parliaments to take a case to the European Court of Justice 
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(CJEU) where legislation is deemed to breach the principle of 
subsidiarity.  
Proportionality has been described “as an expression of 
simple common sense - don’t use a sledgehammer to crack a nut” 
(p.34). Its origins go back a long way before the EU’s existence and 
has broadly been seen as “the need to protect individuals from the 
coercive power of the state” (p.34). In the EU context the principle 
of proportionality as a matter of EU law has developed primarily 
through the case law of the European Court of Justice. For example 
in 2005 in the ABNA case the CJEU struck down an EU directive 
requiring manufacturers of animal feed to indicate the exact 
composition of the feed, on the grounds that this went beyond what 
was required to protect human health (p.37). One consequence of 
CJEU case law on proportionality is a rising number of instances 
where national rules may be challenged for being disproportionate, 
as in the seminal Cassis de Dijon (Case 120/78) of 1979. This is an 
important perspective in the political debate about proportionality, 
where the CJEU can strike down disproportionate national as well 
as EU practices (p.38).  
The Review devotes a section to the related but separate issue 
of the use of the ‘catch-all’ Article 352 as legal basis for EU action in 
cases where no specific legal basis is available. The concern here is 
that the Article 352 purpose of adding flexibility to the EU’s legal 
processes could be abused to expand the EU’s effective competences 
beyond those authorised explicitly in the treaties. The Review notes 
that this article has been little used, given the breadth of 
competences defined now in the Lisbon Treaty, and restrictions 
placed upon its use (p.43). 
The Review sensibly took the trouble to screen for evidence 
on S&P issues in the many sectoral policy Reviews, and quoted 
examples of issues arising in the fields of agriculture, animal health 
and welfare, fisheries, energy, environment, transport, competition 
policy, financial services, social and employment policies and 
fundamental rights (pp. 55-57, pp. 75-78, and in more detail pp. 110-
115).  
Examples of where there were complaints that S&P principles 
were being inadequately respected include land use planning and 
noise, recreational transport (aviation, rail), rules for driving 
licenses, animal health standards adapted to the UK’s island 
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geography. Another example is where the CJEU had ruled against 
flexibility for member states to adopt lighter reporting requirements 
on health and safety issues for businesses employing fewer than 11 
people. Cases often cited in the UK debate are the Directives on 
Working Time and Agency Workers.  
Going in the other direction, there were several cases cited 
where the processes of negotiation and consultation led to 
corrections to respond to S&P complaints, including reforms in 
fisheries policy allowing for regional groupings (North Sea, 
Mediterranean), the recent agreement on energy-climate policies to 
allow for differentiated national implementation of EU-agreed 
targets, and in the case of the Data Protection Regulation the 
elimination of many provisions allowing for detailed powers to be 
delegated to the Commission.  
Assessment 
The most frequent critique in the Review is over the need to improve 
the quality of impact assessments and to ensure more time and 
greater transparency in consultation processes. Related issues are 
the need to ensure better regulatory quality and cut unnecessary 
‘red tape’. The British36 and Dutch37 governments have produced 
lists of regulations that could be scrapped or lightened. The British 
government welcomes the Commission’s ongoing work through its 
‘Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme (REFIT)’,38 which 
reports regularly on regulations that should be improved or 
repealed.  
The Review pays close detailed attention to the case for 
national parliaments to develop a more effective role in controlling 
for S & P issues. Debate on this issue is widespread among member 
                                                        
36 “Cut EU red tape”, Report from the Business Taskforce (commissioned 
by the British Prime Minister), October 2013. 
37 “Testing European legislation for subsidiarity and proportionality –
 Dutch list of points for action”, June 2013 (www.government.nl/ 
documents-and-publications/notes/2013/06/21/testing-european-
legislation-for-subsidiarity-and-proportionality-dutch-list-of-points-for-
action.html). 
38 European Commission, “Regulatory Fitness and Performance 
Programme (REFIT)”, COM(2014) 368 final, 18.6.2014. 
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states, and the UK’s concerns are shared by many others. Detailed 
proposals are discussed, for example whether the ‘yellow card’ 
procedures should be seriously upgraded into ‘red card’ 
procedures, where a majority of national parliaments could play a 
more decisive role in blocking legislation on S & P grounds. These 
are delicate matters that do not invite simple conclusions, given the 
need to enhance the perceived democratic legitimacy of the EU at 
national levels, but also to avoid constitutional confusion of 
responsibilities between the governments of member states in the 
Council and their national parliaments.  
The Review takes note of the innovation seen in the incoming 
Commission on 1 November 2014, in the new position of a First 
Vice-President (former Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Frans 
Timmermans) charged explicitly with controlling for respect of 
subsidiarity and proportionality in any legislative proposals to 
come out of the Commission. “This suggests that there will be a 
firmer focus on these issues within the 2014-2019 Commission, and 
the opportunity for greater engagement with the concerns and 
proposals of Member States and national parliaments” (p.99). 
To conclude, the evidence is that the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality are being taken increasingly seriously among 
member states and EU institutions. This is a logical political 
response to the growth of EU competences that has occurred over 
the last three decades. The above-mentioned institutional 
innovation in the Commission adds to the build-up of treaty-level 
safeguards against EU policies that contravene these principles. The 
UK is well placed to build coalitions in favour of the broader quest 
for regulatory quality, notably because its government and 
stakeholders work hard on these difficult and often very detailed 
technical matters.  
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The evidence at a glance – subsidiarity and proportionality (S & P) 
Continuous build-up of S & P principles in the law and practices of the EU, 
alongside the build-up of EU competences and increased qualified majority 
voting in the Council 
Complaints over insufficient respect for S & P in several sectors, but 
evidence of the processes of consultation and negotiation leading to 
corrections 
Widespread calls for improved impact assessments and more time and 
transparency for consultations 
Ongoing debate on how to enhance the role of national parliaments 
Ongoing debate on how to cut ‘red tape’  
New appointment of First Vice-President of the Commission to control 
proposals for S & P, signalling that processes may be reformed to become 
more rigorous  
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PART IV. CONCLUSIONS 
13. By groups of policies 
In the conclusions that follow we consolidate the broad findings of 
the Reviews by groups of policy. Key points from the evidence are 
summarised in Table 1.  
For the core single market policies, namely the four freedoms 
plus competition and external trade policies, there is generally 
strong UK support for the EU’s competences, except for 
reservations over the free movement of people. While the UK 
unequivocally backs the single market only for goods, services and 
capital, the rest of the EU insists that the integrity of all four 
freedoms together is fundamental and an untouchable red line (on 
which more below).  
All four freedoms demonstrate importantly different 
characteristics. For the free movement of goods the EU system has 
in effect reached a state of maturity, following substantial reform 
measures adopted in the 1990s to lighten the harmonisation process 
in favour of a high degree of mutual recognition, under the 
leadership of the British Commissioner at that time, Lord Cockfield. 
For the free movement of services the system is still far from 
complete, and the UK is at the forefront of those pushing for 
stronger effective EU measures to eliminate contradictory national 
regulations, so here the reform agenda remains very much open. For 
financial markets there has been a continuing process of drastic 
reform in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, starting with the de 
Larosière report, which set the reforms off to a remarkably fast start, 
and remain ongoing. The UK’s City interests have so far been 
adequately protected, which would cease to be the case in the event 
of secession.  
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Table 1. Summary of Balance of Competence findings 
Sector of policy Competence question 
Core single market policies  
Single market overview  Strategic priority for UK; widespread 
support for EU competence 
Free movement of goods Key 1992 reform: mutual recognition & less 
harmonisation 
Free movement of services UK interests in enhanced EU policy, 
including digital sector 
Free movement of capital Major reforms since the 2008 crisis; UK City 
interests protected 
Free movement of persons Benefits and costs contested within UK; 
curbs proposed (not crossing EU red line?) 
Competition/consumer 
policy  
Competition policy strongly supported, 
consumer policy nuance. 
External trade and 
investment 
EU competence vital; no good alternatives 
outside EU 
  
Sectoral policies  
Transport EU competence supported, UK leading role 
in shaping policy 
Agriculture Severely criticised, but policy gradually 
reformed over decades 
Fisheries Severely criticised, but radical reforms 
achieved in 2013 
Energy UK increasing energy importer, driver for 
enhanced EU policy. 
Environment & climate  UK driver of EU policies; EU as amplifier of 
UK interests. 
Food safety, animal welfare EU harmonised approach essential; UK a 
driver of EU policies. 
Public health Limited EU actions useful, including inflow 
of health professionals. 
Digital information rights EU competence necessary; UK active in 
defining rapidly evolving priorities. 
  
Economic, monetary, social 
policies 
 
Economic and monetary 
union 
UK opt-out of both euro currency and 
coercive aspects of fiscal policy coordination 
Social & employment Divisive issue in UK; controversy over a few 
directives. 
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Taxation Limited EU competences useful; unanimity 
rule safeguards 
EU budget UK retains special rebate; achieves reform 
with real cuts for future  
Cohesion Competence for some regional solidarity 
supported 
  
Justice and home affairs  
Fundamental rights Divisive UK debate over European Court of 
Human Rights (i.e. Strasbourg, not EU) 
Civil justice UK opt-outs and opt-back-ins, flexibility 
suiting UK legal system 
Police and criminal justice UK opt-outs and opt-back-ins, flexibility 
suiting UK legal system 
Asylum, non-EU 
immigration 
UK opt-out of Schengen, and selective opt-in 
arrangements on asylum 
  
Education, research, 
culture 
 
Education ‘Erasmus generation’ a transformative 
achievement 
Research & space UK major beneficiary of EU projects; big 
science achievements 
Tourism, culture and sport EU niche activities useful; UK driver for 
sports governance 
  
External relations  
Foreign policy EU multiplier of UK interests; unanimity 
rule safeguard 
Development & 
humanitarian aid 
EU multiplier of UK interests; UK free to set 
own aid policy 
Consular services Budgetary pressures for rationalisation 
Enlargement Member states control whole process with 
unanimity grip; UK traditional supporter 
  
General  
Voting, statistics Present competences satisfactory 
Subsidiarity & 
proportionality 
New Commission appointment signals 
increasing priority 
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There is a large group of sectoral policies that are buttressing 
the single market, as well as pursuing their own specific policy 
objectives. These are all ‘shared’ competences, and the evidence 
shows that the detailed sharing between EU and national legislation 
is in most cases found to be broadly appropriate. This also fits with 
perceptions of the UK’s national interests, both in government and 
business circles. Several important sectors stand out as being of 
particular interest to the UK, notably energy, environment and 
climate change, financial markets, transport, the digital sector, and 
services in general. In all these sectors UK ministers and senior 
officials have played leading roles in shaping or reforming the EU 
policies in question. The evidence here is that the EU’s competences 
at the level at which they are defined in the treaties are not only 
uncontested; on the contrary it is widely considered – in both the 
UK and the EU as a whole – that stronger EU policies in these sectors 
are necessary. 
On the free movement of people, the arguments played out in 
current British political debate, in our opinion, need a sense of 
proportion, for three reasons. First, the evidence shows how 
immigration from the EU helps fill gaps in the labour market, with 
various striking examples such as the contribution of nurses and 
other health professionals from the EU to the functioning of the 
National Health Service, and to the UK building and construction 
sectors that are hard pressed to find the workers they need.  
Second, as regards tensions in society over problems of 
multiculturalism, the greatest concerns arise in non-EU immigrant 
communities, in particular those that have seen the radicalisation of 
young Muslims, with several hundred young British Muslims 
enrolling as ‘foreign fighters’ with ISIS in Syria. In the wake of the 
colossal Charlie Hebdo tragedy in Paris in January 2015, the common 
priority of European leaders is enhanced cooperation over security; 
by comparison problems associated with intra-EU migration, such 
as the capacity of schools to handle increasing enrolments, are of a 
second order.  
Third, as regards EU policies, the freedom of movement for 
people concerns the right to circulate and take up employment, and 
does not include the right to reside or to receive comprehensive 
welfare benefits on a non-contributory basis, as has recently been 
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confirmed by the European Court of Justice.39 This ruling does not 
support the stereotypical argument that the Court is an agent of EU 
‘competence creep’ since this decision clearly upholds national 
competences. Member states thus retain competence for 
determining the right to residence and thence details of what social 
security benefits can be extended to immigrants from other EU 
member states. The UK is not alone in wanting to tighten up on 
these national policies, which can be done without calling into 
question basic EU legal competences. Prime Minister Cameron set 
out his agenda on 28 November 2014 for further tightening the 
system to limit immigration without, however, breaching the 
cardinal rule of free movement of persons. It will take some time to 
clarify the extent to which these proposals can be implemented on 
the basis of existing national competences, or how far they will 
require more or less difficult negotiations with the rest of the EU.  
The broad single market sector, the four freedoms and 
sectoral policies make up a large proportion of EU legislation. The 
hypothetical alternative of national competences, for example for 
product safety and the prudential regulation of service sectors, is 
not a plausible prospect. National regulations would not necessarily 
be less demanding, but would have the serious drawback of 
allowing 28 variations that would effectively disintegrate the single 
market and permit reintroduction of protectionist technical barriers 
to trade. To be sure, there is debate about whether the EU produces 
too much red tape, to which we return below under the reform 
agenda.  
The broad domain of economic, monetary and social policies 
presents a much more varied story. The biggest issue here is the 
eurozone  system, which has undergone huge crises and systemic 
developments since 2008. The eurozone  system proved defective, 
and the response has been to reinforce eurozone-level competences 
with the setting up of the banking union and massively increased 
financial assistance to sovereign debtors in difficulty. There have 
also been reinforcements of the procedures and powers at European 
level to constrain budget deficits, which remains a highly contested 
matter.  
                                                        
39 Dano case, C-333/13, 11 November.  
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Yet this does not directly affect the British situation, since it 
has a permanent opt-out from the euro system, and the UK has been 
able to use its own macroeconomic and monetary powers to recover 
faster from the recession than the eurozone.  In fact, the UK might 
be described as having been able to take a ‘free ride’ on the 
eurozone.  More precisely, soon after the financial crisis of 2008 the 
UK saw a 20% devaluation of the pound against the euro which, 
combined with continued full access to the single market, may have 
helped it get back onto a positive growth path ahead of the 
eurozone. In the hypothetical absence of the eurozone there would 
have been a chaotic movement of intra-European exchange rates, 
with the UK unable to bank upon a simple devaluation against the 
rest of the EU.  
Of other items in this group of policies, the Review on taxation 
notes the EU’s limited but useful competences, and the safeguard 
that exists against ‘competence creep’, since all measures on 
taxation require unanimity.  
On the EU budget, there are two features of special relevance 
to the UK. The first is that over the years the UK has renegotiated 
the initially weak corrective mechanism adopted before the 1975 
referendum, and since Margaret Thatcher’s premiership a 
substantial rebate mechanism has been in place, which is guarded 
by its treaty status (i.e. it can only be changed by unanimous 
decision, and therefore with UK acquiescence). The second is that 
the UK negotiated hard to secure a reduction in real terms in the 
new 2014-20 multiannual commitments for the EU budget, which 
Prime Minister Cameron has marked up as an important reform.  
In the case of the cohesion (or regional) policy the case is made 
in the Review to restrict funding to poorer member states only, thus 
repatriating the competence for richer member states. This 
proposition has a rationale, but is not at present generally accepted 
by other richer member states, or by Scotland, Wales or Northern 
Ireland.  
As for social and employment policies, the UK has followed a 
zigzag path, opting out of the Social Chapter at the time of the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992, opting in with the Amsterdam Treaty in 
1997 with the Labour government, but resuming criticism of some 
pieces of labour market legislation under the present government.  
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In the field of freedom, security and justice the picture is 
dominated by opt-outs for the UK and Ireland, not only for the 
Schengen system of border control and visa policies, but also 
judicial and police cooperation in interior ministry affairs. The UK 
has managed to secure the agreement of the rest of the EU to have 
huge flexibility in choosing where it wants to opt back in to selective 
provisions of EU law. No other member state, except Ireland, is able 
to do this, and no accession candidate could possibly secure such 
terms. The rest of the EU is on a determined course to reinforce EU 
policies in the broad justice and home affairs domain, but the UK 
can stand aside from these except where it wants to join in, subject 
to the agreement of the rest of the EU. In the field of civil judicial 
cooperation the UK again has an opt-out, with the possibility to pick 
and choose in accordance with its perception of what fits sufficiently 
well with British legal tradition.  
The UK’s threat to withdraw from the European Convention 
on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg, while not directly a matter for the EU, would 
undermine the cause of human rights in wider Europe.  
The education and research nexus of policies sees clear successes 
for British interests in the EU, supporting its world-class university 
system and research capabilities. The UK attracts a high number of 
students to its universities from the rest of the EU under the 
Erasmus programme, and wins more competitive EU-funded 
research contracts than any other member state except Germany. 
For some of the EU’s relatively minor competences, such as for 
aspects of public health, culture and international sport, the findings are 
that the EU is performing a valuable supporting role, without 
challenging the major responsibilities of the member states in any 
way.  
The evolution of EU foreign and security policies is broadly seen 
as a ‘force multiplier’ for UK interests and values, with the wish 
expressed for it to become more effective. At the same time the 
unanimity rule for decision-making guards against UK concerns 
about ‘competence creep’.  
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The evidence at a glance – by sector  
UK key interest in deepening broad single market domain 
UK driver of policy development in many sectors (external trade, services, 
energy, climate, environment, food safety, digital) 
Several other sectors clearly beneficial for UK (research, education, public 
health) 
On immigration from the EU, national action can control for ‘benefit 
tourism’ without challenging free movement 
Foreign and development aid policies as ‘multipliers’ of UK interests 
Major opt-outs where policies not in UK interests (euro, Schengen, etc.) 
14. By reform, renegotiation, or repatriation  
As regards the three stated categories of possible action - reform, 
renegotiation, and repatriation – the following conclusions emerge. 
Reform. The reform agenda – past, present and future – is 
shown by the Reviews to be extensive in virtually all areas of policy. 
In justifying his switch of position on the EU to advocacy of 
secession in 2013, Lord Lawson declared that the EU was 
“unreformable”; a position also adopted by the spokesmen of the 
UKIP party.40 This does not fit with the evidence, however. Maybe 
even more surprising for British public opinion: the evidence shows 
that UK negotiators in EU affairs, both at political and senior official 
levels, have a remarkable track record of leading policy reform or 
improvement across many sectors. The serious problems for the UK 
in agricultural policy mainly arose because the ground rules were 
negotiated before the UK’s accession. By contrast, the UK’s policy 
influence since accession in 1973 has been very substantial, 
comparing favourably with any other member state. This is 
illustrated in several sectors, including cases where the UK and 
others see the need for enhanced and not diminished EU policies, 
such as energy, climate change, service sectors, financial services 
and the digital sector, among others. A notable past example was in 
the early 1990s when the single market was advanced by adoption 
of seminal concepts such as ‘mutual recognition’, which lessened 
the burden of harmonising regulations.  
                                                        
40 “It’s Time to Quit”, The Times, 7 May 2013. 
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Two notoriously controversial sectors, agriculture and fisheries, 
have undergone significant reform along lines advocated by the UK. 
Reform of agricultural policy proves to be a decades-long process, 
and one that has to go on. The ‘butter mountains’ are no more, 
however. This represents reforms achieved since the 1990s from 
production support to income support. The burden for the EU 
budget remains considerable, but has nonetheless declined from its 
75% share of the total in 1985 to the 36% planned for 2014-2020. For 
fisheries the reforms decided in 2013 are a sharper and more 
immediately effective correction of past problems, represented most 
clearly in public opinion by the anomalous policy of ‘discards’ of 
fish back into the sea, which has now stopped alongside other more 
basic reform measures. 
On another source of British discontent: certain labour market 
and social policies see an increasing trend towards ‘soft law’, i.e. non-
binding peer pressure such as in the Lisbon Strategy for 2000-2010, 
followed by the Europe 2020 programme for the following decade. 
Here the reform agenda has increasingly followed British ideas 
favouring a flexible labour market, or concepts of ‘flexicurity’ (i.e. 
combinations of flexibility and security; a term first advocated by 
the Danish Prime Minister).  
There remains the live debate about whether the EU is 
managing its regulatory work and responsibilities as efficiently as it 
might, or whether it is producing too much red tape. For an 
independent view on this question the Commission invited 
Edmund Stoiber, Prime Minister of Bavaria, to chair a High Level 
Group to advise it on how to reduce regulatory burdens.41 This 
report made various recommendations, including for setting a net 
target to reduce regulatory costs, for a ‘one-in one-out’ constraint on 
setting new business regulations, and to exempt small and micro 
businesses “where appropriate” from various regulations. While 
                                                        
41 High Level Group on Administrative Burdens (chaired by Edmund 
Stoiber, former Prime Minister of Bavaria), “Cutting Red Tape in Europe – 
Legacy and Outlook”, Final Report, 24 July 2014. The main report is 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/refit/admin_burden/ 
docs/08-10web_ce-brocuttingredtape_en.pdf 
Full information on the work of the group and annexes to the final report 
is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/smartregulation/refit/ 
admin_burden/high_level_group_en.htm 
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these kinds of overarching proposals may be attractive politically 
they risk (in our opinion) proving too simplistic to be operational, 
and cannot dispense from the hard grind of assessing the details of 
masses of legislation item by item.  
The Stoiber report commented positively on current 
developments as follows:  
With the new approach of Smart Regulation and the 
launch of the REFIT Programme, President Barroso and 
the Commission as a whole have initiated a fundamental 
change in the EU law-making process. I believe that this 
re-direction, which has led to a change of working 
methods within the Commission, is a real quantum leap”.  
While this comment may be a little on the over-optimistic 
side, there is little doubt that the campaign to cut Brussels red tape 
is gaining traction.  
In particular, the new Juncker Commission, starting in 
November 2014, charged its First Vice-President explicitly with 
controlling respect for the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality.  
This will give a boost to the Commission’s ongoing work 
under the REFIT heading (Regulatory Fitness and Performance 
Programme), which aims at a simple, clear and predictable 
regulatory framework, to simplify legislation so that the policy 
objectives are achieved at the lowest cost and with respect for the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.42 Under REFIT, the 
Commission is screening the entire stock of EU legislation on an 
ongoing and systematic basis to identify burdens, inconsistencies 
and ineffective measures and to set out corrective actions. Its current 
work programme identifies a dozen priorities (listed in Box 6). 
These are mostly small items, and irritants more than anything else, 
but to weed them out responds to widespread popular demand. 
 
 
 
                                                        
42 European Commission, “Regulatory Fitness and Performance 
Programme (REFIT): State of Play and Outlook”, COM(2014) 368 final, 
18.6.2014. 
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Box 6. Administrative Burden Reduction Plus Programme (ABR+): 
priority simplifications 
- Simplified accounting/auditing for SMEs 
 - Exempt micro enterprises from accounting directives 
 - Simplifying notification system for shipments of waste  
 - Limitation of documents procurement procedures 
 - Fewer respondents for statistics on intra-EU trade  
 - Reduced reporting on industrial production  
 - Lesser requirements for electronic invoicing 
 - Reduce foreign language burdens for VAT refunds  
 - Exemptions from tachograph rules for SMEs  
 - Fewer ‘documents on board’ in transport sector 
 - Simplified egg labelling 
Source: European Commission. 
 
For perspective, the complaints about the burdens of EU 
regulations have to be assessed alongside the more general issue of 
red tape originating at national as well as EU levels. It should be 
recalled that whenever there is a food safety crisis, such as in the 
horsemeat scandal of 2013, the conclusion tends to be that national 
implementation of EU regulations needs to be reinforced, and not 
that EU regulations should be abandoned. Even more dramatically, 
the financial crisis of 2008 demonstrated the grave inadequacy of 
national regulatory policies in this area. 
A related complaint heard in public debate is that the EU 
accounts for an excessively large share of legislation adopted by 
national parliaments, and figures like 75% are sometimes loosely 
spoken of without identified sources. The House of Commons has 
conducted a thorough study on this point, however.43 This is a 
difficult statistical matter, since single acts of legislation can range 
in importance from the state budget to technical regulations about 
the labelling of foods, and much EU legislation is in this second 
category. Subject to these important qualifications the House of 
Commons study concluded: “In the UK data suggest that from 1997 
to 2009 6.7% of primary legislation (Statutes) and 14.1% of 
                                                        
43 “How much legislation comes from Europe?”, House of Commons 
Library, Research Paper 10/62, 13 October 2010.  
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secondary legislation (Statutory Instruments) has a role in 
implementing EU obligations, although the degree of involvement 
varied from passing reference to explicit implementation”.  The 
study also shows how there was a high peak in EU-based legislation 
during the 1980s and early 1990s when the single market was being 
completed, and since then the numbers have declined by two-
thirds. 
The heaviness or lightness of touch of regulatory systems 
varies greatly between EU member states, and the UK is often at the 
lighter end of this spectrum. The EU’s regulations in the 
employment and social policy field have not prevented the UK from 
having one of the most liberal labour markets, as does Denmark, 
which is at the top of world rankings for the quality of its economic 
and human development. By contrast, Belgium and France are 
among the member states whose labour markets are regulated in 
the most burdensome manner. Data illustrating these divergences 
are provided by the World Bank’s ‘ease of doing business’ 
rankings.44 Broadly speaking, the member states are grouped in 
three categories, most of northern Europe with high rankings for 
‘ease of doing business’, France, Spain and Belgium in second 
category of much less ‘ease’, with Italy and Greece coming in a third 
category (alongside Belarus and Russia). 
Of the countries mentioned above, those in the top and 
middle categories are all law-abiding member states, implementing 
the same EU laws seriously. Yet the economic impacts of their 
overall regulatory regimes are quite different, as the small example 
of three architectural practices in Box 7 vividly illustrates with 
regard to the cases of Britain, Belgium and France. 
The crude argument that ‘Brussels red tape’ is suffocating the 
economies of the UK and the whole of the EU into stagnation is 
hardy convincing therefore. Clumsy national regulatory policies in 
the countries ranked in the middle and lower categories above, 
coupled to systemic problems in the eurozone system, are more to 
blame for the ongoing stagnation of the eurozone. 
 
                                                        
44 www.doingbusiness.org/rankings, World Bank, June 2014. 
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Box 7. A cosmopolitan London narrative 
A young boutique architectural practice in London, specialising in 
projects of high artistic value, employs 28 architects, of whom one-
third are British, with nine other EU nationalities making up the rest, 
together with three ‘tech-savvy’ Asians. Average age, early 30s. The 
British founders of the company recently met a couple of their 
professional counterparts in Paris and Brussels. While their London 
practice has grown rapidly, Paris and Brussels remain stuck at 
around five architects.  
Why did London grow, when Paris and Brussels did not? The 
London office grew because it could tap into the entire European 
labour market for highly skilled and specialised young architects 
with zero bureaucracy regarding such things as work permits. The 
British labour supply would have been too narrow. But Paris and 
Brussels could do this too, were it not for other restraining factors. 
The first of these are onerous hiring and firing regulations that are 
poison in a fiercely competitive business where there has to be talent 
on board to prepare competitive tenders, but also the freedom to let 
staff go if the tenders don’t win. As for EU labour market laws: all 
three companies are law-abiding employers, but the London 
company does not find itself constrained by EU laws. Nor do Paris 
and Brussels, since they are really constrained by French and Belgian 
laws that go way beyond what EU law requires.  
The moral of this story is that freedom of employment in the 
EU labour market is vital for high-tech, creative service sectors on 
which London thrives, while national regulations in France and 
Belgium are problems for which the EU is not the culprit. But 
secession could mean immigration quotas and bureaucratic 
procedures for other Europeans to be hired in the UK.  
 
One proposal by Prime Minister Cameron is that reforms 
should be embedded in a new treaty. There are serious problems 
with this, however. As explained by Lord Hannay, this position is 
mainly advocated by two groups at opposite ends of the political 
spectrum: on the one hand those who would like to drastically 
reduce or ‘deconstruct’ the EU’s competences, versus those who 
would like to push on to a ‘fully-fledged federal Europe’.45 In 
                                                        
45 Lord Hannay, Europe Daily Watch, 13 November 2014 (available online). 
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between there is a large body of member states and political parties 
that do not see the need for another treaty, and are politically averse 
to the prospects of another hazardous ratification process.  
A further cautionary comment is due on Prime Minister 
Cameron’s hope for a ‘reformed EU’. Any broad reform process 
embracing a wide range of policies, such as for the EU or a national 
government, are complex operations with mixes of short, medium 
and long-term measures. To use more precise and realistic language 
the objective can surely be for ‘a significantly reforming EU’.  
Renegotiation. The UK’s first act of renegotiation took place 
shortly after its accession on 1 January 1973 under Edward Heath’s 
Conservative government. In the general election of February 1974 
the Labour Party promised a renegotiation of the terms of accession, 
to be followed by a referendum to confirm membership. 
Negotiations centred on the UK’s net contributions to the budget, 
which were high because it benefited relatively little from the 
agricultural policy. A so-called ‘corrective mechanism’ was agreed, 
and the referendum was carried with a 67% Yes vote in June 1975. 
However, this mechanism proved to be ineffective, and 
subsequently Prime Minister Thatcher, in November 1979, sought 
better terms under her negotiating slogan “I want my money back”. 
A much more effective abatement mechanism was agreed, and 
guaranteed by inscription in the treaties. The mechanism has 
subsequently been amended, with extension to other member states 
that argued that they also were making excessive contributions. The 
corrective mechanism is inscribed in a treaty-level act (Own 
Resource Decision), whose content is therefore guarded by the 
unanimity rule.  
More remarkable, in the area of Schengen, justice and home 
office affairs, it has secured not only a block opt-out, but also the 
right to opt back in where it wants to, as shown in the course of 2014 
when it opted out of 133 such measures and then opted back in to 
35 of them. On the other hand, the government certainly does not 
want to opt out of the single market and related sectoral policies, or 
from EU foreign policy where important decisions are taken by 
unanimity.  
Overall, this leaves little scope for meaningful renegotiation. 
The flexibility that the UK requests in its relationship with the EU is 
thus already a reality on a grand scale. With its important opt-out 
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from the eurozone, the UK has been described as “having the best 
of both worlds”,46 i.e. to be fully in the single market while retaining 
flexibility over the exchange rate and monetary policy, which 
helped the UK to emerge from recession ahead of the eurozone.  
There remain two areas of high political controversy, namely 
the free movement of persons within the EU, where the Prime 
Minister has already set out his agenda for negotiation, and certain 
labour market rules, where some specific demands might be 
expected. It remains to be seen how these issues will be treated, 
bearing in mind that they are subject to serious divisions of opinion 
within the UK itself, quite apart from questions of negotiability 
within the EU.  
Repatriation. Finally, as regards repatriation the prime 
purpose of the Balance of Competence Review was to screen for 
those existing competences of the EU that should better be returned 
to the member states. In terms of precise legal concepts this meant 
first of all looking at the ‘competences’ of the EU as they are defined 
in the Lisbon Treaty. At this level the evidence is clear. In not one of 
the 32 reviews is evidence presented by predominant or even 
majority views to suggest that any existing competence should be 
deleted from the treaty. On the contrary, the predominant finding 
is that the competences of the EU are ‘about right’, and that they 
have often found a sensible balance, notably in the sphere of the 
shared competences between EU and national levels.  
This is before asking the question of whether a proposal to 
delete a competence from the treaty would be negotiable with all 
the other member states of the EU, given that this would require 
unanimity. On this point, there can be little doubt that unanimity 
would be elusive, since while enthusiasm for individual 
competences may vary between member states, all competences 
have support from numerous member states. For example, the 
Netherlands, which has adopted a position closest to that of the UK 
on a more rigorous application of the principle of subsidiarity, is 
explicit in not advocating repatriation of competences.  
This broad finding that the competences of the EU are ‘about 
right’ is because the actual system is far more sophisticated in 
                                                        
46 George Soros, 13 March 2014 (http://openeuropeblog.blogspot.be/ 
2014/03/book-review-george-soros-tragedy-of.html). 
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practice than much public debate would suggest over how it strikes 
the balance between EU and national powers. This is because most 
EU competences are ‘shared’ with, or simply ‘supporting’ national 
competences.  
The continuing processes of negotiation over the exercise of 
these competences provides for adjustments in the effective share of 
responsibilities. This is worked out as individual EU directives or 
regulations are defined. The legal basis at the treaty level may be 
fixed in simple terms, such as just naming ‘transport’ as a shared 
competence. But the reality is one of continuous evolution in the 
effective sharing of competences.  
At the second level of individual directives or regulations, the 
Reviews throw up instances where the case is made for their repeal, 
or more often their reform with less onerous implementation costs. 
Whether moves to repeal or lighten EU laws may be called 
‘repatriation’ or ‘reform’ is maybe a matter of opinion and to a 
degree an open semantic question. But it is still an important point 
for political debate, since ‘reform’, although a highly elastic term, is 
in principle an acceptable idea for all, whereas ‘repatriation’ is not. 
For present purposes we consider ‘repatriation’ to be about the 
deletion of competences at the treaty level. For all other sub-treaty 
changes to existing EU laws, either by repeal, amendment or new 
legislation, we may bundle them into the ‘reform’ category.  
 
The evidence at a glance – reform, renegotiation, repatriation 
Reform – abundant agenda across most policies. UK one of the most active 
drivers of reform 
‘Cut red tape’ now high on EU agenda, meets a UK demand; but multiple 
national regulations often more costly 
Renegotiation – not much scope, since UK supports broad single market, 
has opts-out of euro and Schengen, and flexible opt-out/opt-in agreement 
for justice and home affairs 
Repatriation - no evidence for repatriating EU competences as defined in 
Lisbon Treaty; precise sharing of most competences between EU and 
member states found to be broadly appropriate. Detailed application 
through individual directives and regulations can be adjusted. 
 
BRITAIN’S FUTURE IN EUROPE  187 
 
15. Contemplating secession47 
Secession is provided for in Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty (TEU), 
which says that a member state “may decide to withdraw from the 
Union”. It goes on to say that the Union shall negotiate an 
agreement with the seceding state to determine the terms of 
withdrawal and make arrangements for their future relationship 
(see Box 8). This sounds straightforward, and indeed much political 
debate in the UK talks of secession in simple terms. This is not 
realistic, however, since secession would be highly complex and 
hazardous. It would be more like a long and expensive divorce.  
 
Box 8. Secession procedure in Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty 
1. Any member state may decide to withdraw from the Union in 
accordance with its own constitutional requirements. 
2. A member state that decides to withdraw shall notify the 
European Council of its intention. In the light of guidelines provided 
by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an 
agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its 
withdrawal taking into account of the framework for its future 
relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in 
accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by 
the Council, acting by qualified majority, after obtaining the consent 
of the European Parliament. 
3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the state from the date of entry 
into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years 
after notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European 
Council, in agreement with the member State concerned, 
unanimously decides to extend this period. 
                                                        
47 Since hypothetical modalities and implications of secession are not much 
discussed in the reviews, this section relies on the assessments of the 
authors, with contributions by Adam Łazowski, who has published more 
detailed analyses in “Withdrawal from the European Union and 
Alternatives to Membership”, European Law Review, Issue 5, 2012, Sweet & 
Maxwell, and Withdrawal from the European Union – a Legal Appraisal, Elgar 
Publishing, 2015.  
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4. For the purposes of paragraph 2 and 3, the member of the 
European Council or of the Council representing the withdrawing 
member state shall not participate in the discussions of the European 
Council or Council or in decisions concerning it.  
A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 
238(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
5. If a state that has withdrawn from the Union asks to re-join, its 
request shall be subject to the procedure referred to in Article 49.  
 
The consequences of secession have to be assessed from 
several angles – legal, economic and political. 
Legal aspects. There is now a great mass of EU law that has 
entered the UK’s statute books. The fundamental legal question is 
what would happen when, to quote Article 50.3, “the Treaties shall 
cease to apply...” This would depend on the terms of the withdrawal 
agreement. While one cannot forecast what this might consist of, 
there are quite a number of legal points on which some substantive 
comment is possible.  
Secession would, from an internal point of view, first of all 
mean repealing the European Communities Act of 1972, which 
facilitates the direct application of EU law in the UK. The two main 
categories of EU laws, directives and regulations, have to be 
considered separately.  
For EU directives, it is in their nature that they will have been 
‘transposed’ into the national legislation of the UK. This means that 
their substantive content will continue to stand as UK law, and so 
in this case does not “cease to apply”, unless the UK decided to 
change or repeal the UK laws in question. Many such directives 
concern technical norms for products or for regulating service 
sectors. While this so far sounds a comfortable proposition, the UK 
would have to decide where it wanted to be in relation to the mass 
of single market law. Under the EEA option discussed further below 
the UK would keep all single market law on its statute book. 
However, if it chose instead to be more selective in deciding which 
of its UK laws implementing EU directives it would continue with, 
it would face the loss of guaranteed access to the single market.  
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As for EU regulations, these are directly applied by EU law 
on actors in the member states, subject to enforcement by national 
courts and interpretation by the European Court of Justice. This 
body of law would clearly cease to apply, except to the extent that 
the UK had in any case enacted its own autonomous laws to 
supplement EU regulations. But to set out clearly and operationally 
what this would mean would be a major task of legal research, 
which has not been undertaken. For the single market there are 
many regulations and directives, so again the UK would have to 
choose whether to reinstate such regulations wholly or only 
selectively; in the latter case there would be the same risks for 
continued access to the single market.  
Overall, this would be a huge task of combing through all the 
existing stock of EU directives and regulations in order to decide 
what to retain and what to discard. The provision that the treaties 
would cease to apply at the latest two years after the request to 
secede looks implausible. It could be agreed to extend this period, 
as allowed for under Article 50.3, but the downside of this would be 
a continued state of legal uncertainty facing business in Britain. 
As regards the EU’s many international agreements, these 
would cease to apply as between the UK and third countries. The 
EU has 794 bilateral agreements (treaties) in force, and 251 
agreements with multilateral organisations. Since the UK would 
cease to be represented in all these agreements, it would have to 
decide whether to seek to clone the EU’s agreements for itself 
bilaterally, or to negotiate its own different agreements. This would 
mean that the UK would have negotiate afresh all agreements that 
are relevant for it, which would certainly include all trade 
agreements. The UK would remain a member of the World Trade 
Organisation, but would have to negotiate afresh any terms of its 
membership that might differ from those of the EU. The task of 
negotiation or renegotiating the EU’s bilateral trade agreements 
would be difficult because these have tended to become 
increasingly ‘deep and comprehensive’, which is reflected in the 
growing amount of complex regulatory matter that they include (for 
many service sectors such as finance, transport, business services, 
intellectual property rights, government procurement etc.). These 
agreements involve either, as in the case of the TTIP negotiations 
with the US, extremely complex and tough negotiations over 
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regulatory convergence or mutual recognition or, as in the case of 
neighbouring states in east Europe and the Balkans, a lot of reliance 
on EU law as the common model. How the UK would work out its 
own deals alongside the agreements made or being negotiated by 
the EU is not easy to foresee. The third countries would regard the 
UK as a useful but second-level trading partner compared to the EU, 
and would cut no quick and favourable deals with the UK that 
might as a precedent prejudice their major interests in securing the 
best deal with the EU. This brings us into the economic implications 
of secession more broadly. 
Economic aspects. A number of theoretical economic options 
can be described in relatively concrete terms, and these deserve to 
be spelt out in some detail since the stakes are so high.48 
Simplistic big-bang exit. Some people who have very strong 
feelings about wanting secession, and who have not studied the 
workings of the British economy inside the EU, may be attracted by 
the idea of ‘simply leaving’. This might be thought to mean an act 
of parliament renouncing the Act of Accession, and deleting from 
the statute book all legislation that has been required by EU 
membership. But it is inconceivable that any British government 
would do this, since it would put the British economy into a state of 
legal void on a grand scale: a ‘mad’ option. As mentioned above, 
there would have to be deep and no doubt long negotiations with 
the EU over the future relationship, and deliberations at home over 
what to do with the existing stock of EU legislation, and these are 
spelt out in more detail in the following scenarios.  
European Economic Area (EEA) membership. The least 
disruptive course would be to request accession to the EEA, thus 
joining Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. If this were to happen 
the UK would first have to accede to EFTA and its agreements with 
third countries. The EEA scenario would then mean retaining on the 
statute book all existing internal market regulations, as well as all 
future developments of EU laws in this area. In exchange the UK 
would retain guaranteed access to the EU internal market as if a full 
                                                        
48 The scenarios in this section have been carefully analysed in “The 
Economic consequences of leaving the EU”, final report of the CER 
Commission on the UK and the EU single market, Centre for European 
Reform, June 2014.  
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member state. A possible advantage is that the UK would, as a non-
EU EEA member, be entitled to negotiate its own foreign trade 
policies with the rest of the world, but whether the UK could secure 
better deals with trade partners than the EU, with its much greater 
bargaining power, must be open to doubt. The political 
disadvantage of this scenario is that the UK would have no say in 
the ongoing development of EU internal market policies and laws, 
yet would remain obliged to implement them. This is why Prime 
Minister Cameron said in his Bloomberg speech that he would rule 
out this option. 
Customs union, like Turkey. This is also a technically feasible 
option. However, it would in one respect be even more constraining 
than joining the EEA, since it would require the UK to continue to 
implement the common external tariff of the EU and to follow it in 
whatever would be decided in future international trade 
negotiations, either at the multilateral level in the WTO, or in 
bilateral trade agreements such as may be made with the US or 
Japan. This would contradict the typical secessionist position that 
the EU should go ahead alone to make even more liberal trading 
arrangements with the rest of the world than the EU. So this too is 
extremely unlikely to be favoured by any secessionist British 
government. 
The so-called Swiss option. Switzerland and the EU developed 
a complex set of bilateral agreements after the Swiss decided by 
referendum not to join the EEA. Yet the bilateral agreements have 
partly re-assembled the content of the EEA, albeit in a highly 
complex way and without an adequate institutional framework 
guaranteeing robust enforcement. The scheme has been seen as a 
more flexible version of the EEA, but in reality it has not worked so 
well. The EU objects to what it calls a ‘cherry-picking’ approach, and 
to avoid this insisted on a provision according to which termination 
of any single agreement falling under the so-called ‘Bilateral I’ 
package of several agreements would lead to the termination of the 
other agreements. These provisions are now in prospect since in 
2013 Switzerland voted to re-introduce quotas for immigration from 
the EU. Even before this happened, the EU had signalled its 
dissatisfaction with these arrangements with Switzerland, and so it 
is unlikely that the EU would be willing to replicate it with a 
seceding UK. 
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Simple WTO option. Here the UK would, as a WTO member 
state, revert to trading relationships with the rest of the world on 
the basis of the ‘most-favoured-nation’ clause. In the simplest case 
this could mean retaining the EU’s external tariff regime for the rest 
of the world; if the UK’s external tariff schedule were to be different 
this would have to be negotiated. In withdrawing from the EU and 
its customs union, the UK would also be withdrawing from all the 
EU’s existing preferential trade agreements, which in fact cover 
much of the world. But the advocates of secession are mostly 
advocating a more liberal free trade regime with the rest of the 
world than the EU practises today, which leads on to a final 
scenario.  
Radical free trade option. Advocates of the UK setting itself free 
to enjoy radically freer trade with the whole world than the status 
quo in the EU sometimes cite the models of Singapore and Hong 
Kong, which long ago adopted a zero-tariff free trade policy 
unilaterally with the whole world, as did Georgia in 2006. The UK 
would presumably be able to make a free trade agreement with the 
EU, but the question then would be how deep and comprehensive 
such an agreement might be. This would return to the content of the 
EEA and customs union options. If the UK did not join either the 
EEA or the customs union its exports would be subject to strategic 
uncertainty over the level of guaranteed access to the EU market, 
and with obligations to introduce ‘rules of origin’ procedures to test 
whether British exports had been sufficiently ‘made in the UK’ to 
qualify for free trade. The ‘rules of origin’ procedures are heavy 
bureaucratic formalities, costly to business, in outright 
contradiction of the objective to cut the burden of ‘EU red tape’: i.e., 
this would be adding red tape from which the UK is currently free.  
There is the question of whether a British government would 
really want to be much more liberal than the EU is today. The main 
case in point is China, since the EU already has made free trade 
agreements with Korea, Canada, and several Latin American 
countries; has preferential trade deals with most of Africa; and is 
negotiating with India, Japan, the US, Brazil (or Mercosur) and 
others. The only major economies with which the EU is not at 
present negotiating are Russia and China. As regards Russia, the EU 
would be willing to make a free trade agreement if Russia showed 
real interest in this, which it does not. As regards China, the UK 
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already imports from it five-times more than it exports ($10 billion 
exports, $52 billion imports in 2013). Would free trade with China 
risk UK industry being overwhelmed and devastated by the 
competition? Or might the argument be that China would see the 
UK as an attractive manufacturing base for the European market? 
This is highly unlikely for a UK outside the EU (or the EEA). The 
metaphor of the UK becoming an ‘off-shore aircraft carrier’ for 
foreign powers to attack the EU market is already being bandied 
about, and France would take the lead in preventing this. The option 
of free trade with China, combined with secession from the EU, 
would risk the worst of both worlds – devastating competition at 
home and exclusion from guaranteed access to EU markets.  
There is also the question of how interested other major 
players would be to make special free trade agreements with the 
UK. The US case is the most important one in this instance. The EU 
and the US are currently engaged in a very complex negotiation 
over the TTIP, which seeks to go deeply into regulatory matters for 
goods and services. Given the extreme difficulty that the US 
administration has in getting any free trade deals through Congress, 
it is unlikely that it would want to invest in a special deal with the 
UK, which would have to go over all the issues currently under 
negotiation with the EU. The US would be concerned not to make 
particularly favourable concessions to the UK that could then be 
used as precedents in their bigger bargaining stakes with the EU.  
This short review reveals several theoretical options for a 
seceding UK’s trading relationships with the EU and the rest of the 
world. But they all seem to be problematic, compared to remaining 
an influential liberal presence in the EU.49 In short, there is no good 
                                                        
49 No attempt can be made here to quantify the macroeconomic 
consequences of different scenarios. The only pretension to do so was a 
much publicised report, “The Europe report: A Win-Win Situation”, 
August 2014, commissioned by the Mayor of London, Boris Johnson 
(www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/europe_report_2014_08.pdf). 
The Mayor’s economist, Dr Lyons, presents four scenarios in his 
background report in www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/ 
europe_report_appendices_2014_08.pdf, with appendices in 
www.london.gov.uk/priorities/business-economy/vision-and-
strategy/the-europe-report 
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option for a seceding UK’s trading relationships. This may sound 
unduly pessimistic to secessionists. But no better scenario has been 
laid out for serious consideration. The reason is that Britain’s 
economic structure is deeply enmeshed in the European economic 
fabric of complex supply chains for goods and services, which 
depends upon seamless connections across national borders. These 
structures have developed as a function of both EU membership 
and geography, and are the foundations of the UK’s relative 
prosperity. While the physical geography will not change, the 
effective economic geography would. The only sound economic 
option for the secessionists would be to join the EEA, but that is 
rejected on political grounds. Why quit the EU but stay in the single 
market without a say in its future evolution, and without a voice in 
European foreign policy, when the UK already has opt-outs from 
the major policies it does not want to join: the euro, Schengen, much 
of justice and home affairs, and so on?  
Views of the business community. Business leaders also have no 
clarity as to which of the above scenarios might be chosen by a 
British government negotiating secession. However, they do have a 
clear view of the costs of strategic uncertainty about whether Britain 
would be in or out, and of the negative consequences of any 
arrangement other than continued full access to the EU’s internal 
                                                        
The four scenarios for the 20 years until 2035 were: i) ‘business as 
usual’, with a UK growth rate of 1.9% (i.e. continued member ship of the 
EU without major reform; ii) the EU with the UK undertakes major supply-
side economic reforms, with continued UK membership, resulting in a UK 
growth rate of 2.75%; iii) the EU and UK undertake the same reforms as in 
ii) but the UK secedes, and sees a slightly lower growth rate of 2.5%; and 
iv) a scenario in which the seceding UK becomes more protectionist, and 
sees a 1.4% growth rate. The report does not explain the basis for these 
estimates, with no indication of the supposed time-path, even for the first 
five years, for example. In the absence of basic professional information on 
the basis of these numbers, the paper would not have survived peer review. 
In particular, scenario iii) looks like a mere political assumption, with 
secession resulting in a still much improved growth rate, since this was 
used by the Mayor to support the view that the UK could have a good 
future either in or out of the EU, hence the ‘win-win’ in the title. 
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market. This is expressed in several opinion polls among business 
leaders as well as in the statements of individual business leaders.  
Of members of the Confederation of British Industries (CBI), 
71% felt in a poll conducted by YouGov and published in September 
2013 that membership of the EU had a positive or very positive 
impact on their businesses, whereas 13% felt that there was a 
negative impact. Seventy-five percent felt that secession would have 
a negative impact on foreign direct investment, and 86% felt that 
there would be a negative impact on their access to EU markets. 
Seventy-two percent of businesses felt that the UK currently has 
influence over EU policies that affect them.50  
A similar poll, undertaken by the Manufacturers’ 
Organisation, found that 85% of its members favoured continued 
membership of the EU, while a third of manufacturers said they 
would be less likely to invest in the UK.51  
A poll conducted by Ipso/Mori for TheCityUK of members in 
London’s financial sector, published in December 2013, showed a 
majority of 84% favouring continued membership of the EU, with 
only 5% advocating exit. Ninety-five percent said that access to the 
single European market was important to the UK’s future 
competitiveness, with 90% believing that exit from the single market 
and the EU would damage the UK’s competitiveness. Eighty-eight 
percent felt that EU membership economically benefits the UK as a 
whole.52 
These various polls all record overwhelming majorities, 
mostly in the range of 75-95%, in favour of remaining in the EU and 
its single market, and express concern for the damaging impact of 
secession for both domestic and foreign investment. Individual 
business leaders of both British and foreign enterprises are making 
personal statements along the same lines, with a sample listed in 
Box 9.  
 
                                                        
50 CBI/YouGov survey, September 2013. 
51 The Manufacturers’ Organisation, “Manufacturing: Our Future in 
Europe – Stronger Leadership, A Stronger Economy”, October 2013.  
52 TheCityUK, “UK and the EU – a mutually beneficial relationship”, 
December 2013. 
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Box 9. Statements by business leaders on the prospect of Brexit 
“I think Britain pulling out of the EU would be a blow to business, 
without question. From a business point of view it would be a mistake 
for the UK.” Willie Walsh, CEO of International Airlines Group, which 
includes British Airways 
“Being a member of the EU bestows the UK with multiple benefits. It 
is a very attractive place for investors, and not just in the financial 
sphere. If it splits with the EU, it’s not clear what benefits will remain. 
You cannot be sure what the relationship would look like.” Moritz 
Kraemer, Chief Sovereign Ratings Officer, Standard and Poors rating agency 
“You will see less manufacturing, less investment, and some US 
companies would look at the UK differently. Now they see it as a 
bridgehead to the rest of Europe.” Richard Cousins, CEO of Compass 
Group Plc 
“The UK is part of the European Union; that is very important. From 
the foreign investor point of view I hope that the UK will remain an 
EU member”. Toshiyuki Shiga, CEO of Nissan 
“I wouldn’t say we are relaxed, we regard it as a very big tail-risk to 
our business. Our people want to be in London. We would hate to pull 
it apart. Every European firm [in financial markets] would be gone in 
very short order”. Michael Sherwood, Vice-Chairman, Goldman Sachs 
“I do not believe the city’s pre-eminent position will survive if we lose 
our role as Europe’s financial capital. I don’t believe we can maintain 
that position if we are not part of the single market”. Gerry Grimstone, 
Chairman of TheCityUK  
“Europe is the bedrock of our international trade. We can trade with 
other countries of course. But with Europe such a big partner, it makes 
sense to continue that relationship while also trading elsewhere”. Sir 
Roger Carr, former President of the CBI 
“If we [the UK] were not within the EU, Siemens would make it quite 
difficult for me to continue to invest in those factories”. Juergen Maier, 
Managing Director of Siemens UK 
“Britain must not gamble on its future in Europe. The stakes are 
enormous. It is naïve to think we can pull up the drawbridge and carry 
on as usual. The debate has to move on to how we can make Europe 
work to support jobs, growth and higher living standards”. Terry 
Scuoler, CEO of EEF, The Manufacturers Organisation 
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The losses to the UK from secession would further extend to 
a number of policies beyond the single market. As the Reviews 
above showed, the sectors of higher education and scientific 
research would be hard hit. Today’s Europe of young professionals 
are the ‘Erasmus generation’, in which it is has become the norm for 
university students to spend at least a year on exchange in a 
university outside his or her country of origin. This has a profound 
impact on the attitudes of young Europeans, for whom a return of 
former closeted national perspectives is an absurd proposition that 
no-one wants. Moreover, the British university system has been the 
single biggest beneficiary of Erasmus, for two reasons: the English 
language as a necessary professional skill, and the quality of the 
university system. The EU’s research budget is now of substantial 
proportions compared to national research budgets, and has led to 
a very high degree of professional integration of Europe’s research 
communities in both the natural and social sciences. The UK has 
again been a prime beneficiary of EU research funding, with its 
research institutions achieving outstanding success in winning 
competitive research contracts. Secession would mean putting all 
this at risk, or at best placing the UK in the position of supplicant to 
obtain the best cooperation agreement possible from the EU, from 
the position of a second-class associate.  
Advocates of secession have to reflect on how tough would 
be the negotiations to obtain from the EU arrangements that would 
do the least damage to its interests in relation to the single market, 
and other programmes such as for education and research. There 
can be little doubt on the nature of the political context for such 
negotiations. The UK would be choosing a course of action that, 
while intended purely for the pursuit of its national interests, would 
mean inflicting grave reputational damage on the EU and the 
‘European project’ as a whole. The EU would be little inclined to 
grant to the UK special favours in exchange.  
Political implications. The foreign policy review contains 
assessments that the EU serves as a ‘multiplier’ of UK interests in 
the world, whereas outside the EU the UK would be regarded as a 
less significant actor in the world. Secession would therefore be a 
‘de-multiplier’ of these interests. While these are matters of 
subjective judgement, there is no doubt about the position of the US, 
whose importance to the UK would surely increase in the event of 
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secession from the EU. President Obama himself has politely but 
clearly stated that he values the UK as an influential member of a 
strong EU.53 Today the EU is represented in the UN Security 
Council by two permanent members, France and the UK. Both 
benefit from being broadly perceived by others to be representing 
Europe. For the UK this would be diminished by secession, and its 
position in the Security Council would be increasingly seen as an 
anachronism compared to the positions of Brazil, India, Germany 
and Japan, which have no such privilege. France, on the other hand, 
would be more clearly in a position ‘to speak for Europe’ there.  
The argument that the UK needs to give greater attention in 
its foreign policy to the rising powers is hardly contested. But the 
question is whether this would be hindered or helped by secession. 
There is a clear tendency among EU member states to pay more 
attention to the rising powers, especially China. Germany has been 
in the lead in building up its bilateral strategic relationship with 
China. There is nothing to prevent the UK from pursuing these 
interests bilaterally from within the EU, but every reason to expect 
that UK leverage in such relations would be diminished if it had no 
voice in EU affairs.  
The UK’s reputation and relationship with the rest of the EU 
should also be assessed. A seceding EU would be seen as delivering 
a devastating blow to the European ideal. And what is the European 
ideal? It has two pillars. The first was recognised in the Nobel Peace 
Prize awarded in 2013 for the EU’s historic, undisputed 
achievement in transforming the Europe of centuries of war into 
what political scientists call a “security community”, which is an 
area of zero-threat perceptions between the member states. For 
those who take this for granted, even now while observing the 
centenary commemorations of the First World War, one has to look 
no further to the EU’s immediate neighbourhood of Russia and 
Ukraine to appreciate what this means.  
                                                        
53 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “The president underscored 
our close alliance with the United Kingdom and said that the United States 
values a strong UK in a strong European Union, which makes critical 
contributions to peace, prosperity, and security in Europe and around the 
world”, 17 January 2013. 
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The second pillar concerns the values of democracy, human 
rights and the rule of law, to which the UK has made seminal 
contributions from the Magna Carta of 1215 through to the founding 
of the Council of Europe and its European Convention for Human 
Rights  and Fundamental Freedoms and European Court of Human 
Rights. British secessionists would like to withdraw from both the 
EU and obligations to respect rulings of the European Court of 
Human Rights. The rest of the EU would look on in dismay at this 
perceived undermining of fundamental European values, with 
approval coming only from the Kremlin, which would be quietly 
welcoming the disintegration of the EU.  
Finally, there is the issue of how British secession would affect 
the internal politics of the UK, and in particular relations with 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The political scenario for 
secession from the EU is that it would be led by the Conservative 
Party and its MPs from England, with support from the UKIP party. 
During the campaign leading to the Scottish referendum in 
September 2014, Scottish nationalists were clearly in favour of 
remaining in the EU. In the event of UK secession from the EU, it 
can be expected that Scottish nationalists would renew their 
demands for secession from the UK and at the same time seek to 
negotiate membership of the EU as an independent state. This is 
supported by opinion polls that show a larger degree of support for 
the EU in Scotland than in England.54 Following the September 2014 
referendum sensitivities between London and Edinburgh remain, 
notwithstanding the majority rejection of secession from the UK. 
The process of ensuring enhanced autonomy for Scotland remains 
a complex matter constitutionally and a highly charged one 
politically. In short, a referendum over the EU in 2017 or earlier is 
highly likely to aggravate the Scottish question. 
There are also sensitivities in Wales and Northern Ireland, 
most practically around the role of the EU’s Regional Development 
Fund. As the Review on cohesion reported above shows, there is 
opposition in Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland to the idea that 
                                                        
54 In the poll cited here, opinions in the UK as a whole were evenly divided 
over whether to remain in or quit the EU, whereas in Scotland there was a 
2:1 majority for remaining in (http://survation.com/poll-for-sky-news-
reveals-breadth-of-opinion-over-europe/). 
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the Fund be discontinued for the relatively rich EU member states, 
including the UK.  
Overall, the secession scenario would not be good news for 
trust between England and the other three nations of the UK. How 
damaging it would be is hard to say, but the risk of secession being 
poison to the politics of Northern Ireland and Scotland, each in their 
very different contexts, has surely to be taken seriously.  
 
The evidence at a glance - secession 
Legal aspects: procedures for secession exist, providing for a necessary 
withdrawal agreement. Would be a highly complex process of deciding how 
far to repeal statutes implementing EU law 
Economic aspects: a selective repeal of EU single market law would risk 
the loss of guaranteed access to EU market. Damaging impact on 
investment, in the views of overwhelming majority of business leaders  
Only risk-free economic scenario would be to join Norway in the EEA, but 
that would mean loss of sovereignty compared to status quo 
Political aspects:  loss of say in future of Europe. ‘De-multiplier’ of UK 
foreign policy influence in global affairs. US warns against this  
A referendum is likely to aggravate tensions between England and Scotland 
NB This topic of secession was not systematically treated in Reviews. The 
above conclusions are entirely those of the authors.    
 201 
APPENDIX  
BALANCE OF COMPETENCES 
REVIEW - SCHEDULE OF THE 
BRITISH GOVERNMENT’S WORK 
Each item involves publication of a report of around 40,000 words. 
Summer 2013 (published July 2013)  
1. Single market report (synopsis) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/call-for-
evidence-on-the-governments-review-of-the-balance-of-
competences-between-the-united-kingdom-and-the-european-
union 
2. Taxation 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/taxation-
report-review-of-the-balance-of-competences 
3. Food safety and animal welfare 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/call-for-
evidence-animal-health-welfare-and-food-safety-review 
4. Health 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/review-of-
the-balance-of-competences-health 
5. Development cooperation and humanitarian aid  
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/developme
nt-cooperation-and-humanitarian-aid-report-review-of-the-
balance-of-competences 
6. Foreign policy 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/foreign-
policy-report-review-of-the-balance-of-competences 
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Winter 2013 (published in February 2014) 
7. Single market – free movement of goods  
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/single-
market-free-movement-of-goods-report-review-of-the-balance-
of-competences 
 
8. Single market – free movement of persons (published in July) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads
/attachment_data/file/335088/SingleMarketFree_MovementP
ersons.pdf 
 
9. Asylum and non-EU migration 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/asylum-
and-non-eu-migration-review-of-the-balance-of-competences 
 
10. Trade & investment 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/review-of-
uk-and-eu-balance-of-competences-call-for-evidence-on-trade-
and-investment 
 
11. Environment & climate 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/eu-and-uk-
action-on-environment-and-climate-change-review 
 
12. Transport 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/eu-balance-
of-competences-review-transport-call-for-evidence 
 
13. Research 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads
/attachment_data/file/279331/bis_14_592_balance_of_compet
ences_review_government_reponse_to_the_call_for_evidence.
pdf 
 
14. Tourism, culture & sport 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/call-for-
evidence-culture-tourism-and-sport 
 
15. Civil justice 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/balance-of-
competences-review-call-for-evidence-on-civil-judicial-
cooperation 
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Summer 2014 (published in July 2014) 
16. Single market – free movement of services 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/review-of-
uk-and-eu-balance-of-competences-call-for-evidence-on-the-
single-market-free-movement-of-services 
 
17. Single market – financial services and free movement of capital 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/balance-of-
competences-review-single-market-financial-services-and-the-
free-movement-of-capital 
 
18. EU budget 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/balance-of-
competences-review-eu-budget 
 
19. Cohesion policy 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/review-of-
uk-and-eu-balance-of-competences-call-for-evidence-on-
cohesion-policy 
 
20. Social and employment policy 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/review-of-
uk-and-eu-balance-of-competences-call-for-evidence-on-social-
and-employment-policy 
 
21. Agriculture 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/agriculture-
report-review-of-the-balance-of-competences 
 
22. Fisheries 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/fisheries-
review-of-the-balance-of-competences 
 
23. Competition and consumer policy 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/review-of-
uk-and-eu-balance-of-competences-call-for-evidence-on-
competition-and-consumer-policy 
 
24. Energy 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/energy-
review-of-the-balance-of-competences%20 
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25. Fundamental rights 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/balance-of-
competences-fundamental-rights-review 
 
Autumn 2014 (published December 2014) 
26. Economic and monetary union 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/economic-
and-monetary-policy-review-of-the-balance-of-competences 
 
27. Police and criminal justice 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/police-and-
criminal-justice-review-of-the-balance-of-competences 
 
28. Information rights 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/balance-of-
competence-review-information-rights 
 
29. Education, vocational training and youth 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/education-
vocational-training-and-youth-review-of-the-balance-of-
competences 
 
30. Enlargement 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/eu-
enlargement-review-of-the-balance-of-competences 
 
31. Cross-cutting areas: voting, consular, statistics 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/voting-
consular-and-statistics-review-of-the-balance-of-competences 
 
32. Subsidiarity & proportionality 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/subsidiarity
-and-proportionality-review-of-the-balance-of-competences 
 
 205 
INDEX 
Agenda for Change, 156 
Agriculture, 34, 42, 87, 90, 
172, 203 
Alert and safeguard 
mechanism, 11 
Ashton, 152, 164 
Asylum and non-EU 
immigration, 138, 142 
Balance of Competences 
Review, 1, 39, 52, 61, 134, 201 
Banking Union, 8, 57, 59, 106, 
107, 110, 175 
Bar Council, 58 
Blue Card system, 140 
British Chambers of 
Commerce, 55 
Cameron, 7, 8, 9, 26, 39, 40, 
49, 61, 62, 65, 93, 128, 161, 
175, 176, 183, 184, 191 
Capital Requirements 
Directive (CRD), 58 
Carbon, 78, 79, 85, 89 
Carriers Liability law, 139 
Central and Eastern Europe, 
63, 161, 162 
Centre for European Policy 
Studies (CEPS), x, 53 
China, 31, 34, 35, 37, 74, 153, 
192, 198 
City (the), 9, 18, 26, 56, 57, 60, 
62, 124, 171, 172 
Civil judicial cooperation, 
130, 131 
Clegg, 94 
Climate change, 2, 24, 76, 78, 
80, 81, 82, 84, 85, 86, 115, 146, 
156, 164, 174, 178 
CO2, 85 
Coalition for a Digital 
Economy (CODEC), 27 
Cockfield, 45, 48, 171 
Cohesion policy, 114, 115, 
116, 117, 118, 119, 203 
Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), 87, 89, 90 
Common Consolidated 
Corporation Tax Base 
(CCCTB), 123, 124, 125 
Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP), 91, 93 
Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), 42, 
151, 152 
Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP), 151, 
152, 154 
Competition policy, 24, 27, 
42, 57, 65, 66, 67, 68, 168, 172 
competitiveness, 8, 9, 10, 74, 
79, 98, 118, 159, 195 
Confederation of British 
Industries (CBI), 195 
Connecting Europe Facility, 
78, 115 
Conservative Party, 39, 65, 
93, 128, 129, 130, 199 
Consumer Advisory Panel of 
the UK, 95 
Consumer protection, 42 
206  INDEX 
 
Copernicus programme, 147 
Cornish Fish Producers 
Organisation, 93 
Cotonou Agreement, 32, 156 
Council of Europe, 126, 128, 
129, 130, 136, 138, 199 
Council of Ministers, 92 
Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU), 7, 
21, 49, 52, 58, 59, 63, 64, 65, 
66, 102, 125, 127, 130, 131, 
132, 134, 137, 138, 167 
Croatia, 61 
Customs controls, 16, 50 
Customs union, 12, 14, 15, 16, 
17, 34, 41, 42, 50, 71, 191, 192 
Design Right, 50 
Digital sector, 27, 29, 55, 174, 
178 
Directives, 86, 113, 168 
Dublin Convention, 139 
Education, 23, 24, 41, 42, 53, 
142, 145, 150, 173, 204 
Enlargement, 158, 161, 173, 
204 
Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA), 83 
Erasmus programme, 20, 23, 
142, 143, 144, 145, 177, 197 
EU Chemical Agency, 84 
EU Delegations, 74, 164 
European Banking Authority 
(EBA), 56, 57 
European Commission, 2, 24, 
35, 47, 74, 75, 76, 77, 85, 102, 
156, 164, 169, 180, 181 
European Convention for 
Human Rights (ECHR), 126, 
128, 129, 199 
European Council, 7, 8, 11, 
57, 187, 188 
European Court of Auditors, 
121 
European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR), 126, 140, 
173, 177, 199 
European Credit Transfer 
and Accumulation System 
(ECTS), 144 
European Development 
Fund (EDF), 156 
European Economic Area 
(EEA), 15, 47, 62, 71, 90, 188, 
190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 200 
European External Action 
Service (EEAS), 156, 157, 158 
European Parliament, 58, 92, 
94, 96, 121, 131, 151, 158, 163, 
165, 187 
European Patents 
Convention, 50 
European Qualifications 
Framework (EQF), 144 
European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF), 
114 
European Research Area 
(ERA), 146, 148 
European Social Fund (ESF), 
114 
European Solidarity Fund, 
115 
European Space Agency 
(ESA), 147 
European System of 
Financial Supervision (ESFS), 
56, 59 
European Tour Operators 
Association, 149 
BRITAIN’S FUTURE IN EUROPE  207 
 
Eurovignette, 123 
Eurozone, 3, 9, 13, 26, 28, 41, 
42, 47, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 104, 
105, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111, 
119, 161, 165, 175, 182, 185 
ever-closer union, 8, 10, 11, 
40 
Exclusive competences, 41, 
42 
External Borders Fund, 140 
Faroe Islands, 94 
Federation of Small 
Businesses, 55 
Financial Transaction Tax 
(FTT), 122, 124, 125 
Fisheries, 42, 91, 94, 172, 203 
Food Safety Agency, 95 
Food safety and animal 
welfare, 95, 201 
Foreign direct investment 
(FDI), 18, 46 
Foreign policy, 36, 37, 42, 74, 
151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 161, 
173, 184, 194, 197, 198, 200, 
201 
Free movement of capital, 18, 
56, 172 
Free movement of goods, 18, 
23, 45, 48, 49, 51, 171, 172 
Free movement of people, 9, 
10, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 28, 60, 
62, 64, 65, 171, 174 
Free movement of services, 
18, 52, 55, 171, 172 
Freedom, security and 
justice, 42, 130, 131, 139, 142, 
177 
Fundamental rights 
(Charter of), 7, 125, 173, 204 
General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS), 69 
Grayling 
Chris, 13, 25, 128 
Greece, 106, 108, 140, 159, 
165, 182 
Green Paper, 67, 76, 93 
Habitual Residency Test, 63 
Health and Safety at Work 
Act, 112 
Hill 
Jonathan, 60 
Horizon 2020, 20, 23, 146, 147 
Human Rights Act, 127 
Immigration, 21, 22, 40, 61, 
62, 64, 65, 100, 127, 138, 140, 
141, 161, 162, 173, 174, 175, 
178, 183, 191 
Interest and Royalties 
Directive, 123 
Internet of Things (IoT), 100 
Japan, 8, 10, 21, 30, 33, 46, 70, 
96, 191, 192, 198 
Johnson 
Boris, 193 
Juncker 
Jean-Claude, 48, 60, 125, 
180 
Le Touquet bilateral, 22, 29, 
36 
Lidington 
David, 94 
Lisbon Treaty, 1, 11, 41, 42, 
44, 71, 77, 78, 100, 103, 111, 
126, 130, 131, 146, 148, 152, 
166, 167, 185, 186, 187 
Maastricht Treaty, 67, 111, 
131, 176 
Magna Carta, 129, 130, 199 
Mergers Directive, 123 
208  INDEX 
 
Minford 
Patrick, 14 
Monetary policy, 41, 42, 58, 
104, 110, 185 
Most Deprived Persons, 115 
Multiannual Financial 
Framework (MFF), 115, 116, 
119 
Mutual recognition, 32, 45, 
49, 51, 52, 95, 136, 141, 142, 
144, 171, 172, 178, 190 
Mutual Recognition of 
Professional Qualifications 
(MRPQ), 54 
National Farmers Union, 90 
Nobel Peace Prize, 198 
Non-euro member state, 8, 
57, 60 
Northern Ireland, 78, 88, 118, 
176, 199, 200 
Norwegian model, 12 
Obama 
Barack, President, 37, 198 
Opt-out, 3, 7, 36, 138 
Parent-Subsidiary Directive, 
123 
Plan A, 7, 12, 18, 26, 29, 36, 38 
Plan B, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 29, 
36, 38 
Police and criminal justice, 
173, 204 
Projects of Common Interest, 
78 
Public health, 41, 42, 53, 98, 
99, 100, 172, 177 
Qualifications Directive, 140 
REACH 
(Chemicals), 83, 84, 86 
Reception Conditions 
Directive, 140 
Reform, 24, 43, 178, 179, 186, 
190 
Regulations, 135 
Regulatory Fitness and 
Performance Programme 
(REFIT), 169, 180 
Renegotiation, 9, 32, 44, 114, 
120, 184, 186 
Repatriation, 9, 44, 72, 91, 
185, 186 
Research, x, 20, 23, 24, 42, 
119, 146, 173, 181, 202 
Royal Society for the 
Protection of Birds (RSPB), 89 
Russia, 27, 30, 31, 34, 35, 36, 
37, 96, 129, 153, 182, 192, 198 
Schengen, 3, 7, 13, 36, 44, 73, 
131, 139, 141, 142, 149, 164, 
173, 177, 178, 184, 186, 194 
Schengen Information 
System (SIS), 139 
Scotch whisky, 88, 98 
Scotland, 38, 83, 88, 118, 176, 
199, 200 
Secession, 12, 16, 17, 18, 21, 
25, 28, 29, 31, 36, 38, 44, 46, 
69, 72, 80, 86, 104, 110, 125, 
130, 154, 171, 187, 188, 192, 
197 
Senior European Experts 
Group, 90, 93 
Services Directive, 52, 150 
Shared competences, 42, 84, 
131, 138, 185 
Short Selling Regulation, 58 
Singapore model, 14 
Single European Act, 67, 81, 
166 
Single market, 7, 12, 15, 16, 
18, 19, 27, 41, 45, 46, 47, 48, 
BRITAIN’S FUTURE IN EUROPE  209 
 
52, 54, 55, 58, 60, 68, 70, 73, 
74, 77, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 
86, 88, 90, 91, 97, 112, 115, 
117, 122, 132, 133, 134, 153, 
160, 165, 171, 172, 174, 175, 
176, 178, 182, 184, 185, 188, 
194, 195, 197, 200, 201, 202, 
203 
Single Resolution Mechanism 
(SRM), 57 
Single Rulebook, 56, 57 
Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM), 57 
Social and employment 
policy, 111, 203 
Social benefits, 8, 10, 11, 64, 
65 
Sovereignty, 8, 48, 71, 151 
Space, 146, 147, 148, 173 
Sport, 148, 149, 150, 173 
Stakeholders, 67, 68, 159 
Strasbourg, 126, 128, 129, 130, 
173, 177 
Supply chain, 46, 50, 95, 194 
Supporting competences, 42 
Swiss model, 12, 18, 19, 71 
Switzerland, 71, 90, 191 
Taxation, 122, 123, 125, 173, 
176, 201 
Tax-Payers’ Alliance, 93 
Thatcher 
Margaret, 81, 85, 176, 184 
TheCityUK, 195, 196 
Tourism, 42, 53, 62, 74, 148, 
149, 150, 173, 178, 202 
Trade Mark, 50 
Trade policy, 42, 69, 70, 71, 
72, 88, 192 
Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS), 69 
Treaty of Rome, 52, 66 
Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union, 41, 151, 
187, 188 
Turkey, 71, 129, 159, 160, 162, 
191 
Turkish model, 12 
Ukraine, 198 
UN Security Council, 198 
Unanimity, 3, 43, 49, 122, 123, 
125, 151, 154, 155, 159, 162, 
173, 176, 177, 184, 185 
Unified Patent Court, 50 
Unitary Patent, 50 
United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP), 
93, 128, 178, 199 
United States 
US, 54, 154, 198 
Visa Information System 
(VIS), 139 
Wales, 88, 118, 176, 199 
Walsh 
Willie, 196 
Western Balkans, 153 
Working Time Directive, 99, 
100 
YouGov, 62, 195 
  
  
 
  
